RACE AND OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN VOLUNTARY OPPRESSION by Alavi, Roksana
RACE AND OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN
VOLUNTARY OPPRESSION
BY
Roksana Alavi
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy
and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.
                        
Professor Ann E. Cudd                       
Chairperson
Committee members Professor Thomas Tuozzo                           
Professor Anthony Genova                 
Professor Rex Martin                             
Professor Mehrangiz Najafizadeh       
            Date defended: 1/31/2008       
ii
The Dissertation Committee for Roksana Alavi certifies
that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
RACE AND OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN
VOLUNTARY OPPRESSION
Committee
                        
Professor Ann E. Cudd                       
Chairperson
Date Accepted: 3/27/2008      
iii
Abstract
In my dissertation I discuss voluntary racial oppression. In my view coercion
is not required for all oppressive situations. The psychologically oppressed,
internalizes the expectation of inferiority and becomes one’s own oppressor. This
theory of oppression can best explain the situation of racial minorities in the United
States. There are no laws discriminating against racial minorities. So, their oppression
is not externally inflicted.
I provide Sally Haslanger’s theory of race. I believe in this theory of race,
passing people are also victim of oppression. I discuss three harms of oppression:
violence, economic oppression and stereotyping, and show that they can be both
voluntarily and involuntarily inflicted. Although passing people are not victims of
direct harm, they internalize the negative stereotypes and become their own
oppressors. So, in order to end racial oppression, we ought to address both the
political aspects of having rights and bringing everyone to the threshold level of
functioning of capabilities.
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1One
Introduction
In this dissertation, I review current theories of oppression, show what flaws
these theories have, construct my own theory, and clarify how my theory of
oppression differs from them. In doing so I will give a new metaphysics for what
makes something oppressive. I will begin with Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities
approach as my basis for understanding oppression. For Nussbaum, capabilities are
foundations for basic political principles that on the nation-state level should
underwrite constitutional guarantees because granting each person dignity requires
that people be “able to do and to be”.1 Having the freedom and autonomy to exercise
one’s capabilities is to live a life worthy of sentient beings. My basic claim is that
underlying and justifying these constitutional guarantees is the fact that our
capabilities generate rights. Applied to the blight of oppression, the implication is that
if these rights are violated on the basis of group membership, persons are oppressed.
This contrasts with Nussbaum’s view, which asserts capabilities are a better way than
rights to assess whether a situation is oppressive. According to Nussbaum, the appeal
to rights does not fully capture the gravity of the oppressive situation. In my view
Nussbaum fails to develop the closer generative connection between possessing a
capability and possessing a right. If we make capabilities the basis for rights, then we
can solve several puzzles for a theory of oppression. Since some capabilities are more
                                                
1 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), p. 5.
2fundamental than others — e.g., the capability to maintain life — rights grounded on
those will be fundamental and violations of those rights will be most grave.
Furthermore, this theory gives us good reasons to reject spurious claims about
oppression. For instance it is senseless to say that unless men have the right to
abortion they are oppressed. In my theory, men do not have the right to abortion
because they do not have the potential way of functioning that entitles them to that
particular right.
Although this theory of oppression can be used to determine many kinds of
oppression, I will focus on racial oppression. Theories of oppression as applied to
race often ignore the subtleties of racial oppression in the society while claiming
equal treatment of races. Once the capabilities based theory of oppression is set out, I
will then consider current theories of race, give my stance on a theory, how current
theories of oppression capture racial oppression and how my theory will do so. I will
show that current theories of oppression do not adequately capture how racial
minorities can voluntarily oppress themselves. In the current study of oppression
there is a dichotomy of Blacks and Whites that leaves out other racially oppressed
groups. Although one cannot speak of racial oppression in the United States without,
at least, mention of African-Americans, I use Mexican-Americans as my paradigm
example of racial oppression. I chose to use the Mexican community as my main
example because that is a community that I have been living among since I started
writing my dissertation and because they make a good test case for a theory of racial
oppression. They make up over 85% of my students, and my community. I believe
3that is a good test group for two reasons; first, the current situation of U.S. political
debate on immigration and the immigrants’ rights directly affects the way we
stereotype that group, how we understand them as the “other” and the consequence of
the stereotyping in their social status. Second, those living south of the border have,
for centuries, been searching for self-identity. This debate continues as they migrate
north of the border and face their situation in the United States. It has been a
fascinating learning experience to see how people self-identify individually or in their
relation to others, and how the society racializes them. I should note that my theory
does apply to other oppressed groups. I do not claim that my theory is unique to any
particular racial group.
In chapter two I survey the dominant theories of oppression, mainly theories
given by Iris Marion Young, T.L. Zutlevics, and Ann E. Cudd. I will then give my
view and explain how it differs from the others, especially Cudd’s view given her
theory is closest mine. In Cudd’s view there is a set of criteria that all cases of
oppression share. Young argues that there is no unified theory of oppression. There
are “five faces of oppression.” They are exploitation, marginality, powerlessness,
cultural imperialism, and violence.2 She argues that there are no attribute or a set of
them that all oppressed people share. Different faces of oppression have different
attributes. She names different oppressed groups and sets to show us that these are
different kinds of oppressions, although we call those kinds, “oppression”. There is
                                                
2 Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in The Philosophical Forum, volume XIX, no. 4,
1988.
4no one thing that makes them all oppression. I agree with her in that the concept
“oppression” is manifested differently in different oppressive situations. However, I
argue that they all have some criteria in common (Young agrees) and I give these
criteria: systematic inhibition of their ability be it emotional, psychological or
physical, based on their group membership. So, although she believes there are
different faces of oppression, she argues, they still share some common
characteristics. As we will see in Cudd’s view there are, using Young’s terms,
attributes that all oppressed people share.
Zutlevics, on the other hand believes that there is a single theory of oppression
that can capture all kinds of oppression. According to Zutlevics an act is oppressive,
if it takes away “resilient autonomy”, which is having the security to live according to
one’s values and desires even if the external circumstances, such as political parties,
change.3 Although this view allows us to distinguish between oppressive and non-
oppressive behaviors, it does not give any background reasoning on why resilient
autonomy is universally important. At best, it is a correlation to, and not an
explanation of, what makes X Oppressive. Many cultures do not consider autonomy
valuable. Zutlevics does not answer these kinds of concerns. Although, I agree with
Zutlevics that there is one theory of oppression, I believe Cudd’s view takes us closer
to that theory.
According to Cudd there is one unified theory of oppression. She gives us four
criteria that are necessary and jointly sufficient for an action or an institution to be
                                                
3 T.L. Zutlevics, “Towards A Theory of Oppression,” in Ratio, XV 1 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
March 2002), p. 80, 88.
5oppressive. These criteria are, first, oppression has to include some kind of harm.
This harm could be physical or psychological; second, it must be inflicted due to
group membership; third, some people must benefit from the oppression; and lastly, it
must include some kind of coercion or force.4 According to Cudd, coercion is always
wrong and is what accounts for the injustice of oppression. In my view, the coercion
criterion is not necessary to explain the injustice of oppression. Often, more subtle
kinds of oppression are not coercive. Moreover, the oppression of a group usually
continues by voluntarily (non-coercive) acts of the oppressed members of that group
by internalizing the social expectations of them. It can nevertheless be identified as an
injustice on the basis of how oppression results from unjust constraints that do not
constitute literal coercion.
My theory differs in three others ways. First, my theory includes the
systematicity criterion. That is, for a group to be oppressed, there are many
interconnected factors involved to oppress that group. Second, to side with caution
towards those who are oppressed but our theory might not capture, I will hold that
these criteria are jointly sufficient and not necessary. Lastly, although not a flaw in
her view, Cudd’s theory of oppression lacks the metaphysics for injustice of
oppression. The metaphysics that I will propose, using Martha Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, will provide us with a metaphysics for our
theories of oppression. The capabilities approach also gives a basis for why resilient
autonomy is important and why its lack is associated with oppression. In summary,
                                                
4 Ann E. Cudd, “Oppression by Choice,” in Journal of Social Philosophy 25th Anniversary Issue, 1994,
p. 24-26.
6oppression is to have one’s capabilities systematically thwarted or taken away
(violation of one’s rights and unjustified harm) because of one’s group membership,
in order to benefit another group.
In chapter three, I will outline Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. I use
capabilities as grounds for my theory of rights, in which if violated based on group
membership, is oppression. This is the main contribution I am making to Cudd’s view
and to the literature on oppression as well as rights. Nussbaum and Sen argue that
there are certain human capabilities that ought not be destroyed or undermined.
Although Sen does not, Nussbaum gives us a list that she claims is a list of basic
human functional capabilities, some of which are crucial for participation in a
flourishing life, while others are necessary. However, Nussbaum does not limit us to
this list of capabilities. I should note that, naturally, not everyone will develop each of
his or her capabilities but each individual must have the opportunity to develop them
if so desired. The lack of such opportunity is an indication of social injustice.
I believe capabilities provide a better way than traditional theories of rights to
assess whether a society or its institutions are oppressive based on a society’s own
standards. So, if the government does not have the means to provide the society with
an education past high school, then people are not oppressed by their lack of
education, but they are perhaps poor. They may still be entitled to help but not
because people are oppressed. Oppression is a particular kind of harm but not any
harm done is oppression. However, they would be considered oppressed if the
government has the means but does not provide education for the citizens. In my view
7capabilities translate into rights. Hence, my fourth chapter.
In the fourth chapter, I will cover two topics: first, Nussbaum’s objections to
rights as the measure of standards in a society. Second, I will argue that rights are
generated by capabilities contra Nussbaum. Nussbaum argues that the capabilities
approach is a better way than rights to address injustices. She gives three reasons for
this. First, unlike capabilities, there are differing views on rights. Second, we are
justified to treat people unequally if that is needed to bring everyone to a level where
their capabilities can function. Third, as a pragmatic issue, rights are often looked at
as a “Western” idea but capabilities are not. So we are able to overcome the claims of
imperialism by those who commit the injustices. She adopts the talk of rights only to
bring about the idea of having the autonomy to choose which of our capabilities we
want to develop. I argue that individuals’ capabilities are the basis for their rights.
That no longer can be looked at as a Western idea but rather a universal human issue.
The goal of politics ought to include the protection and promotion of the
capabilities of each person. Such protection and promotion should be understood to
be part of what justice requires. Nussbaum uses the capabilities approach as an
alternative to the talk of rights. I believe that capabilities generate rights. That is, if
person X has the potential ability Y, then X must have the right to develop Y as long
as the development of Y does not violate others’ development of capabilities. With
this view of rights, people will have the right to political activism because we have
the ability to participate in politics. On the other hand, men do not have the right to
receive an abortion, because they do not have the potential way of functioning
8required for generating this right.
This view of rights is good for the following reasons: First, it gives us an
understanding of rights as natural rights without the problems of natural rights as
“god-given” or as epistemologically problematic. As Nussbaum pointed out, there are
differing views on rights. Some argue that natural rights are rights given by god, but
in the capabilities view, rights are granted based on individual’s capabilities
regardless of any involvement of a deity. On the other hand, one might argue against
natural rights altogether and argue for rights as civil rights. In that case, there might
be an epistemological dispute about which rights we should have. Rights based on
capabilities solve that problem as well, because my theory is very expansive and will
allow for future capabilities to be added to Nussbaum’s list. We are not going to limit
our capabilities to the limited understanding of what we have about human nature.
This takes me to my second point that is also a response to Nussbaum’s second
concern. I agree with Sen’s view on rights: rights-as-goals. So, each person only
possesses the rights that each person has the potential ability of pursuing. The
capabilities approach grants each individual rights to whatever she or he is capable to
do. The capabilities based theory of rights will give us an accurate study of
oppression in a particular society. Lastly, using capabilities as a basis for rights,
individual’s capabilities are basic for rights. This understanding of rights can no
longer be looked at as a Western idea but rather a human issue.
I will use my theory of rights and capabilities, to suggest some steps that we
can take in order to end racial oppression. However, I first discuss my view of race
9and in that context, I will make some suggestions. In chapter five, I will review the
essentialist versus non-essentialist debate about race and point to some problems that
are addressed in this debate. According to Anna Stubblefield essentialism about race
claims that physical traits of a person are a reliable source to determine one’s
abilities, characteristics, desires, religion, etc. Non-essentialism is the view that the
physical traits of a person are not such a reliable source. She argues that we should
accept non-essentialism because there are more genetic differences between the
individuals within one race, than there are systematic differences between races.
If non-essentialism is true, she asks, then how do we justify identifying with
our racial group in order to fight against oppression of our groups? Stubblefield sets
out to make consistent the non-essentialist view that she holds with the usefulness of
racial identification in order to unify against the oppression of our race – those that
we have some similarities with. I will aim to add to her view by introducing Sally
Haslanger’s view of race.
Further, Michael C. LaBossiere argues that it is not racial identification that
we should be united under, as Stubblefield suggests. We should identify with one
another under the label that we are categorized under and not necessarily with a
particular racial group in which we share some similarity, whether or not there we
identify with members of that group. For instance, in the Rio Grande valley the
Mexicans that have lived here for more than a generation and have been integrated
into the “White” community are frequently referred as “Whites” and they often self-
identify as more or less White. According to LaBossiere, they ought to unite under
10
the label that they are given, the “Whites”. An interesting observation is that they
resemble the non-White Mexicans, in appearance, just the same. I suspect these
people see race as culture. The White-Mexicans are those who have lost much of their
Mexican culture, and do not necessarily look White. In this community they are
labeled “White” but in another community they might be labeled “Brown Mexican.”
It is unclear how LaBossiere would resolve this kind of confusion besides the fact that
he argues that all those who have been given an oppressive label should identify
under the oppressive label to end the oppression.5 Surely, any group labeled in an
unjust way, could work to remove that label, as LaBossiere suggests, but it misses the
peculiar problems related to each labeled group. Although I think he has an
interesting view, it is unclear which one of the harmful labels given to us we ought to
unite under to fight our oppression. People often identify with a race by physical
appearance and perhaps ancestral background.
However, both Stubblefield and LaBossiere fail in telling us what they mean
by “race”? Is there a biological category “race” or is it a social construction? Is race
determined by the physical appearance? Ancestry? Geographic area? I believe once
we answer these kinds of questions we can then enter the debate about essentialism or
non-essentialism about race. Race has often been understood as one’s ancestral
background but one’s race becomes muddled if a person does not meet the “normal”
description of one’s racial background in appearance. The interesting case of Blacks
who were “passing” as Whites in the 30’s and 40’s comes to mind. They looked
                                                
5 Michael C. LaBossiere, “Racial Identity and Oppression,” in International Journal of Applied
Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 2, Winter 97, p. 37.
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White enough, so why were they taken to be Black? Although there are biological
reasons for one’s physical appearance, there are no other biologically interesting
differences between humans significant enough to affect our basic capabilities. To
some, ancestry seems to be sufficient for one’s determination of race. That is if one’s
ancestors are from Asia, then that person’s race is Asian. However, in a pragmatic use
of the term, “race”, people ordinarily use it to refer to one’s appearance. More often
than not minorities are victims of racial violence due to the way they look and not
what race they actually have. Haslanger argues that people are racialized by both
their appearance and geographical origin, and they benefit or harmed due to their
racialization.
Haslanger’s view of race could be further explained using Michael O.
Hardimon’s distinction between the concept of race and the conception of it. For our
purposes, we are going to be concerned with the conception of race. Conception of X
represents the concept of it. A concept can be represented “in a number of different
and competing ways. It is part of the idea of a conception that a conception represents
but one of a number of possible different and competing ways in which a given
concept can be articulated.”6 That is a concept can be interpreted or understood in
several ways. According to Hardimon, these interpretations or understandings are
“conceptions”. We are not going to be only involved in exploring the metaphysics of
race but also the conception of it – the way race is pragmatically used. This is
interesting because it is the conceptions of race (the way that we are racialized) that
                                                
6 Anna Stubblefield,  “Racial Identity and Non-Essentialism About Race,” in Social Theory and
Practice 3, 1995, p. 341.
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the oppressors use in order to minimize and thwart a group’s pursuits of capabilities.
In the concluding chapter, chapter six, I will, within my theoretical
framework, make some recommendations on ending racial oppression, some of which
are based on one’s rights and others beyond rights. I will discuss typical harms of
oppression (violence, economic oppression, and stereotyping), and suggest ways that
they could be voluntary (as well as involuntary) forms of oppression. These harms are
not mutually exclusive. In my discussion I will address the oppression, or its lack, of
those who are racially “passing”. I will argue that those who are passing, even if they
racially identify with an oppressed racial group, can be and often are victims of racial
oppression, although not in the same way. Internalization of expectation of inferiority
(self-stereotyping) could keep them in an oppressed situation.
13
Two
A Survey of the Theories of Oppression
Oppression has been traditionally understood to refer to loss of one’s freedom,
liberty, or capabilities due to active actions of those in power (government). Fifty
years ago, if asked, many would refer to Holocaust or slavery as examples of
oppression. Nowadays oppression includes a much broader understanding.
Oppression, as Iris Young contends, can refer to “systematic and structural
phenomena that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant” but rather
they could be found in everyday minds and actions of each citizen, some well-
meaning liberals, whether they know it or not.7 Examples of this would be hiring a
Mexican woman to clean our house or a Mexican man to mow our lawn.8 This is, at
least, an example of classism but perhaps racism as well. Whether or not these
Mexicans are oppressed is arguable. However, it is evident that they do not belong to
                                                
7 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 271. Consider this quote by Patricia Williams in support of
what Young means when she says that oppression is perpetuated in minds of liberals. Liberals
generally believe we should have neutrality among people of all races. That is, race ought not be a
determining factor in hiring or not hiring someone. However, according to Williams, “Race-neutrality
in law has become the presumed antidote for race bias in real life. With the entrenchment of the notion
of race-neutrality came attacks on the concept of affirmative action and the rise of reverse
discrimination suits. Blacks, for so many generations deprived of jobs on the color of our skin, are now
told that we ought to find it demeaning to be hired, based on the color of our skin. Such is the silliness
of simplistic either-or inversions as remedies to complex problems.” (Patricia Williams, The Alchemy
of Race and Rights  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 48). However, liberals are right,
if we lived in a world where race does not have any significance and never has had any significance.
8 I like to make two points: first, although we might pay the Mexicans well for their hard work, the fact
still remains that the status quo is being held. This group is here to do the work that seems to be
reserved for the poor Mexicans in the United States – there might be exceptions to this. It, at least,
keeps them in a less advantaged social status. The jobs they keep carry no power or prestige. Second,
this has been my experience in the state of Texas and Oklahoma. However, I make a more general
point and that is, the oppression of these groups might not even be intentional. We all continue to do
what we have always done. But here is a remedy. In a personal level, we could only pay them well,
educate and empower them to better their lives but in a political level, the government could make
venues to improve their qualities of life.
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the privileged group. The privileged group is a group that benefits from the
oppression of another group. So, to be in the privileged position, one is in a position
to benefit from the oppression of another. Mexicans might be generally willing to do
these jobs, but the fact that we hire them to do our chores continues the status quo.
They too are doing what the society expects of them. As Marilyn Frye reminds us,
many “of the restrictions and limitations we live with are more or less internalized
and self-monitored, and are part of our adaptations to the requirements and
expectations imposed by the needs and tastes and tyrannies of others.”9 There is no
need for forceful governments, tyrants or abusive spouses. We do what is expected of
us.
Women at the beginning of the second wave of the feminist movement
believed that once we have laws against discrimination, then we can rid ourselves of
sexism, racism, classism, etc., but Carol Pateman reminds us that social justice
requires much more than making laws. We can make laws against discrimination, but
it does not mean that social justice will necessarily follow.10 Perhaps when someone
from a racial minority group applies for a job, the application is not discarded when
the individual is present, or when a pregnant woman walks in for an interview, she is
not told that ‘we do not hire pregnant women’, but many in management positions
still have sexist or racist dispositions that could effect their decision-making, although
the job description might read, “we do not discriminate against anyone based on
                                                
9 Marilyn Frye, “Oppression,” in Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology, edited by Ann E. Cudd,
and Robin O. Andreasen (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 89.
10 Carol Pateman, “Feminism and Democracy,” in Democratic Theory and Practice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pages 204-217.
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religion, gender, race, etc.” Further, the fact that there is so little social mobility
between classes in our society is itself a sign that either people have accepted their
positions or that the society is set up so that it is extremely difficult for people to
make dramatic changes in their lives from the lives of their parents. Rich stay rich and
the poor stay poor.
The upshot is that oppression is much more subtle than we once thought. It is
“civilized”, as Jean Harvey puts it. Civilized oppression “involves neither physical
violence nor the use of law. Yet these subtle forms are by far the most prevalent in
Western industrialized societies.”11  In order to better understand our society, we
ought to have the theoretical framework by which we can recognize all kinds of
oppression, including those that are not prima facie categorized as such, and those
that do not have any one specific oppressor. We might find that most of us participate
in oppression of others or ourselves in ways that are quite harmful to them or us.12
Perhaps this identification would help in ending the attitudes that cause them. Hence,
my choice of dissertation topic.
In this chapter I survey the dominant theories of oppression, mainly theories
given by Iris Marion Young, T.L. Zutlevics, and Ann Cudd. I will then give my view
and explain how it differs from the others, especially Cudd’s view since her theory is
one that is closest to one I will offer. According to Cudd and Zutlevics’s view there is
a set of criteria that all cases of oppression share. Young, on the other hand argues
                                                
11 Jean Harvey, Civilized Oppression (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), p. 1.
12 Harvey in her book, Civilized Oppression, gives a very interesting discussion of humor as a tool that
oppressors use. She reminds us that having a sense of humor is highly prized as a virtue, although in
many contexts, for instance where there is a power difference, it is a way of oppressing the one that the
joke is about (see pages 8-16).
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that there is no unified theory of oppression. I will start with her view.
Iris Marion Young
According to Young there are five “distinct structures or situations…[or]
categories [of oppression:] exploitation, marginality, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and violence.”13 Exploitation is the kind of domination that occurs
“through a steady process of transfer of the results of the labor of some people to
benefit others.”14 Mexican-Americans’ cheap labor is essential in many parts of the
United States in different industries, such as farm-workers or cleaning personnel.
Without their cheap labor, it is hard to imagine if we could continue enjoying current
prices of available goods. In many parts of the United States the law enforcement
officials have cracked down on illegal immigration, and some farmers have a hard
time finding people who can do the work well and affordably. Some farmers worry
that they might have to stop farming because of this new situation. Working in farms
is hard work that requires skills. However, because Mexicans are an exploited group,
their labor is not monetarily rewarded regardless of their immigration status.15 They
do the work cheaply and we benefit.
                                                
13 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 271.
14 Ibid., p. 278.
15 I should note that the guest-worker program would not solve this dilemma for the farmers. They will
not be able to pay minimum wage, keep the cost of food low and keep their farms running. Some have
suggested that even if the guest-worker’s program is initiated, there will still be a need for illegal
immigrants to work for smaller wages than those who have work permit and are entitled to receive
minimum wage.
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Marginalization: most racial oppression is marginalization and not
exploitation.16 Marginalization is when “[a] whole category of people is expelled
from useful participation in social life, potentially then subject to severe material
deprivation and even extermination.”17 Moslem women, who wear hair-covering, in
my view, are one of the most marginalized groups in our society. It is hard for them
to acquire employment because of people’s stereotypes about them.18 That leaves
them in a more impoverished situation. Although their family members might be
financially well off, the women themselves are not. They are kept on the fringes of
social power, which takes us to the next face of oppression, powerlessness.
Powerlessness “describes the lives of people who have little or no work
autonomy, exercise little creativity or judgment in their work, have no technical
expertise or authority, express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or
bureaucratic settings, and do not command respect.”19 This goes back to the example
of the Mexican workers. My experiences with those on the bottom of the social class
category has been such that they are amazed if you treat them with respect and take
them seriously as people and not merely as workers. They, for the most part, expect
nothing and feel unsure about how to express themselves. Often their relationships
with those that they identify with are not awkward or limited but in relation with
                                                
16 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 280.
17 Ibid., p. 281.
18 In a panel given in a Women’s Studies class at the University of Kansas, one Moslem woman said
that it is hard to get any job at all. She had applied at about 30 places, anywhere from retail, to fast
foods, to secretarial work and she had been unsuccessful. However, she pointed out that it is somewhat
easier for professional Moslem women (doctors, nurses, etc.) to find suitable employments.
Considering most people who go to college start working at retail shops or fast foods to support
themselves, this puts the young Moslem women in a marginalized position. The panelist was a young
college student who had experienced that firsthand.
19 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 283.
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those they perceive to be their social superior, they feel as though they have no
power. They find themselves intimidated and unable to express themselves or
influence the situation in any way.
Cultural imperialism “consists in the universalization of one group’s
experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm” and is given preferential
treatment.20 Cultural imperialism is most obvious in a society like ours that places
minority culture in an inferior status to the majority (White) culture. Again consider
the Muslim woman who presents herself as such by appearance. She is not very likely
to get the job if the proper way of dressing for a job interview is a suit. Dress codes
are often culturally decided upon, but what makes the issue interesting is that in a
diverse society as our own, the preferred dress code is Western attire. As a society,
we prefer a suit to a Sari (Indian women’s traditional dress). The Western way of
dressing is considered appropriate and dignified. Taking a look around the world we
see the trend of people changing their traditional attires in exchange for jeans, t-shirts,
business attires, etc. This represents wealth and class.21 Consequently, all minorities
who expect to have careers are forced to put aside their customary attire and conform
to the socially accepted ways of dressing as professionals in the United States.
Last in Young’s list is violence. This category refers to the groups that “suffer
the oppression of systematic and legitimate violence. The members of some groups
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 285.
21 That is a sign of cultural imperialism and is oppressive even though the oppressed do accept it as
their own. The developing countries (or their immigrants to the West) do accept the Western
appearance as superior to their own. As a young child in Iran, I was fully aware that everyone I knew
ridiculed many of the traditional ways of dressing in Iran (not Islamic attire) to be the look of an
“uneducated peasant” and the Western attire as “classy and respectable.” That is a vivid example of
internalization of cultural inferiority.
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live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their
persons or property, which have no other motives, but to damage, humiliate, or
destroy the person.”22 Women have always been victims of domestic and sexual
violence. Women victims of violence constantly fear random attacks because the
perpetrators are not usually predictable. Further, women often fear being raped.
Women often live with the knowledge that they, or someone they know will be victim
of sexual assault. Most women, most of the time, fear being raped if walking after
dark, be it walking from a class to the dorm room or from the parking lot to one’s
apartment. This is both emotional and physical violence. Examples of this face of
oppression are far too many to mention here but I will name only a few more;
Homosexuals, Moslem men, Jews in Germany during the time surrounding WWII
and the African-American men in the United States who are attacked by the police
without much provocation are all examples of violence. African-Americans are more
likely to be victimized the police than any other race.23 This is clear to anyone who
keeps up with the national news. After the Twin Tower attacks, Middle-Eastern men
have also been victims of violence by the local or federal police or their neighbors.
Lastly, homosexuals are beaten, ridiculed, humiliated or even killed due to no other
reason but their sexual orientation. Recall the case of Mathew Shepard who was
beaten and left to die tied up to a fence in a cold Wyoming night, after leaving a bar
                                                
22 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 287.
23 David Jacobs, and Robert M. O’Brien. “The Determinants of Deadly Force: A Structural Analysis of
Police Violence,” in The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 103, no. 4. (The University of Chicago
Press, January 1998). This article points out that the cities with a Black mayor see a reduction in the
rate of killings of Blacks by the law enforcement officers.
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with two young men who offered him a ride.24 All of these are examples of violence.
Some people cannot safely walk the streets, travel in the airports, leave a bar, or
accept an invitation for a late night walk because they expect unprovoked violence.
According to Young, there is no single criterion or set of attributes by which
we can describe oppression (or unify these five categories). Each of these is different.
Each is the result of different circumstances that cause each group to be oppressed.
To come up with a set of attributes (criteria), we are, according to Young, reducing all
oppressions to merely one category and losing the important subtleties that each
entails. Further, we might leave out groups that are oppressed by reducing oppression
to one unified theory.25 Alison Bailey agrees with Young that oppression is not a
“unified phenomenon” because each group experiences it differently. The “felt
experience of oppression of a working-class white woman, for example, will be
different than the felt oppression experience by a middle-class African American
male.”26 Accordingly, this difference in perspective counts for more than a feeling.
She points out that the perspective of the victim will give him or her an authority to
speak of one’s experience. The perspective of an Auschwitz survivor on racism will
be different than an African-American’s living in Detroit. Surely this perspective or
feeling might be different but it does not entail that there is no unified theory of
oppression. Two people can read the same book and have different feelings or
perspectives about it or see it from different background. I think Young recognizes
                                                
24 More on the story can be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Shepard.
25 Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). p.
42, 63.
26 Alison Bailey, “Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye’s ‘Oppression’,” in Journal of Social
Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 3, Winter 98, p. 106.
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this, although she does not acknowledge it. I will show that Young does have some
general criteria for oppression.
First, Young claims that we can generalize that “all oppressed people share
some unjustified inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and
express their needs, thoughts, and feelings.”27 Certainly she is not reducing one
oppression to another but she gives us one single criterion that is necessary for all
oppressed groups to share. That does not mean that anyone who has an inhibition of
ability to develop one’s capabilities is oppressed, but that this criterion must be
present.
In addition to this criterion, she lists two more. She claims that oppression
also “refers to systematic and structural phenomena.”28 This I call the systematicity
criterion. Oppression also refers to “structural phenomena that immobilize or reduce a
group.”29 Oppression is the systematic inhibition of a group “through a vast network
of everyday practices, attitudes, assumptions, behaviors, and institutional rules.
Oppression is structural or systematic.”30 Marilyn Frye agrees that there are many
situations and forces that work together in order to oppress a group.31 Consider this
quote by Judith Andre: “A single assault – even murder – is not oppressive, for there
are many categories of human evil besides that of oppression.”32 As mentioned
oppression is a particular kind of harm done to a group because of their membership
                                                
27 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 271
28 Ibid., p. 271.
29 Ibid., p. 273, emphasis added.
30 Ibid., p. 275.
31 Frye, Oppression, p. 84-86.
32 Judith Andre, “Power, Oppression and Gender,” in Social Theory and Practice: An International
and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 11, Spring 1985, p. 114.
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in that group and that harm is done in a systematic way. Patty might be victim of
murder because the murderer hates women. However, if this is an isolated event in an
isolated situation, it is not oppression, although it is a grave harm and certainly a
crime. The systematicity criterion is the ongoing acts of harm done on a group. I
agree with Andre that no particular person or plan is necessary to keep oppression
going, although, as Frye points out, none of the forces of oppression are accidental or
occasional.33 These kinds of harms often happen, some people make them happen as
much as they can, and if no particular person or group is aware of this, it is still not
accidental. According to Cudd, we do not even need a group that is knowingly doing
the oppressing, just as long as each person is doing what he or she does to keep the
status quo, the systematicity criterion is met.
Given this list of conditions that has to be there for oppression to exist, Young
contradicts herself when she says: “Because different factors, or combinations of
factors, constitute the oppression of different groups, making their oppression
irreducible, I believe it is not possible to have one essential definition of
oppression.”34 However, it seems that the only way to understand her position is to
say that oppression will entail, at least, (1) inhibition of capabilities, (2) this inhibition
is systematic, and (3) this inhibition of capabilities is done based on one’s group
membership. These are to be present in all the categories (faces) of oppression that
are named above. Once the situation is recognized as oppression, we can decide
which of the five mentioned above are happening. As Zutlevics, Cudd, and I agree,
                                                
33 Frye, Oppression, p. 85; Andre, Power, Oppression, and Gender, p. 114.
34 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 276.
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although there are some criteria of oppression, the concept “oppression” is manifested
differently in different situations. Young does not persuade us otherwise. So, we are
on our way to giving a unitary and universal set of conditions for an action to be
oppressive. As we will see in Cudd’s view, there are, using Young’s terms, attributes
that all oppressed people share which include some but not all of the criteria that
Young talks about.
T. L. Zutlevics
Unlike Young, Zutlevics believes that there is a single theory of oppression
that can help us identify all kinds of oppression; “By identifying those underlying
features which render a situation oppressive, we are less likely to miss categories of
oppression not included in Young’s list of five.”35 Zutlevics argues, “to be oppressed
is to be unjustly denied the opportunity for what [she calls] ‘resilient autonomy’ [RA,
hereafter]”, which is having the security to live according to one’s values and desires
even if the external circumstances, such as political parties, change.36 She adds that
being denied resilient autonomy is a sufficient condition for oppression and not a
necessary one.37  Zutlevics asserts that resilience exists if the following two
counterfactuals hold: first, “resilient autonomy exists if, and only if… were S to
decide to change her life [plans] then she would not be unjustly constrained from
doing so. Second, [S has resilient autonomy if] any change in external circumstances
                                                
35 T. L. Zutlevics, “Towards A Theory of Oppression,” in Ratio XV 1 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
March 2002), p. 82.
36 Ibid., p. 80, 88.
37 Ibid., p. 85.
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…would not present an unjust impediment to S’s living in accordance with her values
and desires.”38  In the first case, S changes her values based on her own decision, but
in the second, she does not. So, according to Zutlevics, one ought to have the
opportunity to live a resiliently autonomous life. She adds, however, that RA can
justly be taken away. For instance, by jailing criminals we take RA away from them
but that is justified (assuming laws are). So, the mere fact that there is a lack of RA,
does not mean that the person is oppressed.39 Consider her example.
Person A receives an unjust parking ticket. According to Zutlevics, it is not
oppression if it has no long-term harm, no financial burden, it is not a part of an
intimidation campaign, the individual is not physically harmed, and it does not alter
one’s life goals or plans. ‘Life plans’, according to Zutlevics, “refers merely to what it
is that a person broadly wants to do in and with his or her life, not some inflexible or
unchanging set of goals.”40 So, as far as one’s general goals in life are not altered, due
to receiving this unjust ticket, the person getting the ticket is not oppressed because
RA has not been violated. Getting a parking ticket, although unjust, Zutlevics claims
is an isolated event and does not lead to any other instance of injustice nor does it
make the person who received it to change his or her life plans.41 So “to be oppressed
is to suffer serious or pervasive injustice”, supposedly those resulting from lack of
                                                
38 Ibid., p. 88.
39 Ibid., p. 84.
40 Zutlevics, Relational Selves, Personal Autonomy and Oppression, p. 425. She borrows this
definition from Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (London:
Croom Helm, 1986), p. 8. This definition, if explored in more detail, might fall into a circularity
problem. According to Zutlevics, oppression is lack of resilient autonomy. Having resilient autonomy
is changing or keepings one’s life plans as one choose. Suppose one’s life plan, broadly, is not to live
an oppressive life. So, oppression is not living an oppressed life, which is circular. It is mere
tautological or conceptually empty.
41 Zutlevics, Towards a Theory of Oppression, p. 83.
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RA.42 So it seems that she believes that oppression is lack of RA that leads to a
“serious or pervasive injustice” but we are not told what that might be.43
There are several issues to be dealt with in her view. First, a slight change in
the scenario will make the parking ticket oppressive. Suppose due to the unjust ticket
she received, she has to park four blocks away, which means she has to leave for
work sooner, which means she will lose the time she spent with her family at
breakfast. Although this is not a grave situation, it is a particular way that she has had
to change her life, (not life plans as she defines it) although this change may not be
pervasive, it has made her life unnecessarily altered. Lack of RA entails that one’s life
plans are altered. Therefore, given Zutlevics’s definition of RA, her RA has been
taken away. When an individual’s RA is unjustly taken away or constrained there is
oppression. The single act of unjust treatment (for instance being victim of a crime,
although an isolated event) could force one to change one’s life plans to a point where
they are completely altered. In such case, Zutlevics will have to agree that some
pervasive injustice is done. She has not altered her personal goals but is no longer
able to live according to her values. Since getting an unjust parking ticket could lead
to unjust violation of RA and so oppression, it will be extremely difficult to
distinguish injustices due to crime, personal misfortunes, or accident, from
oppression. My example does not change the analysis of her case but it points out that
there are crucial distinctions between crime, accidents, and oppression, which her
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 84.
43 Something can be pervasive or not depending on the person. I believe that Zutlevics should give us
an account of objective pervasiveness.
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view does not capture. Our theory of oppression must pick some particular kind of
injustice. Perhaps Zutlevics will argue that all ‘serious or pervasive injustices’ that
unjustly takes away RA are oppression. But this falls into the problems of reduction
that Young is concerned with and that is reducing oppression to just any pervasive
harm. I disagree with this formulation of oppression. I believe that oppression is a
particular kind of injustice done systematically on a social level based on a group
membership.
Unlike many scholars of oppression such as Frye, Cudd, and Young, Zutlevics
does not have a group membership criterion in her theory of oppression.44 That is,
individuals can be oppressed as long as their resilient autonomy is unjustly taken
away or the means are not provided for people to make resiliently autonomous
choices. It would seem that a person who has been robbed is, in this account,
oppressed, because one’s RA is taken away. Supposing that this is an isolated event in
an isolated situation, it is not clear why Zutlevics would say this is oppression.
Oppression is a particular kind of social / political injustice.  To say that any
event that makes one change her life plans (as lack of RA entails) is oppressive is
subjective and consequently it would be hard to distinguish injustices caused by
random unfortunate events from acts of oppression. This problem alone undermines
many racial, religious, sexual, class, or age, oppressions and minimizes the harms
done to the oppressed.  For instance, it would imply that a group that is the victim of
gender oppression is the same as a White, heterosexual, wealthy man who is the
                                                
44 Cudd, Oppression by Choice, p. 25; Frye, Oppression, p. 87; Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p.
273.
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victim of theft. In this case, he might change his life goals and values because he feels
now that, he too can be a victim. Although we do not want to deny that he is victim of
a crime, it should be noted that he is not the victim of oppression.  He might have to
make life plan changes in order to prevent this kind of harm again. It would be
trivializing to label both this event and slavery, oppression. Certainly there is some
harm involved but they are different kinds of harms. I do not believe that the lack of
RA is a sufficient condition for oppression, because, as I have shown, there are cases
in which RA is violated, that are not cases of oppression, although there is harm done.
At best we could conclude that at times the unjustified denial of RA points to an
oppressive situation. However, we are not sure what those times are or when RA can
be justly taken away.
In summary, lack of RA as the criterion for oppression picks anyone in the
society that has experienced a life-changing harmful event. This is too broad.
Sometimes there are events in one’s life, that leads to one’s change of life plans, but
that are not oppressive.
Further, this theory does not account for more subtle cases of oppression,
namely, psychological oppression.45 Often times, the oppressed internalize the
expectations of their oppressors and make those expectations their own. In such cases,
not uncommon, the oppressed become their own oppressors and believe the decisions
that they make are their own authentic choices, although they are indeed the
oppressors’ decisions. So, the oppressed might not “feel” oppressed although they are
                                                
45 I will say more on psychological oppression later in this chapter.
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oppressed. These cases are not, and I do not believe they can be, addressed by
Zutlevics’s theory, because RA has not been taken away.46  The psychologically
oppressed will not know there is another way to be, and if presented with other
choices, she might reject them. One, who suffers from false consciousness, might
change her life, if the political environment changes, but she will not see it as a threat
to her autonomy.47 Zutlevics, rightly, does not look for a rigid set of goals in life that
are uncompromising. She looks at our goals as more broad. So, not any change of life
is a sign of lack of RA but only those that force individuals to change. In the case of
the psychologically oppressed, they often argue that they are not forced to choose the
lives that they lead but rather their decisions are authentic ones.
On a final point, even if this theory of oppression allows us to distinguish
between oppressive and non-oppressive behaviors, it does not give any background
reasoning on why resilient autonomy is so universally important. At best, it is a
correlation to, and not an explanation, of what makes X oppressive. Many cultures do
not consider autonomy valuable. We must address why having RA is important and
why its lack is a sign of oppression. Zutlevics does not answer these kinds of
                                                
46 Recall the definition of RA, which is having the security to live according to one’s values and
desires even if the external circumstances, such as political parties, change (Zutlevics, Towards A
Theory of Oppression, p. 80, 88). Given this definition of RA, a person who is psychologically
oppressed would still be able to live according to his or her values and desires, although they may not
be authentic ones. We are left to say that there are no cases of psychological oppression. Perhaps she
has another way to explain psychological oppression but lack of RA does not account for it.
47 Cudd makes the distinction between empirical theory of coercion and moral theory of coercion. The
former claims that a situation / person is coerced only if she feels coerced. The latter suggests that
although she might not feel coerced she is coerced because she is denied some right (see Cudd’s
Oppression By Choice, p.  26, 31). I agree with her that we are concerned with the moral (objective)
theory of coercion and not how one might feel about her situation. This same distinction should be
made in the case of oppression. That is we ought to make distinctions between empirical and moral
cases of oppression. Someone who is psychologically oppressed does not consider herself oppressed
although objectively she might be. This is the study of oppression that is philosophically interesting.
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concerns. Although, I agree with Zutlevics that there is one theory of oppression, I
believe Cudd’s view takes us closer to that theory. I now turn to Cudd’s theory.
Ann E. Cudd
According to Ann Cudd, there is one unified theory of oppression. She gives
us four criteria for oppression that are necessary and jointly sufficient. These criteria
are, first, “oppression must involve some sort of physical or psychological harm…”48
Harm could be either justified or unjustified. An imprisoned convicted criminal is
harmed but the harm done is justified. Therefore, it is not the kind of harm that is
oppressive. Oppression is always a harm but not any harm done is oppression.
Oppression is a harm that unjustly limits one’s “freedom or choice relative to other in
one’s society.”49 If everyone in a society is harmed in the same way for the same
reasons, that harm is not one that would indicate oppression. For instance, if no one
had access to running water, including the government, then those people are not
oppressed. Not having access to running water is harmful but, in itself, it does not
show oppression of any particular people in a society. Hence, Cudd’s second criterion
of oppression.
Second, harm must be inflicted to a social group due to their membership in
that group by another social group. A social groups is one that individuals belong to
“independently of their oppressed status… [one] that they closely identify with, so
                                                
48 Cudd, Oppression by Choice, p. 25.
49 Ibid., p. 25. Emphasis added. I believe harm is violation of some capability. I will explore
capabilities in the chapter three.
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that the harm attaches to their very self-image.”50 -- For instance, race, gender, sexual
orientation, or religious groups. Unlike in Zutlevics’s view, for Cudd, individuals
cannot be oppressed as individuals but only as members of a particular group. A
White heterosexual man who has been robbed is not oppressed but he is certainly a
victim of crime and harmed. However, if society systematically targets that group for
robbery, then we can say that he belongs to a group that is harmed because of his
group membership and is oppressed. Every member of an oppressed group is
oppressed although in some cases it might be hard to see. For instance, Condoleezza
Rice may seem like she is not oppressed given her social status and political power,
but she is. She faces the same fears and limitation as all other (Black) women in less
powerful positions in society.51 Women fear being attacked, raped, or become victims
of sexual assault, regardless of the social status that they might hold. Being an
African-American woman she has barriers to cross that White women do not. In
short, although some people who belong to the oppressed group might not appear
oppressed, they nonetheless are.
Third, the social group that is doing the oppressing must benefit from the
                                                
50 Ibid., p. 25. I should note that sometimes people belong to groups that they do not identify with. For
instance, one might belong to the group of Black women but not closely identify with that group.
51 We can argue that she is victim of “tokenism” which is, according to Suzanne Pharr, “a method of
limited access that gives false hope to those left behind and blames them for ‘not making it.’”
(Homophobia: A Weapon of Sexism (California: Chardon Press, 1988), p. 62-63.) She can and does
contribute to the oppression of her group. Once we see Rice in one of the highest government officials
it gives us appearance of equality in our society and we wonder why all the others (women, Blacks, or
Black women) do “not make it”. We then blame them for their failure. See Lani Roberts, “One
Oppression or Many?,” in Philosophy in the Contemporary World, vol. 4, no’s. 1 & 2, Spring &
Summer 1997, p. 45.
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oppression. Cudd refers to this group as the “privileged group.”52 Not every single
member in the privileged group is actively and knowingly an oppressor but that they
all benefit from the membership in that group. The privileged group is a group that
society favors for respect, jobs, salary, government office, and many other benefits.
White, heterosexual men in our society certainly fit this description. The fact that the
United States has never had anyone but White men for president is a good indication
that our society favors White men and that they are the ones with power. The social
elite in this society is by far White men. “Although women make up almost half of
America’s labor force, still only two Fortune 500 companies have women CEOs or
presidents, and 90 of those 500 companies do not have any women corporate
officers.”53 The White heterosexual men, who fight for social justice and oppose
patriarchy, racism, or religious persecutions, do still benefit from the oppression of
minorities, whether they know (or desire) it. Cudd points out “typically cases of
oppression involve persons who reinforce the status quo social norms without thereby
intending to harm anyone else, or even without being aware that upholding the status
quo could harm others.”54 This could be any of us in any group who keep doing what
we are expected to do without challenging the system.55 For instance, we keep sexism
                                                
52 Ann E. Cudd, “Psychological Explanations of Oppression,” in Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide
to the Current Debate, edited by Cynthia Willett (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), p. 187-
216.
53 John Gettings, David Johnson, Borgna Brunner, and Chris Frantz, Wonder Women: Profile of
leading female CEOs and business executives. This data was gathered from the following website:
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/womenceo1.html
54 Cudd, Oppression by Choice, p. 25.
55 This parallels bell hooks’s view on feminism. According to hooks we live in a patriarchal society. To
be a feminist is to oppose patriarchy, which is to oppose our social system as a whole (see "Let's Get
Real About Feminism: The Backlash, the Myths, the Movement," in Ms. September/October, 1993,
pages, 34-43.
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alive and well when we keep the gender roles going without posing any serious
challenges to them. For instance, when any well-intending person buys my daughter a
pink dress or a doll, continues to engender in her what her socially accepted roles are,
roles that are set by a patriarchal society. Susan Stark takes this a step further. She
claims that we contribute to the oppression of African-Americans in our society by
living and paying taxes in a society in which the government is mainly made up of
white upper class men.56 If she were right, it would mean that African-Americans
contribute to their own oppression. Although this seems like blaming the victim, I
think she brings up an interesting challenge.
Lastly, oppression must include some kind of coercion or force. Coercion is
“lack of voluntary choice.”57 Cudd reminds us that we always have a choice, even
when we are mugged. We have a choice of giving up our wallet or risking our lives.
When we “choose” to give up our wallet it is not a free choice and therefore has a
different moral standing as a choice that is free. So, coercion is not “absence of all
choice, but a lack of the right kind of choice [voluntary choice].”58 According to
Cudd, coercion is always wrong and is what accounts for the injustice of oppression.
So, to say that oppression is an injustice, it has to be forced (or coerced). She adds, to
judge something (objectively) coercive it ought to be looked at from a moral
background rather than an empirical one. That is, we must ask, is X coercive because
                                                
56 Susan Stark, “Taking Responsibility for Oppression: Affirmative Action and Racial Injustice,” in
Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, 2004.
57 Cudd, Oppression by Choice, p. 27.
58 Ibid., p. 27.
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it denies someone a right that she or he is entitled to, or is someone feeling coerced?59
In the latter case, we will end up with a subjective account of coercion. As a result,
any situation where one might be faced with a hard decision would be coerced. Cudd
agrees with Robert Nozick’s account of coercion. That is coercion “should be judged
against a background moral theory that takes autonomy, as well as property rights,
seriously.”60 So, her account of coercion is backed with a rights based moral theory.
A Discussion of Cudd’s View
My theory of oppression closely parallels Cudd’s theory with some revisions.
First, I do not believe we need to consider coercion as always immoral to explain the
injustice of oppression. Certainly in the ordinary use of “coercion,” including Cudd’s,
a prisoner (murderer) is coerced: he is actively and intentionally forced to remain in a
particular place, perhaps for life, against his will. Although he has the right to
autonomy and his rights to live a free life have been violated, this violation (coercion)
is justified by the need to prevent his future attacks on others, and perhaps other
considerations as well.61 Cudd agrees that some kinds of harm are justified. So, the
presence of harm alone is not always a sign of oppression. She writes, “to make a
claim of oppression is to show that the harms involved are unjustified, or
                                                
59 Ibid., p. 27.
60 Ibid., p. 31. Cudd later (p. 33) points out that although this view is individuals coercing individuals,
institutions could do that too. That is, coercion is often inflicted by social institutions. For example, the
way the mining industry is set up and portrayed in our society, it is a “man’s” job. Women are
discriminated and verbally harassed when they work as miners.
61 Zutlevics makes a distinction between justified and unjustified inhibition of resilient autonomy. So,
there are times that we can justly force or coerces people or take their resilient autonomy away and we
do not commit an injustice.
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correlatively, to show that some harms are justified is to show that they are not
oppressive.”62 In my view of oppression, harm is normative and it is violation of
one’s capabilities. I believe the same can be said for coercion, that it is not necessarily
always wrong. We can make normative claims about both coercion and harm by
pointing out whether they are justified or not. Imagine a purse-snatcher who has been
caught by the police and forced to the ground. Surely he is both coerced and harmed
and both are justified in this case.
Therefore, I do not believe that the coercion criterion is a necessary element of
oppression. Often, more subtle kinds of oppression are not coercive. Consider cases
of psychological oppression. These are often cases in which there is no coercion or
force involved, individuals have the free choice to make decisions beyond the ones
they did make and so there is no lack of voluntary choice. The psychologically
oppressed become their own oppressors. The choices are perhaps politically available
to them, but they will not make choices other than ones that their society or culture
demands of them. Sandra Bartky defines psychological oppression as follows:
To be psychologically oppressed is to be weighed down in your mind;
it is to have a harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem. The
psychologically oppressed become their own oppressors; they come to
exercise harsh dominion over their own self-esteem. Differently put,
psychological oppression can be regarded as the ‘internalization of
intimations of inferiority’.63
The psychologically oppressed will not often consider themselves oppressed but in
essence they become their own oppressors and so participate in their own oppression.
                                                
62 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 23.
63 Sandra Bartky, “On Psychological Oppression,” in Femininity and Domination: Studies in the
Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 22.
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These people are not coerced or forced to make choices that are harmful, nor are they
forced to accept their inferior position. They believe that whatever their social or
political status is, they have freely and voluntarily chosen it, although their status is
one of inferiority. Using Marx’s terms, they suffer from false consciousness. Having
false consciousness, according to Bartky, is to be “Systematically deceived as we are
about the nature and origin of our unhappiness, our struggles are directed inward
toward the self, or toward other similar selves in whom we may see our deficiencies
mirrored, not outward upon those social forces responsible for our predicament.”64
That is, we are taught that if we are not happy with our lives, it is some deficiency
that we, as women, suffer from and it is not the social forces that keep us down. In
other words, the victims are blamed for their predicament. It is like telling a raped
woman that her clothing and smiles were “inviting” the rapist to rape her. This takes
the blame off the rapist and she comes to accept that the assault was indeed her fault.
A young woman in her late 20’s told me that she was embarrassed to tell her family
that she was raped when she was 14 because she could have done something about it
but did not. So, it would show that she is powerless.
The oppression of a group usually continues by voluntarily (non-coercive)
acts of the oppressed members of that group by internalizing the social expectations
of them.65 This is what Martha Nussbaum calls adaptive preferences, the situation
                                                
64 Ibid., p. 31.
65 Cudd asks us if we can voluntarily through rational choices oppress ourselves by giving us the Lisa
and Larry case (I will discuss the example shortly). However, she does not actually show that we can
voluntarily oppress ourselves. She argues that at best it appears that we have made a voluntary choice
in cases that our decisions leave us in oppressive situations. There is actually institutional coercion
involved. See Oppression by Choice, p. 35-41.
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where we make choices that are expected of us, or that we encouraged to make.66
Cudd agrees; “the oppressed are co-opted through their own short-run rational
choices to reinforce the long-run oppression of their social group.”67 Imagine a young
woman who does not accept the scholarship from a prestigious university in order to
stay home and attend a junior college because “good girls stay home until they get
married.”68 If asked, she would perhaps say that she chose to stay home because she
wanted to be close to her family. There does not seem to be any coercion involved
here, but if she had the opportunity for authentic choice, it would be very likely that
she would choose to accept the award. These kinds of situations can nevertheless be
identified as injustice on the basis of how oppression results from unjust constraints
that do not constitute coercion as we have defined it here. Coercion for Cudd is the
absence of voluntary choice. From the appearance of it, she seems to have voluntarily
chosen to stay home, and again, if asked, she would claim to have made the decision
voluntarily. I argue that her situation is, at least, potentially oppressive, although it
was not coercive.
Another way that my theory differs from Cudd’s is that my theory includes
the systematicity criterion. That is, for a group to be oppressed, there are many
interconnected factors involved to keep them down. Although, I make this point
explicit, it is implicit in Cudd’s group membership criterion. Frye gives us an
                                                
66 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 136-137. Cudd refers to adaptive preferences as
“deformed desires” (Analyzing Oppression, p. 180).
67 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, p. 22.
68 Teaching at a Hispanic-serving institution, I have heard this many times. Some young women do not
believe that they should go to college, especially if that makes them unable to take care of their
siblings or their own children, or if they do go to college, they do not believe that they should go away
from home.
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interesting analogy to illustrate the systematicity criterion. She asks us to imagine a
birdcage in which the arrangements of its wires keep the bird trapped inside. The
wires do not seem to be related as a structured whole to cage the bird. The “cageness
of the birdcage is a macroscopic phenomenon”69 as are the lives of the oppressed
people. If we look at the birdcage at the microscopic level, we see only one wire and
will not know how these tiny wires can keep the bird in, but once we step back and
look through a wider lens, it will be clear how this one wire is intertwined with all the
others to do so. It is “a network of forces and barriers which are systematically related
and which conspire to the immobilization, reduction and molding of women [as well
as other oppressed groups] and the lives we live.”70 The bird is physically closed in
by the wires that are analogous to the forces we find in the world of oppression. 
We can see that there are many forces that are arranged in such a way to
insure the inferior status of the oppressed group. For instance, young women are
encouraged not to go out alone at night because they are women, but men are not so
discouraged. As a matter of fact, the presence of young men, regardless of their age,
makes it safe for any young girl or woman to be out at night. I recall that when I was
a teen or younger, taking my brother who is four years younger assured people of my
safety. The fact was that I was often put in a situation that I had a child and myself to
take care of if something does go wrong. However, this attitude towards women
implies that we cannot take care of ourselves. 
Examples of such cases that systematically harm women, physically or
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emotionally, are endless. Women are often advised to be passive and not aggressive.
A horrific effect of this advice appears clearly in Mary Koss’s research on rape. Many
of the rape victims that she interviewed said that they did not scream for help or try to
physically hurt the perpetrator because they found it embarrassing (to them and to
their rapist) to scream or physically attack their rapist.71 While aggression in women
is often looked on as a vice, in men it is a virtue and sign of masculinity. Another
common example is that in the workplace women are paid less than men for doing the
same jobs. Unpaid maternity leave reduces household income at the time when a
family needs it most and pressures the financially needy mother to go back to work
soon after the birth of the child. On the other hand, we are criticized for leaving our
children at the daycare, especially during the first year of their lives. Lack of adequate
and affordable childcare facilities is also an issue that new mothers have to deal with,
and it often falls on the mothers’ to-do list. At the end, if we fail to be all that our
society encourages us to be, we fail as women. These are the wires that keep women
in their oppressive situation. Oppression is systematic. There are many forces that
work on keeping women (and minorities) from advancing and remaining in their
disadvantaged situation, although from the perspective of those looking in from the
outside, it seems like that they should be able to advance and improve their situation.
After all there are no laws that keep them in their disadvantaged positions, and so if
they do not succeed, it is no one’s fault but their own.
My theory of oppression differs in two other ways. First, to side with caution
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Date and Acquaintance Rape (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1988), p. 40.
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towards those who are oppressed but our theory might not capture, I will hold that
these criteria are jointly sufficient and not necessary. There might be cases of
oppression that we do not know about. To say that these criteria are necessary would
be limiting. My claim is, if X meets my criteria, it is oppression. The same kind of
problem appears in Young’s view on oppression. If someone points out a kind of
oppression that is not caught by the five faces of oppression, does it mean that they
are not oppressed because they do not fit any of Young’s five faces of oppression? I
think not. There has to be room for future growth. So, at least we should take
epistemic caution and not set necessary criteria of oppression.
Second, Cudd’s theory lacks the required metaphysics for why oppression is
an injustice.72 The metaphysics that I will propose uses Nussbaum and Sen’s
capabilities approach for a basis for rights in order to provide us with a metaphysics
for oppression. This background could apply to all theories of oppression. Therefore,
the capabilities approach also gives a basis for why resilient autonomy is important
and why its lack is associated with oppression. According to both Nussbaum and Sen,
capabilities are necessary for flourishing human life. To take these away is a harm /
injustice.73 Some of these are necessary and are the basis for other capabilities and
they ought to never be taken away because the others cannot flourish without them. I
will elaborate on the capabilities approach in the next chapter.
 I will end this section by illustrating my theory with an example. Mexican-
                                                
72 This lack is not a flaw in her view. Her work is part of a larger dialogue, and literature on
oppression.
73 Unlike Cudd’s conception of harm, in my view harm is normative. I believe that harm is violation of
one’s capabilities, which are also basis for rights. I will explore capabilities in the next chapter.
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Americans are kept in the lower status in our society, mainly because they are
Mexicans. They are “used” for cheap labor. They do the majority of our hard labor
and dirty work so our children or we, won’t have to do it. Many of the field workers
are illegal immigrants who do not have the rights that legal immigrants enjoy, and
because of this (and often lack of communication abilities with their bosses) they are
often exploited. They are not paid minimum wage and are forced to work under harsh
conditions. These workers are paid low wages (harm), because they are Mexicans
(group membership), so the landowners who are the wealthy and all of us who buy
those goods can benefit (the privilege group). They are not only harmed in this one
particular way. If mistreated, beaten, or raped by their overseers they are not
protected by law so they cannot report to the police – their illegal status will be
revealed and they would be even worse off.74 In some states like California the
children of illegal immigrants are unable to go to school or daycare because these
institutions will not receive government funding for allowing undocumented children
to attend. Consequently, they are kept in their state of poverty. They often cannot go
back to Mexico because there are no available jobs and they or their families will be
even worse off. These are just a few examples of many forces that work against them
and systematically keep Mexicans in a disadvantaged position and discriminated
against.75
                                                
74 Even if the workers have legal working visas, they chance losing the opportunity for future work.
75 This examples parallels Marilyn Frye’s birdcage example.
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Coercion and Voluntary Actions
Coercion for Cudd is normative and the presence of coercion makes
oppression wrong because coercion is always wrong. As Cudd agrees, coercion can
be normative or not, just as harm can be and in my view harm is normative. I believe
the presence of unjust harm, together with the other criteria of oppression is sufficient
to make a situation oppressive. Most subtle cases of oppression do not involve
coercion. Let us consider Cudd’s Lisa and Larry’s case to illustrate more subtle
examples of oppression.
In her work, Oppression by Choice, Cudd has us consider Lisa and Larry’s
situation.76 Lisa and Larry is a married couple who both hold jobs outside the house.
They decide to have a child and want one of them to stay home to care for her/him.
They consider their options and rationally decide that it is financially beneficial for
them if Lisa stays home and Larry works. Men are paid more in our society and are
more likely to get promotions and raises. So, for this reason alone they would be in a
better financial situation in the future if Lisa stayed home. Even if they start out with
the same salaries, they will not end their careers with same salaries. In Cudd’s
scenario, Lisa and Larry shared household chores when they both work. After she
quit her job, more of the household chores fall on Lisa as well as taking care of their
child. Larry, who has more financial burden and is the only financial provider is
under more stress and believes that it is his right to not do as many chores when he
gets home. This situation leaves Lisa in a less advantaged situation in comparison
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with Larry, regardless of whether they stay married or not.77 It is quite easy to think
of benefits of working outside the house in a labor market that is valued and paid;
Larry benefits from having a higher social status, socializes with people outside the
house, has less housework, and spends far less time with his child, who by virtue of
being a child is very demanding. Lisa’s labor at home is not valued in the society and
because she leaves the job market her labor loses value. So, she has made a rational,
(according to Cudd, apparently) voluntary and informed decision that has left her in
an oppressive situation. According to Cudd, Lisa is oppressed because her choice was
coerced (not voluntary) due to the factors mentioned in the above scenario, although
she seems to have voluntarily chosen to stay home and could have chosen otherwise
than she did without any institutions keeping her from working.
The society is structured to advantage some groups over others. Surely she
had the option of going to work instead of Larry but the outcomes were such that if
she had, her family would be much worse off. They would have to dramatically
change their living standards so she can remain employed and have Larry stay home
to care for the child. This example works in cases of interracial (say Black and White)
homosexual couples that adopt a child. As they decide which one should stay home to
care for the child, they will have to consider that the Black partner (be it male or
female) will make less money then the white partner and should perhaps stay home if
they are to maintain their quality of life. In a totally egalitarian society the question of
race or gender will not come into play as the partners decide who should stay home to
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care for children. Even if we grant that there is no coercion involved and everyone
acted voluntarily, our society is structured so that we rationally make decisions that
leave us in oppressive situations. Lisa and Larry’s situation is an example of this and
surely Lisa is not alone; due to the choices that people have in our society, “woman
are coerced in making the choice to eschew economic power and status for domestic
servitude…. This implies that women are oppressed by the vicious cycle
phenomenon, and thus by means of their own individually rational choices.”78 Lisa
actually has the tools to carefully consider the situation and has the options in order to
make the best choice but many do not.
We can say two things about this case. First, Lisa’s decision is not voluntary
(coerced) because of the way that society is set up; if she stayed home, the family
would be financially much worse off. Forces that discriminate in the work place
against women coerce her. According to Thomas Mappes, “a person can … be
effectively coerced by being threatened with the withholding of something (in some
cases, what we would call a ‘benefit’) to which the person is entitled.”79 In this case,
Lisa is coerced into staying home because if Larry stays home, they will not benefit
from the higher income that he will be earning and possibly that he currently earns.
So, according to Mappes’s definition and Cudd’s analysis, Lisa did not choose
voluntarily and is, therefore, oppressed.
Second, we can say that Lisa is not coerced and that people can (and
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sometime do) make voluntary decisions that leave them in oppressive situations.
Cudd brilliantly shows the former. The latter is what I will argue for here.
Oppression is best continued if the oppressed internalize the social
expectations of them. By making choices that the oppressors want them to make, they
continue their own oppression. The psychologically oppressed often come to believe
that their choices were their own authentic choices and were freely made. Putting it
differently, by having the appearance of choice, one may not feel coerced and so does
not believe he or she is forced or coerced in making they decisions that she or he does
make. 
Feeling free from force or coercion is not always a good indication of
freedom. According to Mappes, one way we can determine if our choices are coerced
is to ask, “Does the proposal in question have the effect of making a person worse off
upon noncompliance?… The person who makes a threat attempts to gain compliance
by attaching an undesirable consequence to the alternative of noncompliance. This
person attempts to coerce consent.”80 The idea here is that if we are trying to avoid a
bad consequence by consenting, then our consent is forced and morally questionable.
Imagine a person who is told that she will have to undergo female genital mutilation
or face starvation because in her society she is not allowed to work. She might oppose
the practice but she consents to undergo it. This is coercion. She was forced to do
something that if she disagreed would bring about horrible consequences. Consent
obtained under conditions in which noncompliance results in the withholding of the
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opportunity to exercise a basic human capability clearly makes the person worse
off.81 The circumcised woman loses a capability to preserve another, namely she loses
bodily integrity to preserve her life. That is morally alarming. In a just society, we
must not be forced to choose between our bodily integrity and our life. I might
consent to have my arm cut off if I know that is the only way to save my life.
However, that is an unfortunate situation and one that I was coerced into because the
alternative was even worse.82 Although cutting my arm to save my life is not a sign of
oppression, the case of circumcised woman is because her case meets all other criteria
of oppression. However, the threats that are used to get consent could be physical or
mental. One can physically or mentally force someone to agree to his or her will. In
summary, according to Cudd, an action is coercive if it is not a voluntary act. Mappes
argues that a voluntary act is one that is not backed by any threat.83 So, both Cudd
and Mappes hold that lack of voluntary choice is coercion. See below;
                                                
81 I will discuss the capabilities approach in the next chapter.
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Cudd
~ voluntary  Coercion   ~V  C
Mappes
Threat  coercion 1. T  C
~ Threat  voluntary 2. ~T  V
3. ~V  T   Logically equivalent to 2
4. ~V  C  1, 3 Hypothetical Syllogism,
     (Cudd’s)
5. ~C   V Logically equivalent to 4
Cudd does not define voluntariness but Mappes does and his definition eventually
entails Cudd’s. I believe we have to find a ways to separate these two concepts. There
are times where there is no threat involved but the choice is still not a voluntary
choice or that one is forced to choose from choice B or C because she is forbidden to
choose A. For instance, person P is forbidden to attend school A.84 However, She is
allowed to attend schools B or C. She was not forced to choose one or the other. So,
she chooses voluntarily between the two. Although she is forced to choose B or C,
there was no threat involved when she chose either. However, she is under threat (be
it emotional or physical) if she tries to attend school A. To define coercion as lack of
voluntary choice is too broad. Here is why; we are faced with many obstacles. These
obstacles necessarily force us to make a decision sometimes contrary to that we wish
to make. We do not want to say that any action that is done under any shadow of
force or coercion is involuntary. Anyone who lives in a capitalist society regardless of
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his or her status is coerced, and therefore, we can make a case that all workers in a
capitalist society are oppressed. It is true that Lisa is oppressed. It is true that she was
faced with a hard choice. However, her choice was a voluntary choice. She acted
voluntarily although there might be bigger forces at work. We need a definition of
voluntariness that accounts for cases of Lisa and Larry. Let me start with Aristotle’s
definition of voluntary actions.
According to Aristotle, actions are voluntary if they are not done out of
ignorance and are not done by some force; “what is involuntary is what is forced or is
caused by ignorance, what is voluntary seems to be what has its origin in the agent
himself when he knows the particulars that the action consists in.”85 Particulars refer
to the components of making decision – basically knowing who is doing, what, how,
why and in what way. According to Aristotle there are six particulars and if we are
ignorant of them our action is involuntary. In his words, the particulars are,
(1) who is doing it;
(2) what he is doing;
(3) about what or to what he is doing it;
(4) sometimes also what he is doing it with, e.g. the instrument;
(5) for what result, e.g. safety;
(6) in what way, e.g. gently or hard.
Of 1-6, Aristotle finds 2 and 5 the most important.86 Ignorance of these two will mean
that we do not know what we are doing or what the results of our actions are.  By
force, he means external force that is out of the agent’s control; for example, when
someone pushes you and you run into someone else. This is an example of force that
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was out of one’s control.87 Prima Facie, we can all grant this criterion of non-
voluntariness, but his second criterion, being ignorant of the six particulars, is
questionable.
There are many things that we are ignorant of when we make a decision. In
response to Aristotle, one can act voluntarily even if one is ignorant of the particulars,
although if some harm was done, one is not morally culpable for it. Recall the case of
the Mad Doctor who fills the patient’s medicine shot with cyanide. The Ignorant
Nurse, as she has done for years, picks it up and administers the shot. The patient
dies. The Nurse acted voluntarily when she gave the shot, although she had no
intention of killing the patient and she is not responsible for his death because she
was ignorant of the content of the shot. So, at best, we can say that she did not
voluntarily kill the patient. However, if we take 1-6 seriously, then we have to
conclude that the nurse’s action was involuntarily done, but that is not the case. She
voluntarily took a needle (assuming as she always has it was filled with needed
medicine) and gave the shot to her patient. This was a voluntary act and killing the
patient was not. Aristotle’s view does not account for subtleties of cases as such.
 In my view, actions are voluntarily done when there is no physical or mental
force present. There are many cases where we make decisions when we are ignorant
of 1-6. Consider a freshman that chooses History as her major and ends up becoming
a successful Historian. She might not know of other majors that might interest her,
what are the details of pursuing a graduate degree or what a career in History entails,
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as many of us did not when we chose our fields of studies. Although she is ignorant
about her choices, I believe, she acted voluntarily. No one physically or mentally
forced, coerced, or threatened her to major in History. Although this might not be an
informed choice, she is not coerced, her choice is not involuntary and there would
have been no bad consequences of choosing to study Philosophy or Math.
Coercion, on the other hand, involves active forces, such as social structure,
laws, attitudes, or lack of social justice. This opposes Aristotle’s view on force. He
believes actions are not forced when done under “duress” 88 but in my view, it
depends on the kind of pressure. Life pressures are certainly a determining factor in
our decision-making process. Often we assume that as long as there are no physical
forces involved, people are choosing freely to do as they wish, but there are many
aspects to what makes something coercive or forced. One might argue that Lisa was
forced to choose to stay home although there were no direct forces involved.
According to Cudd, “Direct forces cause inequality through the intentional actions of
a dominant group on a subordinate group.”89 Direct forces are all socially imposed
and the individual is not at all responsible for them.  For instance, Lisa’s society does
not forbid her from working after she becomes a parent, as was the case in the 1930’s.
On the other hand, there are indirect forces that mold the oppressed in more subtle
ways that Aristotle is not considering here. “Indirect forces cause inequality through
the choices and decisions of the members of the oppressed group themselves, as they
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try to live in the face of other inequalities and injustices.”90 These are the
internalization of the expectations of one’s society where “the oppressed seem to
shape their preferences to embrace the feasible set of options they are faced with.”91
These kinds of forces are not so obvious nor can they be immediately stopped. We are
all socialized into our roles and these roles are the forces that often direct our
decision-making. Contra Aristotle, we have to recognize that there are many instances
of force that are not obvious. Given that, we can still make voluntary decisions under
the shadow of these forces and we often do. Perhaps there is a fine line between
actions that are involuntary and ones that are coerced. Particular actions might be
voluntary although the social, cultural, or family structure might be psychologically
coercive.92
More on Psychological Oppression
Members of oppressed groups may internalize various forms of systematic,
institutionalized social and political oppression. The oppressed internalize political
and social expectations in different ways, and become their own oppressors. As I
pointed out, Bartky calls this sort of oppression psychological oppression. There are
different categories of psychological oppression — stereotyping, sexual
objectification, and alienation, among others.93 Alienation happens when people are
separated from basic characteristics that make important contributions to their
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51
development as human beings. For example, Mexicans are categorized and treated in
ways that leaves them self-alienated and that ignore their needs as human beings—as
ends with dignity and worth and not merely “janitors and farm workers.”
Objectification occurs when an individual’s body parts are distinguished from the rest
of her personality and are treated as though they entirely define her personhood or are
the most important features of her personhood.94 Stereotypes often portray many men
and women of color as irrational, stupid, and childlike. Women are “more intuitive
than rational, more spontaneous than deliberate, close to nature, and less capable of
substantial cultural accomplishment.”95 Often stereotypes will lead to the sort of
attitudes that are expected of the stereotyped whether they are good or bad. Those
stereotyped to be childlike and incapable of making decisions internalize that
stereotype as a part of them and thereby become their own oppressors.96 This is a very
simple, non-controversial issue for those who have ever been around children. We are
taught not to tell children that they are ‘bad’ but rather criticize their actions, so that
they would not self-stereotype as somehow deficient, and act accordingly.
I believe the guest-worker program in the United States objectifies the guest
workers and would not work to their benefit. The workers are only seen as workers
and not people who will develop lives here. Under the guest-worker program, or ones
similar to it, after their terms are up, these workers and their families are eventually
ripped out of the lives they have established here and have to go back. They are being
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used for our benefit. As long as they do the hard work we do not want to do, we
won’t have to pay them as much, and so the price of goods remains low, more benefit
for us. Perhaps each person is only a worker in a capitalist economy. However, our
situation is rewarded by rights and privileges that we have as citizens, which the
guest-workers will not enjoy. For instance, they will not have the right to vote,
receive social security when they reach retirement age, or have their children raised in
the environment that they are brought up in. They will always be second-class
citizens.97 They might internalize this view of themselves and self-identify with the
boundaries set for them by the society. Even if they are given amnesty after so many
years, they have already lived as a second-class citizen and it is very unlikely that the
standards of living for them will significantly change. They have been ‘broken in’ for
their inferior position in the society. A statement from a Mexican-American faculty
member from the University of Texas-Pan American makes this very clear. Professor
X said in a panel, that her father, who is a janitor, suggested that she should become a
secretary when she graduated from High School. He thought he was giving her great
advice; she would work in a clean environment, air-conditioned room, “and that is a
great job for a Mexican-American woman.”98 I believe this is a great example of
internalization of social expectation of inferiority, hence, psychological oppression.
Professor X holds a Ph.D. but if she had taken her father’s advice, she would, at best,
be a secretary. That would be a great example of people limiting themselves because
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that her identity not be revealed.
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that is what they (or their parents) believe they can do. They do not develop their
capabilities because they have internalized the expectation of inferiority. I hold that
any practice that systematically and unjustifiably limits people’s development of their
capabilities, deprives them of the benefits routinely enjoyed by others, or assigns
them to inferior status due to their group membership, by force or otherwise, is
oppressive. Oppression is not always obvious; it often requires close analysis and
careful observation of the society’s treatment of its people. When a group is
politically or economically held down, often the members of that group internalize
the social expectation of them (the oppressor’s expectations) and become their own
oppressors.
In Summary
I agree with Cudd and Zutlevics that there is one theory of oppression.
Zutlevics’s theory is too broad and does not give a metaphysics for why she believes
that resilient autonomy is important. It, also, does not distinguish between cases such
as crime, accidents, or oppression. It is crucial that we distinguish between these
because the solutions to each of these cases differ. My theory closely parallels
Cudd’s. In my view an act is oppressive if it meets the following criteria; One, there
is some kind of harm done – one’s capabilities are unjustly taken away, thwarted or
destroyed. Two, the harm is done based on group membership. Three, another group
benefits from it. And lastly, four, the oppression is systematic. In short, oppression is
to have one’s capabilities systematically thwarted or taken away (harm) because of
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one’s group membership, in order to benefit another group, whether the harm is
voluntarily done or not. My theory of oppression picks out as many cases of
oppression as Cudd’s. If we take Ockham’s razor seriously, we should seriously
consider my revisions because it gives our theory fewer parts and explains at least as
much as Cudd’s theory. If we can capture all oppressive situations without
introducing coercion, we should do so because coercion introduces a whole new
debate.
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Three
The Capabilities Approach
In this chapter I will outline Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. I use
capabilities as grounds for (metaphysics of) my theory of oppression. This is the main
contribution I am making to Cudd’s view and to the literature on oppression as well
as rights. One criterion of oppression is harm. Harm, in my theory, is unjustified
violation of one’s capabilities, which are the bases for rights. In addition to
summarizing Nussbaum’s view, I will also consider some criticisms against this
approach and respond to them.
Capabilities are things that people are “actually able to do and to be.”99 The
basic idea of capabilities approach is that there are certain human capabilities that
ought not be destroyed, undermined or deterred. These certain capabilities are those
that do not violate the liberty principle. According to the liberty principle, people are
free to act as long as they do not violate others’ freedom. So, although we have the
capability to commit atrocities we should not be able to develop them. This hindrance
does not count as unjustified harm. In Nussbaum’s words,
Not all actual human abilities exert a moral claim, only the ones that
have been evaluated as valuable from an ethical viewpoint. (The
capacity for cruelty, for example, does not figure on the list.) Thus, the
argument begins from ethical premises and derives ethical conclusions
from these alone, not from any further metaphysical premises.100
Nussbaum provides a list of capabilities that she believes will stand the best chance of
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universal consensus. I will start with her list and then explore the ethical role these
capabilities play. Some of the capabilities listed are very important while others are
necessary preconditions for a flourishing life.
The first three capabilities in the list are the most fundamental and without
these others cannot be actualized. They are, (1-3), Life, Bodily Health, and Bodily
Integrity. From these capabilities we can derive the right to live a healthy, well-
nourished life, one that is not prematurely ended, as well as having the right to
reproductive health, freedom to move around free from physical and sexual violence
and enjoying sensual and sexual satisfaction.101 For instance, one who is raped, or is
forced into an arranged marriage has her capability of Bodily Integrity violated.
(4, 6) are Senses, Imagination and Thought, and Practical Reason. These
capabilities allow individuals to become informed and provide the opportunity to
develop one’s abilities for deciding one’s comprehensive conception of the good and
plan one’s life, including education, religion, and artistic expressions.102 These
include one’s ability to make critical decisions about one’s life. According to
Nussbaum, practical reason is one of the two most important capabilities because the
use of practical reason makes each person an agent who makes autonomous choices
and determines his or her own path of life instead of being herded as a “cog in a
machine.”103 Governments that do not allow freedom of religion or have a state-
mandated religion violate the capability of Thought and Practical Reason. Under
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those governments we are deterred from developing our own conception of the good.
(5, 7-10) are Emotions, Affiliation, Other Species, Play, and Control over
one’s Political and Material Environment.104 These are capabilities that we use in the
social aspects of life. They include the personal and social freedoms and opportunities
as well as authority over one’s life prospects. These capabilities include freedom to
develop friendships and other attachments, to express one’s emotions and joys, as
well as making political and economic associations and projects. The capability of
affiliation, along side practical reason, is of special importance for Nussbaum for the
same reasons mentioned above. At first glance, some of these capabilities listed might
seem trivial or of less value than those mentioned earlier but undermining them could
be life-threatening. Under the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the
Taliban, being joyful in public, smiling in government issued photographs, or any
display of play and happiness by teens and adults is stigmatized and often punished.
This violates the capability of Play, and Emotions. Youth suicide-rate, alcoholism and
drug use in these societies is skyrocketing. Being joyful and having the capability to
play is crucial in one’s quality of life. One cannot have a flourishing life if joy and
happiness and playfulness are missing. So, these capabilities are not trivial.
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is a list of many ways that people can
potentially function in order to gain a truly human life. I refer to this list of
capabilities given by Nussbaum as “capabilities” but there might be relevant
capabilities that Nussbaum does not name or that she is unaware of. Those I refer to
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as, potential ways of functioning. The distinction is merely between those capabilities
Nussbaum identifies and additional others which might be there but are absent from
her list. These freedoms and opportunities must be constitutionally guaranteed for
each individual person (rather than an aggregate of people). Nussbaum proposes these
capabilities "as a foundation for basic political principles that should underwrite
constitutional guarantees."105
She gives us two reasons for her list of capabilities. First, this list is intuitive.
That is, a thriving and flourishing life will include these capabilities and the
opportunity for their development. She adds,
The intuitive idea behind the approach is twofold: first, that certain
functions are particularly central in human life, in the sense that their
presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the
presence or absence of human life; and second, that there is something
that it is to do these functions in a truly human way, not merely an
animal [non-human] way.106
By truly human, Nussbaum refers to a life that is "worthy of a human being."107 The
reason that Nussbaum puts the individual in the center of her theory is that her view
of individuals is Kantian; each person is an end with full value and dignity each
person possesses. The human intrinsic value is not in virtue of being a part of a
whole, as in the case of utilitarian evaluation. So, when we look to see if people have
their basic rights (capabilities) met, we do not look at the aggregate good or gross
national product. We look to see if each individual (not a group) has the opportunity
for developing her capabilities.
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The second argument Nussbaum gives for choosing these capabilities is that
there is, using John Rawls’s terms, strong probability that they would come out of an
overlapping consensus among members of different cultures. Certain lack of liberties
and goods are considered bad regardless of what metaphysical view of the world we
hold.108 As mentioned, there are other capabilities that we could consider adding to
the list, but these are the ones that stand a good chance of cross-cultural consensus
regardless of different cultural beliefs.109 Nussbaum explains,
By 'overlapping consensus' I mean what John Rawls means: that
people may sign on to this conception as the freestanding moral core
of a political conception, without accepting any particular
metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical
or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or human
nature.110
The overlapping consensus proposed by Nussbaum is a continuation of what John
Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines."111
A reasonable comprehensive doctrine has many parts. First, people will have
to be reasonable. Reasonable persons are those who aim in making proper use of their
political power. It is proper in the sense that we can reasonably believe that others
will agree with the political principles that we propose. Surely, we cannot reasonably
believe that all people will agree with the law (written or unwritten) that women
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should make 80 cents for every dollar that men make for doing the same job. So
proposing such a law, according to Rawls, is not reasonable;
Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely
believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions —
were we to state them as government officials — are sufficient, and we
also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept
those reasons.112
According to Rawls, the sincere belief that other citizens will probably accept our
principles is one criterion of reciprocity and reasonable people aim to satisfy it. A
reasonable person will agree that men and women ought to be paid the same wages
for the same jobs. So, paying women less than men for doing the same job would not
meet the criterion of reciprocity because we could not reasonably and sincerely
suppose that paying women less than men for the same job is acceptable to women.113
This double standard is not a part of a reasonable overlapping consensus of
comprehensive doctrines.
The second criterion for reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive
doctrines is "the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their
consequences."114 There will be times that reasonable and rational people, contrary to
Kant’s universalism, will not agree with one another regardless of their commitment
to gain consensus. So, we agree to disagree and accept the consequences, because it is
sometimes impossible to come to rational agreement about difficult moral
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situations.115 Discussion among reasonable people in a liberal democratic society
would inevitably lead to disagreements. People may disagree about their
comprehensive conceptions but citizens must learn to accept this disagreement as part
of a liberal democratic society. Those who reject the criterion of reciprocity are not
reasonable.116 Rawls says,
[R]easonable doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding
political institutions: equal basic human rights and liberties for all
citizens, including liberty of conscience and the freedom of religion.
On the other hand, comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a
democratic society are not reasonable.117
Nussbaum captures these liberties and freedoms, as well as many more, with her list
of capabilities.
In summary, intuitively and through the idea of an overlapping consensus of
reasonable comprehensive conceptions on what makes for a flourishing human life,
Nussbaum justifies her list of capabilities. In order to have a fully good human life
individuals should have the opportunity to develop each of these capabilities – i.e.
each person must have the opportunity to go beyond the threshold of making these
capabilities a part of one’s life. The protection and promotion of capabilities should
be a part of what justice requires.118
So we must ask what each person is capable of doing in a society when
considering a society’s level of justice, and not merely what one is happy with or
thinks what one is entitled to. A theory that only attends to the mere feeling of being
                                                
115 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 56.
116 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 59.
117 Ibid., p. 172-173.
118 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 74.
62
happy is “subjective welfarism, the idea that each person’s perceived well-being
should be the basis for social choice.”119 This appeal to perceived wellbeing is not
adequate, because our society, economic status, social class, etc often shape our
preferences. So, we might believe that our needs are met while in reality they are
not.120
Also, according to the capabilities approach “we ask not just about the
resources that are sitting around, but about how those do or do not go to work,
enabling … [individuals] to function in a fully human way.”121 The mere possession
of political rights is not enough to give one opportunities to develop one’s
capabilities. One must be informed of the political rights. If I do not know that I have
the right to bodily integrity, then I do not know that I can exercise my right in case if
that capability is violated. An example is the status of women in India. Indian
constitution grants women much more rights that women actually have the
opportunity to pursue. This is, among other things, due to the women’s ignorance of
these laws.122
In assessing the level of social justice in a society, we do not want to look at a
total sum, such as the Gross National Product, as utilitarianism or subjective
welfarism do, or at an average per capita amount, as average utilitarianism does. Each
individual’s actual, not merely perceived, wellbeing ought to be considered. Each
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person is an end in herself or himself and ought not be considered as merely a
contribution to the whole or as the very best judge of their own situation.
 Amartya Sen, the first to develop and discuss the capabilities approach, also
rules out the utilitarian approach to access the level of justice and distribution of the
goods in a society. He argues that utilitarianism “rules out that anything other than
consequences can ultimately matter”123 and that “the utilitarian calculus tends to
ignore inequalities in the distribution of happiness (only the sum total matters-no
matter how unequally distributed).”124 Further, he criticizes utilitarianism in that it
does not consider human rights, capabilities, freedom, etc. All this theory is
concerned with is the aggregate good, or at best the average value of happiness for
each person given the aggregate good. Neither gives us any information on how the
individuals are doing.125 I believe these long standing objections to utilitarianism are
persuasive, and that utilitarians have never adequately dealt with them.
In contrast, the capabilities approach on entitlement to goods and
opportunities insures each individual the opportunity to choose his or her own
conception of the good and decide which capabilities they will develop.126
Consequently, not everyone will develop each of his or her capabilities but the
opportunity to develop them ought to be provided for all individuals. The lack of such
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opportunity is an indication of social injustice. Some people choose not to develop
some capabilities. The capability of Bodily Integrity includes the opportunity for
sexual satisfaction through sexual relations. A nun could choose not to be sexually
active although she has the capability to do so. On the other hand, a woman who has
undergone female genital mutilation no longer has the capability to enjoy sexual
satisfaction. She cannot choose to develop this capability to the fullest because she
does not have the necessary bodily parts. Although the outcome may be the same in
these two situations, the former is her choice but the latter by force. The difference is
that the latter destroys a capability and the former chooses not to develop it. Because
it is always suspect when one’s body is mutilated such as in cases of female genital
mutilation, foot-binding, breast ironing127, etc., it is prudent to question those
practices and find their destruction a moral offense.128 As discussed in the last
chapter, the victims of psychological oppression often internalize the oppressors’
expectations of them. We have to keep in mind these cases as we wonder if one
should respect X’s choice to undergo FGM, or other harmful, capability-destroying
procedures.
I should note that in the United States, as well as in most capitalist societies,
the opportunities to develop our capabilities are often income-based. For instance,
many children of the poor Mexican-Americans living in South Texas do not believe
                                                
127 Betty Murungi and Nicholas Asego Nairobi, “Kenya: ‘Breast Ironing’ in Cameroon,” in The East
African Standard, May 28th, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200705280394.html?viewall=1.
128 Some argue if a person freely chooses to under go FGM, then this is a voluntary action and so not a
sign of oppression. In chapter one, I argue that we could voluntarily choose to be victims of
oppression. When we our actions lead to destroying our capabilities, and other criteria of oppression
are present, it is oppression whether or not it was voluntarily chosen.
65
that they have the opportunity to improve their lives beyond the lower-class status of
their families’ lives.129 To some extent they are right. The society is structured so that
not everyone has the same opportunities to develop their capabilities and live
according to their conception of the good. This is why, again, I do not approve of
looking at GNP or the aggregate good (utility) to decide whether a government has
secured the means necessary for development of capabilities for its citizens.130
According to Nussbaum, the destruction of a basic human capability ought not
be traded for social gains, on either the society wide level or in one’s personal life.
Basic capabilities are from a different category as social gains and are radically
different in nature. For example, we ought not be forced to compromise our capability
of Bodily Integrity, in order to get a job promotion. Although we often make trade
offs, that is a sign of injustice. Women who are forced to stay home and only care for
children do not have the opportunity to develop those capabilities that relate to one’s
public life. Suppose a woman who “willingly” gives up her public life in order to live
in a marriage so that her basic needs are met. She is cut off from her society, friends,
other people, and most likely, from playing. Recall Bartky's definition of oppression;
"being cut off from the sorts of activities that define what it is to be human."131 These
women are systematically and unjustly cut off from what it is to be fully human,
namely their capability to be involved in the public realm and have economic
freedom. Some do not have the resources to change their lives, be it education, job
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skills, self-confidence, etc.
Nussbaum insists, "The central capabilities are not just instrumental to further
pursuits: they are held to have value in themselves, in making the life that includes
them fully human."132 If one must trade a social good in order to have safety, food, or
good health (basic capabilities), then there are good indications that situation is
oppressive. A student was bothered that her life-long friend had recently married and
was no longer allowed to take part in the world outside the four walls of her house.
She has no car, her husband does not give her access to the television when he is
away from home, and she is not allowed to talk on the phone. He regularly checks on
her and will not allow her to associate with other people in any form, including going
to the grocery store without him because there were men there. She has accepted this
as a good thing because he takes “good care of her”. She has voluntarily given up her
social capabilities in order to have her basic capabilities actualized. Given her level of
education, job experience, and her young age, she sees no other options in her life but
finding a man and marrying one who is willing to take care of her basic needs (food,
shelter, and safety). Her spouse might take care of her basic needs but she had to trade
off all the social aspect of her life for it. This young woman’s life might be less
threatening than being poor (or possibly starvation), but if one must compromise
playing, affiliation or other social goods (capabilities) in order to gain other basic
capabilities, there is reason for us to be alarmed. That is a sign of oppression. It is
arguable whether she did not freely choose not to develop them. In some scenarios, to
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develop those capabilities would mean that she might have to choose life or death. I
am also willing to give up my arm to save my life and it does not follow that losing
my arm was a good thing, nor does it follow that my choice was not coerced. The
government has failed to secure the development of basic capabilities for her so she
can develop her other capabilities that make her a human being with full worth,
dignity and a potential for a flourishing life.133
In sum, no one should be unjustly harmed, although there might be
disagreement on what constitutes harm and justice. I hold that “harm” is unjustified
violation of capabilities. I agree with Nussbaum that basic human capabilities are
necessary for flourishing human life. Once the opportunity to develop these
capabilities is taken away from a person then she or he would not have the potential
for a good life as she or he did before. For example, if my capability of Play is taken
away from me, then a huge reward in my life is taken away. Lack of joy and play has
been connected to many psychological disorders, which we can agree take away from
living a flourishing life.134 To assure that each citizen has potential for a flourishing
life, the State must adopt a constitution that does not allow the violation of these basic
human functioning capabilities.
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum
Sen and Nussbaum have each developed a theory of distributive justice based
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on capabilities. Although their approaches are similar there are differences in their
articulations of this approach. A comparison helps illuminate Nussbaum’s view. First,
both agree that there is a place that qualities of life in the form of capabilities can be
compared, but Nussbaum gives us a threshold that each individual should reach
whereas Sen does not address this issue and leaves his theory open.
Second, both endorse the Rawlsian view on political liberty. These liberties
are addressed in Nussbaum’s articulation of the theory in the form of her list,
although Sen does not give us such a list.
Third, both put the individual at the center of the capabilities wheel. To decide
whether we have justice, we ought to look at individuals’ capabilities and not GNP,
aggregate utility, etc.
Forth, although neither is a cultural relativist, Nussbaum gives explicit
argument against this view and in defense of universal values.135
Fifth, Sen does not “ground the capabilities approach in Marxian/Aristotelian
idea of truly human functioning” as does Nussbaum.136 He explicitly rejects
Aristotle’s and grounds his theory on standard of living. According to Aristotle, the
standards of living is eudaimonia and that involves having “a basket of multiple
attributes.”137 Sen, on the other hand, sees the standard of living as “a choice over
alternative baskets (each basket may have only one item or many).”138 Nussbaum’s
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list would also account for having different baskets. However, the way Nussbaum
articulates her view gives everyone the same capabilities but some might just develop
one.
Sixth, Nussbaum divides up the capabilities to three kinds, basic, internal, and
combined. Sen does not make such distinctions. Basic capabilities are,
[those] innate equipment of individuals that is necessary basis for
developing the more advanced capabilities, and a ground of moral
concern… the capability of seeing and hearing is usually like this….
Internal capabilities [are] developed states of the person herself that
are, so far as the person is concerned, sufficient condition for the
exercise of the requisite functions. [For example a girl who has not
been genitally mutilated has the internal capabilities for sexual
pleasure. Finally the combined capabilities are] internal capabilities
combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the
function. A woman who is not mutilated but who has been widowed as
a child and is forbidden to make another marriage has the internal but
not the combined capability for sexual expression…139
Lastly, Sen makes a “distinction between well-being and agency, which,
together with the distinction between freedom and achievement, structure much of his
recent writing about capabilities.”140 This discussion is missing in Nussbaum because
she believes that her theory can account for these distinctions while not requiring
them.
 Objections to the Capabilities Approach
While this is not the place for a thorough discussion of the capabilities
approach, a review of certain basic objections to the capabilities approach is worth
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doing. It clarifies the approach and demonstrates its flexibility and resilience.
Peter Vallentyne
Nussbaum argues that all States ought to guarantee these capabilities in their
laws. Some of these capabilities that she calls basic capabilities, ought to come to the
threshold of functioning. Others are to be left at the threshold of functioning to people
to decide which to develop. Peter Vallentyne argues that the capabilities approach, at
best, is nothing beyond well-being theory. He adds that all capabilities ought to reach
the level of functioning because if we are after a good life for individuals, a life that
has all functioning is a better life than one that merely has opportunities for
functioning. We do not have a way to rate the value of capabilities and therefore, it is
“arbitrary to exclude some functioning that contribute to such value [be it good life or
other things].”141
There are two things to be said here. First, Vallentyne ignores the role of
autonomy. I might have a better life if I know how to sing well but I decide not to
develop this capability. I also want it to be there if in the future I decide to do so.
However, I do not want to be forced to bring that capability to functioning. That
would be a violation of my autonomy. So, to say that we ought to be concerned with
the level of functioning for all capabilities as Vallentyne does, I would be forced to
develop capabilities to the level of functioning against my will. This undermines a
good life. Second, we are not arbitrarily picking from the capabilities to get them to
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functioning level rather, Nussbaum argues, the basic capabilities are necessary for the
development of the others without which others cannot be developed. Because of the
two responses above, Vallentyne’s argument, that capabilities approach and well-
being approach are equivalent, does not hold. Here is his argument:142
Premise one (P1): Capabilities are opportunities to function.
Premise two: (P2): “No functionings are irrelevant to justice (justice is not
concerned solely with basic capabilities.)”
Premise three (P3): “Opportunities are to be understood as effective freedoms
and not merely as control freedom.”
Premise four (P4): “[T]he opportunity for well-being approach is committed
to evaluating opportunities on the basis of their contribution to well being
(quality of life…).” As does capabilities approach p1-p3.
Conclusion (C): Capabilities approach and well-being approaches are
equivalent.
Let us consider this argument.
P1. Capabilities are opportunities to function.
Response: This statement is unclear. Capabilities are not “opportunities” but
rather they are ways that we can be. I might have the capability of political
affiliation but not the opportunity to get it to the functioning level.143 So, it is
false (at least, unclear) to say that capabilities are “opportunities to function.”
They are ways of being that we should have the opportunity to bring them to
the functioning capabilities.
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P2. “No functionings are irrelevant to justice (justice is not concerned solely with
basic capabilities.)”
Response: I discussed this point above. This premise is false. Justice is
Certainly concerned with all capabilities but not with their functioning
because not everyone desires to fulfill all their capabilities. To force people to
do so, is violation of their autonomy and grounds for questioning.
P3. “Opportunities are to be understood as effective freedoms and not merely as
control freedom.”
Note: “Effective freedom to function includes all possible functioning
independently of whether one’s will plays any role in bring them
about….Control freedom to function is based on those possible functionings
that one can bring about, or at least sufficiently influence the probability of
coming about, through the appropriate of one’s will.”144 That is, to have
effective freedom regardless of what I desire, there are people who ought to
provide for me. However, control freedom refers to freedoms that I can bring
about things that I desire. Under effective freedom, Vallentyne gives us the
example of a person who is in coma. She has a will to eat but cannot.
Although she might have the will, she does not have the control to feed
herself. So if others feed her, she has effective freedom.
Response: First, I don’t believe that this is a very clear example because her
will is not known. However, suppose she had in some past expressed her
desire about being fed or not, if ever in that state. In this case, using these
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distinctions, she has both freedoms. Further, if we force someone to do things
that they do not will, going back to discussion of P2, then we are infringing on
one’s autonomy and way of life. Suppose I do not want to own home
furniture. I find furniture arrogant, useless, and classist to own. I would find it
intrusive and at least questionable if someone shows up to my house with a
truck full of furniture as a gift for me. So long as I am not violating the liberty
principle, and buying furniture is something I am able to do and choose not to,
I ought not be forced to do so. This is a crucial point that Vallentyne seems to
overlook.
P4. “the opportunity for well-being approach is committed to evaluating opportunities
on the basis of their contribution to well being (quality of life…).” As does
capabilities approach p1-p3.
C. Capabilities approach and well-being approaches are equivalent.
So, in conclusion Vallentyne does not fully do justice to nuances of the capabilities
approach and merely reduces it to the well-being approach. I think that his argument
fails.
Interestingly, on one hand Vallentyne criticizes the capabilities approach for
not promoting functioning for all capabilities, on the other hand, others criticize
Nussbaum for demanding that all governments, even non-liberal ones to bring
everyone above the level of functioning. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has been
criticized for being universalist. The critics argue that expecting non-liberal
governments to guarantee her list of capabilities in their constitution is nothing but
imperialism and arrogant intrusion on their freedom.
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Hilary Charlesworth
Hilary Charlesworth argues, “The development of international law relied on
European ideals as universals and these standards were imposed by colonialism and
conquest.”145 Such imposition has in many cases harmed the colonized people.
Examples of such cases are endless but one that hits closest to home is the
colonization of Africa and North America.
Charlesworth’s concern is worth considering. She is right to be concerned
about imposing Western values on those who disagree with us. However, there are
ethically relevant distinctions to be made that he is ignoring. Not every universal
value (or its imposition) is a violation of one’s cultural autonomy or a nation’s
sovereignty. We should be cautious. People’s demand for equal rights in the non-
Western societies has often been criticized as being Western. Some societies, such as
the Taliban and to some extent the Amish, consider educating girls and women as a
false value. A woman’s job, her proper destiny and fulfillment, is to be a wife and
mother. But clearly, a society that enforces this vision puts women in a disadvantaged
position in relation to men, and limits their choices immensely. Applying universal
values to these kinds of issues that have to do with discrimination based on sex,
gender, and within family life, is not “imperialism”. It is a moral demand to allow all
people to live full human lives and have the opportunity to make authentic (and
informed) choices in their lives. This is not an act of colonialism, where people are
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being forced to serve a colonial power.
In her paper, Missionary Positions, Ann Cudd gives us two responses to this
kind of charge that is noteworthy. First, she argues that we have to make distinction
between imperialism, missionism, Eurocentrism, and humanism;
(1) imperialism, which seeks to impose a universal standard that
merely serve the interests of the imperial power; (2) “missionism,”
which attempts to change the deepest spiritual commitments of the
subject of the work; (3) Eurocentrism (Americanism?)’ which imposes
its aesthetic and cultural norms on others; and (4) humanism, which
tries to help the oppressed find a path out of their oppression.146
Of the four mentioned above, humanism is the only justified method of intervening
into another’s culture. (1-3) refer to a situation that intervening nation, which Cudd
calls “invaders”, do not have the right intentions. For a group to justly intervene with
one’s ways of living, they must have right intentions. Their strategy ought to be
effective and the outcome ought to be considered.147 Imperialists, missionaries,
Eurocentrics, and humanists might all have the same goal in mind, but, their
intentions differ and that makes a moral difference. Imperialists invade with their own
benefits in mind. They will use both physical and material forces to benefit
themselves. Humanists cannot be equated with the imperialists because, as Cudd
reminds us, imperialism “is not simply an attitude, but involves real, material injury
from which psychological injuries may well follow.”148 Majority of the accusations
made to people such as Nussbaum are not founded because she certainly does not
have the imperialist intentions or methods. Nussbaum does not believe that we ought
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to force people to develop each of their capabilities. However, the opportunity for
their development ought to be guaranteed by every constitution.
Second, Cudd rightly argues, that “the postcolonial theorists assume a
mistaken essentialist notion of culture.”149 But cultures are fluid and are always
changing. For instance, there has been a huge debate regarding female genital
mutilation and how we, in the West, ought to respond to it. The charges of cultural
imperialism were and are still brought up against condemning this practice. However,
it should be noted that the way that people have looked at this practice has changed
and there are numerous (internal) activists that work on banning this practice. There is
nothing essential to this practice or the African cultures that cannot be changed. There
are some groups that have managed to ban this practice in numerous places.150
Traditional cultures seem to be most concerned about the status of women in
their society and how the West affects their choices and ways of life. Surely, to point
out to women that they live oppressed lives as virtual slaves to their families, could
cause chaos, confusion, and even inspire popular feminist insurrection in the hope of
breaking through the “wires” that keep them caged.151 While the dissemination of
universalist values is destabilizing, and has been in the West too, this is well and good
in the end. This is not a violation of cultural autonomy. It is a prerequisite for it.
Cultures are the activities of people. To be autonomous is to make autonomous
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choices. People are not able to make autonomous choices if they are not given a
choice, or one that is given to them is not one even worth considering. An illustration:
Amish children only attend school up to 8th grade. However, at age 18, each child is
allowed to leave and explore the world outside of the Amish community. They must
make the choice of staying out or coming back to live in the community by the end of
two years. This might seem like freedom, but is it? I would say, at least for women, it
is not. Boys are taught many traits that they can use to provide for themselves, if they
decide to integrate in the larger society. So if they leave as young adults, they are
ready to hold jobs and make a living. It is a different story for the girls, who have not
been taught the same things. Girls are taught how to be a good wife and mother. What
chances do they have to make a good life for themselves outside the Amish
community without much education or a trait? Not much. A universal value that
demands that they all people receive at least some kind of training (or at least a high
school diploma) in order to be in the same playing field as the men, is threatening to
the values of the community, but it allows for equality among the women and men.
They might decide to come back and live the Amish life, but that choice is not the
least worse; it is one that they have freely chosen among equally viable others. That is
true cultural autonomy.
Nussbaum’s view is not one that condemns traditional roles, be they in
Western or nonwestern societies. However, she argues that “if women fully in
possession of the capabilities on the list want to choose a traditional gender-divided
mode of life,… any good political liberalism should create spaces for them to do
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so.”152 One might argue that the women in the western liberal world are also faced
with many obstacles and the choices that they make do not always leave them in
flourishing situations. This is true. However, we have great many choices in choosing
our career, mate, education, and the number of children that we will have. Having
options might cause confusion and anxiety, but anxiety about making the right
decision for ourselves is far superior to the anxiety, even despair, of having no choice
in our lives. Nussbaum writes,
We should say, first, that if divorce and career difficulties are painful,
as they surely are, they are a lot less painful than being unable to work
when one is starving because one will be beaten if one goes outdoors,
or being unable to leave an abusive marriage because of illiteracy and
lack of employment skills.153
Nussbaum refers to women in India, who do not have to worry about making
decisions about these matters, but suffer worse harms. If a woman loses her husband
and she has no sons able or willing to care for her, she often suffers malnutrition,
starvation, injury, or death. The husband’s family might beat her if she tries to find
work to feed herself.154 Surely, for many people divorce is one of the most difficult
experiences of their lives, but it is worse if one’s life (or mental health) is in danger
by living in a physically (or emotionally) abusive marriage. Anne Phillips argues that
“Nussbaum's version of feminist internationalism is built on the significance of
choice in liberal philosophy, and yet there is the implication that the choice of
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inequality would be irrational in some way.”155 According to Phillips, Nussbaum
condemns decisions that leave us in unequal positions in our family, politics, etc. For
example, suppose a society that women “chose” to be inferior (unequal) to men.
Consider this scenario: a husband and wife were discussing their future with a
professor at South Texas College. The husband was planning to go to law school and
become a lawyer while the wife was going to study to be a law office manager. When
the professor encouraged them both to go to law school or perhaps she should be the
lawyer and him the manager, she said, “no, I should not be superior to him.”156
Although this is not an ideal situation for Nussbaum, she could respond that
inequality can be chosen, but an acceptable inequality should be a result of informed,
educated, uncoerced choice and I add, not one that is made by all women in the
society because they are women. However, it is possible that informed, educated, and
free women might choose to live as second-class citizens, although it is highly
unlikely that a woman who has the skills to be self-sufficient, would choose
conditions that assure her inferiority. Nussbaum’s approach leaves open this course of
action. However, when a woman is content with having no formal education, no legal
rights of divorce, no social rights to work, or faces beatings, or even starvation if she
rejects the inferior status and condition imposed on her by her society, we have
legitimate grounds to doubt her acquiescence is a free choice.157 Does she have a free
or autonomous choice? Would she have chosen another sort of life if these extreme
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conditions did not exist? It is possible, might even be probable. Choices made under
such harsh conditions and perilous alternatives are suspicious. When a Mexican
illegal says that she is happy to be living in a modest house in South Texas without
running water or electricity she might be sincere, but we have to consider the
alternative that she escaped and not accept her willingness to remain in such
conditions as a free choice if her only alternative is to return to the far greater poverty
she fled from.
Under the capabilities approach, the government should not set unjustified
limitation on developing our lives and our capabilities. We might decide to limit our
own capabilities or not develop some of them but that choice ought to be an informed
choice. Consider a former criminal defense attorney, Thomas Van Orden, who in
spite of his great talent and abilities, has chosen to make a Washington D. C.
homeless shelter his home.158 Assuming this person was not pushed out in the street
and did not lose his job due to some unjust reasons, then it is reasonable to conclude
that he has acquired his disadvantaged position by free choice. Perhaps he finds his
new way of life mentally and emotionally more relaxing, less constraining in his time,
and a better way of life free from other’s intrusion. Although there are other equally
viable options available to him, he has decided not to develop his capabilities or no
longer use them in ways that we might believe they might best be used.
By comparison, this is not the case with majority of the population of the
homeless community. They are often runaway children, mentally or physically
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handicapped, or those who have lost their jobs and consequently their homes. These
are people who have not chosen to live in a disadvantaged situation and have little
chance of developing their capabilities. Nor is this the case with the abused housewife
who is not permitted to have friends, leave her house or keep a job. Nussbaum points
out, “women have all too often been treated as the supporters of the ends of others
rather than as ends in their own right...”159 Often these women consider their ways of
life the only way they can live and see no way to improve it. Van Orden, the
homeless lawyer, has made an informed decision and has chosen to be homeless and
he is not forced into a situation that is potentially harmful to him physically or
mentally. In summary, Nussbaum is not necessarily concerned with lack of choice but
rather lack of free choice. Choices are not free if we are forced to make them by
others. Some choices might appear to be free while they are not. They are due to
internalization of expectation of inferiority. If we are convinced that we are in some
way or another inferior to others, although our choices are free, we could still be
oppressed. So, if one makes choices based on false consciousness, one is not making
a free choice.
Charlesworth is also concerned about the implications of universal rights talk
on the women of underdeveloped nations. She warns that we ought to be hesitant to
talk about universal civil and political rights for women of the third world because
their economic plight is more pressing. The worries we have in a liberal democratic
society are very different. She puts it this way:
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The search for universal women's predicaments can obscure
differences among women and homogenize women's experiences.
Feminists from the developing world often charge Western feminists
with being overly concerned with the acquisition of civil and political
rights while ignoring the significance of economic and social rights,
such as the right to food and to housing, or collective rights such as the
right to self-determination and development.160
For Nussbaum, the concern would be that the capabilities approach fails to give
urgent social and economic needs priority. Charlesworth seems to assume that when
we talk about women’s right in a universal context that we are not taking into account
their basic need such as food, housing or collective rights. Nussbaum repudiates this.
The rights that Charlesworth has mentioned here will not be actualized unless women
gain the opportunity to develop their capabilities necessary to ensure these rights.
According to both Nussbaum and Sen, many governments cannot ensure that
everyone gets food all the time but can create and maintain policies, institutions, and
programs that ensure people’s development of their capabilities required to access
Rawls’s primary goods. Primary goods are “various social conditions and all-purpose
means that are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully
exercise their two moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the
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good.”161 And become morally equal members of the society with full capability to
cooperate in social and political real.162
 Both Sen and Nussbaum agree that there is a very tight correlation between
the primary goods and the capabilities. According to Nussbaum, the list of primary
goods includes both “thing-like terms and capability-like terms” but she uses them in
terms of capabilities.163 Sen asserts that unlike what Rawls might have intended, his
theory seeks the capabilities; “He [Rawls] motivates the focus on primary goods by
discussion what the primary goods enable people to do. It is only because of his
assumption – often implicit – that the same mapping of primary goods to capabilities
holds for all, that he can sensibly concentrate on primary goods rather than on
corresponding capabilities.”164 Sen seems to claim that Rawls is talking about
capabilities all along. The list of primary goods is a list of basic needs to get people to
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the level of functioning. It seems that without those, we would not have much
opportunity to develop our own comprehensive conceptions of the good.165
Further, Rawls’s list of basic rights, which seems to be an extension of his list
of primary goods, is also covered on Nussbaum’s view. According to Rawls, the most
basic human rights are,
[T]he right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty
(to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a
sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom to
religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal
equality as expressed by the rule of natural justice (that is, that similar
cases be treated similarly).166
Although this seems like a short list, as Rex Martin points out, these are just stepping-
stones and are not the only rights that Rawls believes we are entitled to.167 If we are
given the rights that Rawls names in this passage, then we are preserving the option
that education and earning skills will help one with one’s economic efficiency and
self-determination. Nussbaum is more explicit than Rawls. She addresses the reality
that different societies will inevitably, and reasonably, contribute different levels of
resources to the development of different human capabilities. Nussbaum argues that
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there is a complex threshold in each society for the just development of each
particular capability. The government has the obligation to assure that all its citizens
reach that level. So, putting it in the language of rights, we have a positive right to
Rawls’s list of liberties (and rights) and Nussbaum’s list of capabilities.
To have a positive right to something entails that there is someone that
guarantees the actualization of that right. For instance, when I say that I have positive
right to food, I have that right whether or not I make a living wage that allows me to
eat. The positive right ensures that I eat even if, I make no wages to feed myself or
fail to be a productive member of the society. Having a negative right to something is
merely “not [to] be stopped from doing something” in this case not being kept from
doing what it takes to feed myself.168 Sen questions the legitimacy of having merely
negative rights. Sometimes, it seems that we have to take some positive actions to
make sure that people’s negative rights are not violated. Sen puts it nicely;
Indeed, valuing negative freedom must have some positive
implications. If I see that negative freedom is valuable, and I hear that
you are about to be molested by someone, and I can stop him or her
from doing that, then I should certainly be under some obligation to
consider doing that stopping. It is not adequate for me to resist
molesting you; it is necessary that I value the things I can do to stop
others from molesting you. I would fail to value negative freedom if I
were to refuse to consider what I could do in defense of negative
freedom.169
In this quote Sen argues that it is not sensible to say that we do not have any positive
freedoms but only negative ones. There are times when we have to take positive steps
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to ensure people’s negative rights are not violated.170 Capabilities approach aims to
guarantee that each person has the opportunity (positive right) to develop his or her
own conception of the good.
So, each person has to reach the “threshold level of each capability, beneath
which it is held that truly human functioning is not available to citizens; the social
goal should be understood in terms of getting citizens above this capability
threshold.”171 Different people in different cultures will choose differently and that
will account for cultural, as well as, self-determination. Surely, a government that
does not guarantee this threshold of functioning for each person cannot say that the
people in the non-Western societies are culturally different than people in the West,
and that Western universal values do not apply to them. People should be given the
opportunity to develop their own conception of the good. If the government does not
give this freedom to its citizens, it is impossible to say that people in X choose A, and
people in Y choose B, because we would not know what they choose if they did have
the opportunity to do so. So, it is absurd to say that people of X have the culture A
and since we have culture C, our principles do not apply to them. At best, we can say
that they have culture A inflicted on them.  It is an infliction because people have not
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been given the opportunity to decide their personal or political goals. However, not
everyone would choose to develop their capabilities nor should they be forced to do
so, but the potential has to be there for them if they so choose.
For instance, although in the United States women have been given the
opportunity to be economically self-sufficient, not every woman takes this
opportunity and develops it. The same can be said about people of the developing
world. If they do not want to develop certain capabilities, they ought not be forced to
do that. However, the opportunity has to be there for them to so choose and determine
their own conception of the good and their politics. Otherwise, there is a violation of
their liberty and such violation is not justified, as long as they are not harmful to the
members of their society.
Charlesworth is concerned about the collective rights. These are groups’ rights
to self-determination, safety from violation of their identity and cultural imperialism.
She asks us to inquire about “whose culture is being invoked, what the status of the
interpreter is, in whose name the argument is advanced, and who the primary
beneficiaries of the invocation of culture are.”172 I have to some extent responded to
some of these concerns. Nussbaum accounts for these rights in her Central Human
Functional Capabilities and they are protected as long as they do not violate the
liberty principle. In her book, Women and Human Development she explicitly points
out that her view does account for plurality. Different cultures, people, groups, etc.,
choose to develop different capabilities. However, that is, as long as they do not
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violate anyone’s ability to develop his or her capabilities.173 Group rights can be
harmful to some members of that group. Those ought to be challenged. Susan Moller
Okin wonderfully illustrates how special group rights could be problematic when we
begin with a concern for the individual. In short, she is concerned with special group
rights that leave women in those groups in oppressive situations. For instance,
granting African immigrants the right to genitally mutilate their daughters violates the
children’s right to safety as well as violating their capability of bodily integrity.174
People are entitled to collective rights as long as they do not violate the liberty
principle. Generally, Nussbaum gives us the following five ways that we could follow
in order to make room for plurality;
(1) We specify the list at a rather high level of generality, leaving a lot
of room for nations to specify the items in accordance with their
history and their current problems….
(2) We make capabilities and not functioning the appropriate political
goal.
(3) We put the various liberties, and choice itself, in a place of
prominence on the list.
(4) We interpret the whole list as a list of capabilities to be promoted
for political purposes, a core that can be the object of an overlapping
consensus of many distinct conceptions, not as a fully comprehensive
conception of the good.
(5) On the whole, we leave implementation to the internal political
processes of each republican state. Thus we are advising and not
requiring.175
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This summarizes the responses to objections of cultural imperialism or
charges of insensitivity to others legitimate claims to self-determination.
Richard Arneson
Richard Arneson brings the final problem. He argues that the idea of threshold
is arbitrary and cannot be justifiably instituted. He sets out one form of the problem
this way,
One difficulty is how one nonarbitrarily sets the threshold level. Why
here and not higher or lower? What we have is a smooth continuum of
possible levels of overall capability for flourishing. Higher capability
is always better than lower capability. But I do not see how much any
unique level (not even a broad thick line) can be picked out such that if
a person has that level, she has “enough.”176
There are three concerns we face with setting thresholds: first, on the individual level
Arneson is concerned that we have to draw the threshold level arbitrarily because
each individual’s level is different. But this is really an empirical issue, to be
determined for each individual, in the context of our resources. This is not a
theoretical problem. Second, is the problem of determining what is generally
sufficient, because a higher capability for flourishing is always preferable to a lesser.
Again, a misunderstanding of the empirical element seems at work here. If each
individual is dealt with so they can make autonomous choices as effectively as our
resources allow, we have succeeded in securing their basic capabilities. Third, some
capabilities are basic and others are not. Why should our constitutional guarantees be
at a basic level of capabilities spectrum and not the nonbasic too? The reason is due to
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the fact that what Arneson calls “lower capabilities” are those necessary for the
development of the “higher ones”. Each person will have the opportunity to develop
his or her own talents, capabilities, and the conception of the good. There is no limit
for one’s development of capabilities once they go over the threshold.
Moreover, Arneson is concerned that Nussbaum does not give us clear
guidelines on what is required to get people to the desired level. Nussbaum responds:
[T]his [setting threshold] is best done by internal processes of each
liberal democracy, as it interprets its own constitution. History shows
that this is not only possible but is also quite a reasonable way to
balance concerns for history and culture against the demands of a
universal norm.177
So, each government decides how much they are able to do (economically and
culturally) to achieve the fullest opportunities for capability development. The
historical and cultural aspects of each society must also be considered. Consequently,
a pre-democratic culture that does not yet highly value the capability of political
affiliation, the threshold would be set below a culture that openly encourages its
citizens to participate in the politics. However, the “Levels should be set high enough
to goad people to take intelligent action, but they should not be set so high as to bring
the whole document into discredit.”178 No basic human functioning capability must be
destroyed or undermined, unless a government is utterly incapable of makings those
guarantees.
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Groups or Individuals?
The last concern one might have concerns the capabilities approach in relation
to our criteria of oppression set in chapter two. The worry is that a theory of
oppression based on capabilities approach, requires us to forgo the criteria of group
membership.  This is not the case because although my theory is individual based
(each person must have the constitutional guarantees that are based on the
capabilities), it does not contradict our group membership criterion. We can recognize
oppression of a group if one’s capabilities are thwarted due to the fact that she or he
belongs to a particular group. For instance, if in a society women’s bodily integrity is
violated because they are women, and it meets the other criteria of oppression, then
we know that women are oppressed.179 However, if a particular woman is severely
mentally handicapped and does not have the functioning ability to make decisions
about her body, then making decisions for her is not the violation of her bodily
integrity because she does not have that functioning ability to make many of the
decisions on behalf of herself. The capability of bodily integrity is, “Being able to
move freely from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign,
i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual
abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for
choice in matters of reproduction.”180 Although the severely mentally handicapped
woman is unable to “move freely from place to place” and to limit that is not a
                                                
179 Also see Ann Cudd’s “How to Explain Oppression: Criteria of Adequacy for Normative
Explanatory Theories,” in Philosophy of Social Sciences, 35, March 2005, see pages 20-49.
180 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 78.
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violation of this capability, being sexually assaulted is a violation of this capability
because it grants her a right to safety.
 In Summary
I believe the capabilities approach illuminates the nature of oppression. The
capabilities approach focuses on the site of oppression, the individual, and reveals a
vast range of morally important characteristics of the individual, all of which play a
powerful role in allowing us to describe exactly how oppression occurs and what its
remedies might be. As long as the governments guarantee the developments of these
capabilities to the threshold of functioning, we can get closer to a society that is just
and is beneficial to its members. The capabilities approach takes the focus away from
society as a whole or GNP and puts it on the individual, where it belongs. A country
might have a high GNP but also be plagued with poverty due to government
corruption or lack of concern for the living standards of its citizens. The capabilities
approach looks at the individuals’ lives to determine if one’s society is just.
Once the government guarantees these capabilities, we ought to be free to
choose to develop any of our capabilities and other ways of functioning if their
development does not violate the liberty principle. If one violates another’s
development of capabilities, we are justified to keep her or him from developing
them. As Nussbaum points out, not all capabilities ought to be guaranteed by the
constitution. For instance, the capabilities to commit atrocities are not protected.
However, we are able to express freedom of speech although it might be offensive to
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some groups. So, to harm is violating one’s capabilities that one is entitled to develop
(which, as mentioned, are ones that do not violate the liberty principle).
The capabilities approach is a good basis for the discussion of rights. In the
next chapter, I will argue that the capabilities generate rights. The capabilities
approach best answers many of the questions we might have about what rights are,
who has them, etc. So, in essence, harm is violation of one’s rights, which are
generated by capabilities.
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Four
Capabilities as Rights-Generating
Many philosophers agree that at least some people have some rights, but they
disagree on what those rights actually are, where they come from, who has them,
whether there are correlative duties, or whether rights are positive or negative.181
Whatever rights are, Rex Martin argues, they are, at least, “fairly determinate
things.”182 The theories of rights are numerous and there is much discussion on this
topic. Due to space constraints, I will only discuss the three prominent views on rights
(rights as entitlements, claims, and wellbeing), and point out how the capabilities
approach might answer some of their concerns. Next, I will discuss the differing
views on where do rights come from (natural rights or civil rights). Finally, I will
show that the capabilities approach, outlined in the last chapter, could answer many
questions on rights (at least the ones mentioned here). The idea is that if we ground
rights in the capabilities, then we can know “what the motivating concerns [of rights]
are and what the goal is.”183 The goal here is to get everyone up to the threshold of
functioning. It is not sensible to give someone the right to have food, when this
                                                
181 Alan Gewirth defines positive and negative rights as follows. “Negative rights entail negative
duties, i.e., duties to forbear or refrain from interfering with persons’ having the objects of their
rights…Positive rights, on the other hand, entail positive duties, i. e., duties to help persons to have the
object of their rights.” See “Are All Rights Positive Rights?,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.
30, no. 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Summer 2001), p. 322.
182 Rex Martin, A System of Rights, p. 26-27. This view of rights opposes Jack Donnelly’s view that
rights are relative to a situation such as whether the person deserves to have that right not violated (an
imprisoned criminal, for instance), or to a situation whether the it is impossible for the government to
provide that right. (See “Human Rights as Natural Rights,” in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 3
(John Hopkins University Press, Autumn 1982), p. 395-397. According to Martin, “rights are
established ways of acting or being acted toward, or being treated” (Martin, A System of Rights, p. 42).
183 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 97.
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person has no means of acquiring any nor is there anyone who will acquire it for
them. Women in India have the right to work but many widowed Indian women are
unable to get jobs because they are harassed by their families for doing so. At the
same time they lack the protection of the government in these situations. These
limitations keep women from exercising their right to work. Under the capabilities
approach, the government ought to make it possible for women to hold jobs.184 So,
the capabilities approach gives us guidelines to what we ought to do to make sure that
citizens in fact do actually have the right to food or jobs and the means to actualize
the goal of being fed. Capabilities answer the questions of what rights we have, and
what ought to be done about them; without this sort of grounding, rights remain
ambiguous.
In this chapter, I want to erect a bridge between rights and capabilities. I will
argue that capabilities generate rights. For example, if I have the capability of being
involved in politics, I ought to have the right to do so (as far as it does not violate
others’ rights). According to Bernard Williams, we have to work on the
understanding of the connection (or relationship) between these two concepts (rights
and capabilities) but capabilities are a better way than rights to talk about human
situations. In addition to this, rights talk is more obscure than talking about
                                                
184 If the government does not protect those rights, women still have them but they are being violated. I
believe civil rights reflect human (natural) rights. We have human rights by virtue of being human. So,
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human rights, then we still have rights. They, however, are violated. Derrick Darby, on the other hand,
has an externalist view of rights. He would argue that no rights are violated, because we do not have
rights outside of civil rights. However, he adds that although we don’t have the rights that the
government does not give us, we should. (See Derrick Darby, “Blacks and Rights: A Bittersweet
Legacy,” in Law, Culture, and the Humanities, 2, 2006, p. 420-439; and Darby, “Unnatural Rights,” in
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 33, 2003, p. 49-82.)
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capabilities. The capabilities approach to rights starts with what we can do and be as
humans and what leads to flourishing human lives and ends with what rights we
ought to have. According to Williams,
The notion of a basic human right seems to me obscure enough, and I
would rather come at it from the perspective of basic human
capabilities. I would prefer capabilities to do the work, and if we are
going to have a language or rhetoric of rights, to have it delivered from
them [capabilities]….185
Williams’s view is closer to my view than Nussbaum’s. I want to draw rights from
capabilities while, Nussbaum wants to keep the two different dialogues around but
keep them somewhat separate. However, she is correct to point out that “thinking in
terms of capabilities gives us a benchmark as we think about what it is to secure a
right to someone.”186 We start with capabilities that people have or can develop and
see what it means for them to have the ability and to put those capabilities to work as
each individual chooses. We can then see what the government ought to aim at in
order to have flourishing citizens in the society while they decide what rights they
should grant to the citizens.
Although Nussbaum argues that capabilities should be the basis of judgment
in a society, she does not want to get rid of rights talk altogether for the following
four reasons: (1) Since we are familiar with that kind of talk, the rights talk focuses
our attention on people’s claims to just treatment by their government, and (2) just
claim to certain things by virtue of being human. She asserts that the talk of rights
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edited by G. Hawthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 100.
186 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 98.
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gets more attention than talk of capabilities. Further, (3) when we talk of rights, it
often entails the importance of choice and autonomy that capabilities talk does not
immediately bring to mind; Lastly (4), as I mentioned earlier, although people have
many disagreements about the status of rights, there seems to be agreements about
having rights.187 So, in short, Nussbaum holds on to the rights talk because of the
familiarity of the right language used while the details of capabilities approach are
being worked out and becomes more familiar.
Sen too holds on to the concept of rights but he looks at rights from a different
angle. He believes, “[p]olitical rights are important not only for the fulfillment of
needs, they are crucial also for the formulation of needs.”188 The needs are formulated
not by what people believe their rights are but rather by human beings need to
develop a flourishing life with full dignity and human value which includes being
able to decide one’s own comprehensive conception of the good and live by it. I will
argue there is no need for the dichotomy of rights and capabilities because
capabilities are building blocks of rights. Let us start with a discussion of rights.
Rights: Entitlements, Claims, or Wellbeing
There are three ways to understand rights: as entitlements, claims or
wellbeing. In this section, I will briefly describe these and point out some deficiencies
in each view and where my view falls in between the three.
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Entitlements
Tara Smith challenges welfare rights in support of entitlements. In her
formulation of welfare rights, rights are “entitlements to goods that a person
possesses in virtue of nothing more than her need for the goods.”189 According to
Smith, rights are entitlements. Rights as entitlements are claims that we are entitled to
use based on “a particular moral principle: the principle that governs freedom of
action in social context.”190 This is negative freedom that requires others not to
interfere with people’s actions, as long as they are not harming others. Naturally, this
formulation of rights does not protect people from “unfortunate circumstances,
human biology, or accidents of nature.”191 In short, Smith’s view is that if we
understand rights properly, then we will accept the entitlement theory and not welfare
theory. The most prominent supporter of this view of rights is Robert Nozick.
According to Nozick rights are “permissions to do something and correlative
obligations of others not to interfere.”192 In Nozick’s view my right to life would
entail that no one ought to kill me and if someone does try that they be stopped. So,
we are free to do as we wish without interference of others, unless we are violating
others’ freedom. Smith adds, “rights are entitlements, expressing certain ways that
people may not treat one another.”193 Libertarians, including Nozick and Smith,
                                                
189 Tara Smith, “On Deriving Rights to Goods from Rights to Freedom,” in Law and Philosophy, vol.
11, no. 3 (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), p. 218. I should add this need is
interesting if it is required to bring people up to the threshold of functioning. She does not make such
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190 Ibid., p. 220.
191 Ibid., p. 221.
192 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 92.
193 Smith, On Deriving Rights to Goods from Rights to Freedom, p. 220. Italic is added.
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generally assert that the only time that we have legitimate ground for coercion is to
prevent one’s freedom from being violated. So, if I am entitled to free speech, it does
not follow that people ought to provide me a “soap box” but rather they must not stop
me from climbing onto my soapbox.194
Unlike the capabilities approach that obligates the government to get everyone
to the threshold level of functioning, the entitlement theory leaves everyone to get
him or herself to that level if they so wish. The capabilities approach aims to give
everyone an equal playing ground (same starting point) to live their lives. Given that
people have different talents, economic status, life situations, etc., we have different
levels of capabilities and different abilities. So, rights under the capabilities approach
will give different people different content to our rights. I might have a right to
government assistance when my next-door neighbor does not due to our life
circumstances. On the other hand, Smith argues “The freedom that rights protect is
not freedom from unfortunate circumstances, human biology, or accidents of nature.
Rights shield freedom only from another persons’ potential intrusions.”195 That is
having rights means that others do not harm one or interfere with one’s practice of his
or her rights. These are negative rights. As mentioned in chapter three, to have a
negative right to something is just “not [to] be stopped from doing something.”
Positive rights, on the other hand, entail that someone does something to ensure the
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, Autumn 1978), p. 66, 68.
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actualization of that right. Welfare rights theorists would demand some version of
positive rights.196
Smith does not agree with positive rights for three reasons: first, because in
her view, rights are not to be looked at as providing a complete moral (social justice)
theory but rather as “one component of a complete moral theory.”197 There are other
moral concerns that one might have that individuals should take into account in virtue
of other people’s needs and welfare, which might be taken to mean charity. Second,
she argues that to have welfare rights chains us to people’s needs. Third, we will end
up with a communist government if we give people what they need. I will discuss
these throughout.
The capabilities approach keeps people from “potential intrusions” and does
more. It also accounts for difference in circumstances, biology, or luck because due to
these factors and more, some people need more resources than others to get to the
functioning level. If justice requires that everyone have the same opportunities, then
we ought to account for those situations mentioned here. For instance, a child who
was raised in a family of intellectuals is much more advantaged than the child of an
emancipated slave. The former child expects a good life with dignity and endless
opportunities but the latter expects a hard life with little respect or few opportunities.
If we take the traditional entitlement theory of rights seriously, then as long as the
pursuit of education is not actively interfered with, justice has been served. There are
no other obligations on the government to provide the necessary means for the latter
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child to also reap the benefits of such rights. I beg to differ. The opportunity for the
former child is there and she perhaps has the resources to ensure her success. The
latter child however, needs more goods (for instance, money, food, healthcare) to
make this opportunity a real live option for her. If we are committed to equality, it is
apparent that one child will have to receive more to exercise her opportunities and
develop her capabilities. The right to education could be meaningless to the child of
the emancipated slave because she does not have the resources to practice that as a
real option.198 Rights without positive obligations to protect them are meaningless.
Henry Shue makes the same claim when he says,
[T]he infant and the aged do not need to be assaulted in order to be
deprived of health, life or the capacity to enjoy active rights. The
classic liberal’s main prescription for the good life – do not interfere
with thy neighbor – is the only poison they need.199
If a parent is unable to provide food for her child or an elderly person is unable to get
the medication that he or she needs, merely staying out of their way could leave them
in a grave situation. I agree with Shue that inaction alone is not enough. Inaction is
the poison that kills them. They ought to have a positive right to food and medicine,
which goes beyond inaction in order for that right to make a difference in their lives.
Smith makes a distinction between having rights and exercising them; “to
‘have’ a right is simply to be in possession of it; it is to be entitled to assert the ‘final
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claim’ that a right is. To ‘exercise’ a right, though is actually to invoke it, to make use
of it.”200 This is an interesting distinction that Smith makes. Let us explore this. She
claims that when we exercise our rights we decide to practice them in our lives and no
one ought to interfere. To ‘have’ a right we ought to be able to decide how we should
exercise it. This is the matter of one’s preferences. The capabilities approach would
say that when we have a right we ought to have the preconditions to practice this
right. If I have a right to food, there ought to be preconditions to practice that right.
Smith, or other libertarians ask, “Is it true that a person’s having a right must
incorporate her being able to exercise that right?”201 Smith answers, no. She gives us
the example of someone who has the right to buy beer and the beer store is closed.
She claims that X’s right to buy beer is not violated because she is unable to buy beer.
In her view, clearly, she has the right but cannot exercise it. So, she concludes that to
have a right does not give the rest of us an obligation to make sure that X be able to
exercise that right — in this case, buy beer.
It is hard to imagine that she is serious with this example. Certainly, buying
beer might be a right that one has but (1) there are certainly more pressing rights, for
instance, right to life. Her view implies that if we have a right to life, then no one
ought to do anything to maintain it. Suppose I am at a pool alone. I am drowning but
no one is there to save me. It does not follow that if there are people who can save my
life that it is not their obligation to save me. Even Nozick does not make such a claim.
The capabilities approach makes it clear that the government’s job is to get us to the
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functioning level, if we ourselves cannot, and leave us to decide which of those
opportunities we develop.
One might argue that it is too costly to get everyone to the functioning level
but there are resources available to do so. I should note that some societies do attempt
to bring people to the functioning level but we must do more. For instance, under the
capabilities approach, everyone ought to have the right to political activism. That
might, at least, mean that people be literate and know the constitution. These are the
elements that are already being taught at schools but not adequately. Some children
might need more time to learn to read, write or understand the Constitution. People
often ignore these children and they are left behind. So, a more developed education
system could solve many of these problems with little cost to the citizens. Further, the
children of the elite are more likely to acquire these opportunities than those who live
in impoverished environments. To help people achieve the threshold of functioning is
not as burdensome as one might believe. Take the capability of health for instance.
According to the United Nations High Commission of Refugees and former president
of Ireland, Mary Robinson, it does not take as much as we might believe to vaccinate
all the children in the world and give them clean water.202 If the United States could
spend 75 billion dollars on war in Iraq in one month, which the U.S. did, then we are
able to spend that much in three years to vaccinate all children in the world and give
them clean water. Then why not do so? I believe the answer is simple. It is because of
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classism. We do not realize that poverty is a social problem and not an individual
problem. I do not suggest what Peter Singer does, to give to charity as much as it
takes but remain a bit over their poverty level, but there is great evidence that we can
do much more than we are willing to do.203
(2) Smith commits a strawperson fallacy when she uses trivial examples such
as buying beer and closed beer stores. She minimizes really awful human situations to
the analogy of beer and the opportunity to buy beer and then attacks the claim that if I
have a right to buy beer there has to be someone that has to be there to sell me beer at
all times. Buying beer is not, according to Smith, a particular right, rather it is
exercising the general right to freedom of action.204 I agree with Smith that to have a
right to buy beer is indeed a particular instance of one’s right to act a certain way and
not a general right to freedom. However, even if we assume that buying beer is
indeed a right, then there are more pressing rights that ought to be discussed or at
least acknowledged. The capabilities approach gives us a list of such rights we can
use as a start. In that same list, we have some capabilities, such as life and health that
ought to come to the functioning level to assure that others can be exercised.
When Smith argues that “a right to freedom does not promise unlimited
abilities to use one’s freedom to satisfy all of one’s desires.” regardless of what
corner of the rights debate one falls on, everyone agrees.205 First, some desires might
be violent ones and violate others’ rights. Second, the “welfarists” do not claim that
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all of our desires ought to be satisfied, rather, they aim to fulfill basic needs (e.g.,
food) so we can exercise other rights. We live in a society that the upper class
benefits from the lower class oppression. It seems that, contrary to Smith’s
proposition that we will be chained to other’s needs, with little harm to ourselves, we
can provide those people’s basic needs. Consider this example, citizens and legal
residents all have the right to get an education in the United States. Suppose that I an
unable to provide my child with the required uniform for school. Smith’s argument
implies that my child does not have the right to a uniform in order to attend school if I
am unable to provide that for her. She would argue that I still do have the right but I
am unable to exercise it. However, in her view, if I am unable to buy a uniform, no
one else is responsible to provide me with one, so I will not have the ability to
exercise my right to education. Social justice requires that we can exercise our rights
in general. Mere words on some document somewhere in some storage does not
benefit anyone if it does not change lives and improve opportunities for better quality
of life.206
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One’s right to education, and in this case right to own a uniform, does not
imply that one have the right to have every desire fulfilled, as Smith argues.207 If this
were the case, then she would be right to say that, “rights would handcuff people to
one another’s desires.”208 Such is not the case. Quite the contrary, the government’s
job ought to be to situate people so they won’t have to be dependent on one another,
can make free, autonomous choices and would not be enslaved by their needs. People
cannot live free lives if their most basic needs are not met.209 Imagine a family in
Thailand who, with the agreement of the daughter, sell her to a brothel.210 Certainly,
she agreed but it was not something that she would have done, if her family had other
options for obtaining food. Although many libertarians believe that their view of
rights would set people free to live as they wish, without much government
assistance, it would only be freedom for middle-class, upper class, the social-elite and
the rich. She does not deny this. She concludes her paper by saying that “it is
undeniable that some people’s freedom ‘buys them less stuff.’”211 This appears
outrageous (as it should) to those who care about justice. The poor would have to
watch while our children survive the greatest medical calamities, and their children
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107
die of strep throat. I see no freedom worthwhile in this. Smith claims that I am
conflating what she is “entitled to take and those which she is not.” For example, the
rich are entitled to medicine and the poor are not, and this is okay so long as no one
kept them from buying medicine or getting jobs that entitled them to buy medicine.
She adds that claiming that a poor person does not have the right to medicine if he
cannot exercise it, is the same as saying, “that a poor person is unfree because she is
not allowed to steal.”212 The difference is obvious. Stealing is taking one’s property
without one’s consent.213 Under no view of rights, including the capabilities approach
has anyone the right to steal from another or harm another if it is not in the case of
self-defense or defense of another. However, the right to medicine is essential to
exercise one’s right to life. As even Hobbes agreed, the government’s job is, at the
very least, to protect the citizens’ lives. Providing medicine to a poor person who is
unable to do so himself falls under the protection of life.  So, the government ought to
provide medicine (positive right) and not merely allowing people to acquire it
(negative right).
The capabilities approach gets away from shallow examples or claims such as
“right to buy beer” and puts emphasis on the rights essential to human flourishing.
Individuals in a society do not start at the same place but it does not follow that one’s
beginning should dictate where one (at least socially) ends up. Rights ought not be
only for the middleclass, upper class, or the social elite. Demanding the government
to provide basic healthcare, education, and adequate protection of citizens, is not an
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argument for communism as Smith implies. We do not have to have a communist
society in order to ensure everyone equal basic needs and to make sure everyone
starts at the same playing ground. Interestingly, a communist nation is unable to
achieve what I am arguing for here. Ann Cudd points out in a capitalist society such
as ours, we have much more resources to bring people to a better state of existence.214
Using Smith’s terms a capitalist society is better situated to assure the exercise of
rights and not merely having rights. One might fail out of school or get fired due to
his or her own failures; however, initial assistance for getting a job — say, having an
education — ought to be provided if we care about equality, human dignity, and
people’s lives.
 We might be unable to use force to get people to classes but more
information might have to be provided for some people to inform them about the
consequences of not taking their education seriously. On the other hand, one might
worry that Smith’s view would do away with the public education system, public
healthcare, farmer’s subsidies, and numerous other public benefits that we take
advantage of in our everyday existence.
Further, the capabilities approach is not a totalitarian approach. We set the
grounds (whatever needed) to bring people up to the threshold of functioning, which
would leave the rest to the individual to decide what to do with their opportunities.
                                                
214 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, p. 122-125.
109
This agrees with Smith that “respecting rights leaves undetermined the results that
people’s actual exercises of freedom will bring about.”215
Before we move on to the concept of rights as claims, it is worth noting
Ronald Dworkin’s view of the entitlement theory. The entitlement view of rights,
according to Dworkin, “uses rather than explains the concept of a right.”216 It does not
really tell us what rights are, rather the theory merely tells us what it would be like to
practice our rights. I think he is onto something. Surprisingly, if we take capabilities
for the basis of rights, then we can use the entitlement theory as actually having a
concept of rights and in addition entitling people to positive rights and not merely
negative rights. Certainly that is not what Nozick and Smith had in mind, but their
entitlement theory can also be extended to entitle us to positive rights as well and
freedom to exercise them. We could have a hybrid of positive right and entitlement
that stem from the capabilities but that is not the traditional understanding of the
entitlement theory. Left wing entitlement theories can be articulated in conjunction
with the capabilities theory to entitle us to positive rights.
Claims Theory
 Joel Feinberg famously defined rights as justified valid claims. According to
Feinberg, “[l]egal claim-rights are necessarily the grounds of other people’s duties
toward the right-holder…. rights are necessarily linked with the duties of other
                                                
215 Smith, On Deriving Rights to Goods from Rights to Freedom, p. 233.
216 Ronald Dworking, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 90.
110
people.”217 So, unlike Nozick and Smith’s view, having a right to education implies
that there is someone who has a duty to provide me with the means to get an
education. Getting an education is a right of each citizen. Therefore, if my child needs
a uniform, pencils, etc., and I am unable to provide them for her, someone else
(possibly the government) ought to provide that for her. Shue also agrees that merely
having a right is not adequate to respect a right. There has to be someone who has an
obligation (duty) to ensure what is essential to exercise that right. This view of rights
has caused many controversies over what it means to have a claim, what duty
correlates with it, and who has this obligation and to what extent. I will explore some
of these problems here, starting with Rex Martin’s concern about the vagueness of a
claim.
According to Martin, having a claim is unclear. He asks if having a claim to
something is merely having one’s concerns heard. For example, if I have a claim to
my car, is that claim met if someone hears me talking about it? Surely not, because if
the reason that I am claiming my car is because it is stolen, having someone hear me
out will not get my car back. However, this is a beginning of getting to my claims
about my car. Once this claim (of hearing me out) is satisfied we arrive at the “valid
claim” which might entail that one sees my title and is assured that I have not sold my
car to anyone else or that I have not defaulted on my car payment and had it
repossessed. When “a threshold of satisfaction [of a valid claim] has actually been
achieved, the claim becomes a valid claim-to. It has then become the ground of other
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people’s duties.” The claim-to is a necessary condition for claim-against, which gives
other people duties and obligations.218 So, merely having a valid claim does not get
my stolen car back to me. I have to have a claim-to something and claim-against
someone to get my car back.
The controversy here comes about when we claim that if one has a right then
someone else has a duty based on this right towards the right holder. Consider an
example articulated by Phillip Montague. According to Montague, if we have an
obligation not to lie to someone then that person has the right not to be lied to but he
says, that is an inadequate explanation of the situation. He argues,
For even if, say, the obligation not to lie to others implies that others
have a right not to be lied to, the right not to be lied to is not the
ground of the obligations not to lie. One cannot justify the judgment
that A is obligated not to lie to B by stating that B has a right not to be
lied to, because the two statements are logically equivalent.219 Thus,
even if a statement concerning one individual’s obligation to another
implies a statement about the second individual’s right against the
first, it does not follow that the rights-statement can serve as either a
justification or explanation of the obligation-statement.220
Montague’s view implies that we need another basis to justify obligations that we
have based on these rights because the rights and the obligations say merely the same
thing. So, to say what justifies the obligation is the right that it correlates to, we are
begging the question. He makes an interesting point here that the capabilities
approach can answer. The capabilities approach looks at people’s capabilities, which
are the basis of rights, and decides other’s obligations. Our obligation is to enable
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people to get to the threshold of functioning. Under the capabilities approach, we
have the capability of being reasonable and making rational decisions for ourselves. If
we are lied to, then we cannot make the decisions we would have made for ourselves
if we were told the truth.221 So, lying would violate one’s capability to make rational
decisions based the facts of the matter. Our capabilities are justified by the fact that
they lead to human flourishing lives.222
Montague’s solution to the above problem is different than mine. He
concludes that the equivalency dilemma implies that there are some rights that are
ground for obligations and those that are not.223 He appeals to D. Daiches Raphael’s
distinction.224 First, “rights of actions” are rights that “can be exercised” such as
rights to free speech, and defending oneself. Others are obligated to not interfere with
these. Second are “rights of recipience,” which are those that cannot be exercised.
These are rights such as “rights not to be injured or killed and the right to receive a
fair wage…”225 In the case of the latter the rights and obligations cannot be
distinguished and so the rights cannot be grounds for obligation.226 One might have a
right to not be killed but another might not have the obligations to honor that right
under certain circumstances. Killing someone might be the only way of self-defense.
So, the right not to be killed is one that cannot be exercised. That is, the right not to
                                                
221 For a discussion on obligation to tell the truth, see, Claudia Mills, “Passing: The Ethics of
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223 Montague, Two Concepts of Rights, p. 378.
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be killed does not obligate person A to not kill person B.227 According to Montague,
“individuals who are incapable of intentional activities are incapable of exercising
rights, and may not even possess those rights that are exercisable.”228 So, as far as this
last statement goes, I agree with Montague that if one is incapable of exercising a
right, he or she does not have the capabilities to generate certain rights, then that
person does not have those rights. However, there are basic capabilities, for instance
life or bodily integrity, which each person possesses although he or she might be
incapable of actively claiming them.229
Martin argues against having a duty if one is not aware of one’s duties and
cannot ever be aware of them; “if one cannot even be aware of a particular reason for
doing one’s duty, or cannot credit it as a good reason, then one cannot be said to have
a duty to act for that reason. That particular reason can make no claim on that
person’s duty.”230 I think he is conflating the epistemic question of can I know all of
                                                
227 It seems that Montague could add to his view times that one has the right to defend one’s right to
life if attacked. If that is the case, then unjust killing of A is immoral. Surely he still has the right to life
but if the only way that I can save my child’s right to life is to kill someone (take their right to life
away) I ought to have the right to do so in self-defense. The capabilities approach (in agreement with
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damming the river, I interfere with the livelihood of the people who need the river to live their lives
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228 Montague, p. 384. Montague goes on to say that “(most) non-human animals, human fetuses,
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paper.
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my duties, with what duties do I have. That is, I might not know all of my duties but
still have those obligations. For instance, I might have the duty to care for my parents
in old age but not know it. It does not follow that I do not have such duty. Knowing
my duties is different than having those duties. Further, he conflated the epistemic
question with the culpability question. It is true that I cannot be responsible (or
morally culpable) for not performing my duties if I do not know what duties I have.
However, it does not follow that I do not have that duty. Martin attempts to respond
to concerns such as mine but I do not believe that he adequately deals with the issue.
He clarifies that,
I am not arguing here that people have only the duties they believe
themselves to have….they can properly be held to be under a moral
duty which they do not now believe themselves to be under if the
argument for that duty can be constructed from the overall social set of
moral beliefs they do have (subject, of course, to the constraint that
this particular construction is not blocked by other important beliefs
they have, for example, by their scientific or religious beliefs.) My
point, then is that people can have only the duties that they are
reflectively able to have.231
Again, I go back to what I asked earlier. What if under no amount of reflection can I
see that it is my duty to provide adequate food and shelter for my child, although I
have the means available to me? Perhaps I have little gift for intellectual analysis. It
does not follow that I do not have the duties that I cannot know I have towards my
child. At best, it means that I am not culpable, if I do not provide these necessities for
her. Numerous counter-examples come to mind in response to Martin’s claim here.
Suppose a father demands that his daughter undergo female genital mutilation. He
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believes that it is his duty to do so in order for his daughter to be accepted as a good
standing member of her community. Suppose that the child dies in the process of this
procedure due to bleeding.232 The father acted wrongly. However, we could argue
that he is not culpable in his action because he did not and could not foresee the
outcomes. Perhaps he was lied to about the risks to her. He had the best intentions
about his daughter’s wellbeing. He acted according to what he believed was dutiful.
Moreover, in his view the way he acted (demanding that his daughter be circumcised)
was not contradictory to his duty to protect his daughter and raise a human being with
a flourishing life. He did not see his duty any other way and could not see that he had
a duty to protect his daughter from this practice.233 This individual might never, given
his religious or scientific views, see that it was his duty and only his duty to protect
his daughter from this and that he did not. His ignorance makes him not culpable but
it does not make him dutiful either. So, to have a duty and to know that you have
certain duties are two different matters to be dealt with as such.234
Rights as valid claims-to and -against is closer to the capabilities approach
than traditional understanding of rights as entitlements. With the list of the
capabilities that Nussbaum gives us, we are in a good place to see what people are
capable of doing and help them get to the level that they can use their capabilities to
achieve the lives that they so desire. If one has a claim-to and a claim-against
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“choose” to undergo female circumcision.
234  Martin’s view is if there are no circumstances in which I can know my duty, then I do not have
one. I think I do but I am not culpable if I do not deliver my duties.
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something, reproductive health, for instance, we have a duty to ensure that she or he
has the means to achieve that right, in this case, right of deciding on her or his own
reproductive health. That might mean free information on birth control, available and
affordable birth control for those who cannot afford it, sex education classes at
schools, no forced sterilization or forced pregnancies, etc. The capabilities approach
can account for the claim view by clarifying people’s rights and duties.
Wellbeing
Lastly, I will give a brief consideration of rights as wellbeing. According to
Rodney Peffer, rights to wellbeing stem, “directly from the concept of human worth
and involve the guaranteed satisfaction of basic human needs.”235 At the basis of
rights as wellbeing, for Peffer, is the idea of human dignity and worth. Feinberg also
agreed that human dignity sets people as a “potential maker of claims.”236 The
wellbeing view of rights obligates us to provide social goods in order to recognize
human dignity and value. Dying of strep-throat is something that can be easily
prevented. The right to adequate health care is included in the right to wellbeing. This
concept of rights is a consequentialist understanding of rights with the goal of making
people’s life better but wellbeing theory of rights alone is not adequate for a full list
of rights. As Peffer points out in his view, “‘rights to well-being’ is not an all-
inclusive category for any right to any benefit we may have (many of these will be
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social and economic rights which are social contract rights but not rights to well-
being…).”237 Peffer argues that we need the social contract theory of rights in
addition to the well-being to account for the satisfaction of non-basic rights such as
right to free speech. He categorizes some rights as rights to personal wellbeing and
others as political rights. Right to healthcare falls under the category of personal
wellbeing, while freedom of speech falls under political rights.
My view of rights is not based on social contract but rather one that makes a
human flourishing life based on the development of one’s human capabilities. The
capabilities approach accounts for this inadequacy that Peffer points out in the
paragraph above. In my view we do not need a social contract in order to decide
which rights should be granted to people. That is a social contract is not the
justification for political rights, which Peffer argues for. We do not need to agree
about rights based on some social contract. Instead our lawmakers ought to look at
capabilities as a guide regarding which rights to grant to their subjects. Those are
rights that lead to human flourishing lives. Social contract assumes that we only agree
to certain ways and rights in the society that everyone wishes to have. However,
under the capabilities approach we have a list that Nussbaum claims everyone would
agree on.
Rights as wellbeing aims to make people’s lives actually better. It is not
merely having rights that is of interest but rather that these rights actually lead to
good lives. The intention behind this theory of rights is praiseworthy. As Peffer puts
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it, “rights to well-being arise from our concern for human welfare” which is quite
commendable.238 However, there are worries about this view because sometimes we
might not know what is in people’s best interest or what serves their welfare best. Sen
reminds us that, “a person may have objectives other than personal well-being. If, for
example, a person fights successfully for a cause, making great personal sacrifice,
(even perhaps giving his or her life for it), then this may be a big agency [personal]
achievement without being a corresponding achievement of personal well-being.”239
Further, “sources other than the nature of one’s life” can affect one’s wellbeing.240
For instance, one might be ill or lose a loved one. Although illness and death decrease
wellbeing and have seriously negative affects on one’s personal life, they do not
change the nature of one’s life in the same way as if one loses social or political
rights. We can still make the same political choices as before. So, the realm of rights
is not coextensive with the requirement of wellbeing. Much of what is required for
wellbeing we cannot claim rights to. For instance, I cannot claim a right that my
grandfather not dies because his doing so would interfere with my wellbeing.
The capabilities approach certainly has people’s wellbeing in perspective.
However, there are personal events in one’s life that keep one from being well. For
this reasons, the capabilities approach does not make wellbeing a priority. Some
people might be incapable of being well regardless of having all their capabilities met
and reached to the functioning level. What we, under the capabilities approach, are
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concerned with is to set constitutional grounds for development of capabilities which
would increase wellbeing but does not ensure it nor does it aim at it. However, the
final outcome of each person’s life (wellbeing) is not the government’s job to protect.
The best we can do is to bring each person to the threshold of functioning – we are
not to force him or her to take the leap and use all his or her capabilities.241
Unlike the rights as claims theory or the capabilities approach, Peffer claims
that wellbeing theory does not necessarily put an obligation on anyone to ensure
anyone’s well being, unless, of course, it is a negative right or if it is in one’s ability
to do something about it.242 Peffer uses a rather odd example to illustrate this point,
which I do not believe succeeds. The example that Peffer gives to illustrate this point
is the astronaut who is lost in space. Although he is entitled to food, no one can get
food to him. So, no one has the obligation to do something about it. Peffer makes the
same kind of mistake that Martin does. Perhaps there is someone who is obligated to
feed him (the people who are also responsible for finding him), but, if they cannot
feed him due to the fact that they do not know where he is, they are not morally
culpable if they cannot find and feed him. I am always responsible to pick up my
child from her caregivers at the end of the working day. If I am unable to, due to a flat
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tire, it does not follow that I no longer have such responsibility. It does mean that I
am morally not culpable under such circumstances if I fail to pick her up. In sum, the
wellbeing theory of rights does not adequately address the distinction between
people’s individual lives (their health, for instance) and their political life
situations.243 If we support wellbeing theory, we would expect the government (or
any other agency for that matter) to ensure that our lives are going well, even in cases
where they have no ability/means to do so.
In this section, I have covered three theories of rights: entitlements, claims,
and wellbeing. These cover the questions about (1) what does it mean to say “I have a
right to x”?, (2) what justifies my claim to a right to x?, and (3) what rights do I have
(and particularly, do I have positive rights)? Smith and Feinberg address (1), what
does it mean to say “I have a right?”.244 Nussbaum directly, addresses both (2) and
(3); I aim to show that the capabilities view can address all three. I also believe that
the capabilities approach can avoid the shortcomings of each view as I have discussed
throughout. It would be best to reject each of these views and start with the
capabilities. Capabilities give us what we need if we are committed to justice and
equality, at least equal opportunity for a good life.
In the next section I will discuss the two kinds of human rights, and address
the question, by virtue of what do we have the rights we have?
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Natural Rights and Civil Rights
There are, generally speaking, two kinds of human rights: natural rights
(human rights) and civil rights.245  Natural rights are those that people have in virtue
of being human. So, we all have them. This idea comes from the notion that humans
are more or less equal. Thomas Hobbes argued that because of this equality in the
state of nature we have the right to do whatever it takes to preserve our lives. This
right is given to each individual without regard to any other individual’s right to life.
Everyone has the right to self-preservation with any means available to him or her.
Since, for Hobbes, there is no justice or morality in the state of nature, there is
nothing that would be considered unjust or immoral. In the state of nature we have the
right to rape, steal, or kill in order to preserve ourselves, although it might seem
excessive to us. No one is safe in such a situation. The fundamental law of nature has
us give up this right to the sovereign, if others will, and he is supposed to protect us
and grant the rights that he believes we ought to have. The sovereign’s primary duty
is to protect our lives. Since we agree to give our rights to the sovereign, we are in a
social contract with other people and agree not to kill them. According to social
contractarians, agreements make the government legitimate and the rights that we
have are those that are given to us by this legitimate government. These are called
civil rights.
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agreement, etc., but I am going to categorize rights in two categories for simplicity sake. The
distinction between these rights has arisen from my discussions with Professor Ann Cudd.
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Civil rights are legitimate claims by citizens of a State against a legitimate
government as well as other citizens. This view of rights involves us in the discussion
of what makes a government legitimate. If a government meets our legitimacy
criteria, then the given rights are the ones that we are entitled to. Although many
seem to be committed to this theory, there are problems here too.246 People often
disagree about what makes a government legitimate. Even if we agree on this, we ask,
why are these rights granted and not others? Imagine a democratically elected
government, which does not recognize the citizens’ right to freedom of religion.
Although the government is legitimate, it is not infallible. Governments make
mistakes and sometimes do not grant rights that we have based on our human dignity
and worth. The United States’ Constitution is supposed to work as an agreement
between the government and citizens. So, as long as the government holds itself
responsible to respect that document, it is legitimate – for instance, a government that
has a constitution such as our own which requires the government to be
democratically elected. We are to agree then, if the government meets these two
criteria, then it is legitimate. However, even a democratically elected government
could still be oppressive and not grant most basic human rights. Under the capabilities
approach at least the list that Nussbaum gives ought to be guaranteed by the
constitution. This would answer the question of what rights do we have and which
should the government grant us. The rights-based capabilities approach is a version of
natural rights theory.
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As mentioned, natural rights are those that we have in virtue of our humanity.
A theist supporter of natural rights theory argues that our rights are God-given. This
is a Lockean view of natural rights. He believes that, in the state of nature, we have
some rights beyond the right to self-preservation not because of a government or a
civil society but in virtue of being human and being creations of God. We have a right
to “life, liberty, and property.” Unlike Hobbes, John Locke argued that in addition to
right to life, we have the right to enforce the laws and to protect our property.
Although, there is justice, morality, and the right to punishment in the state of nature,
because the kind of punishment is unclear, people agree to a government to set laws,
judges, and enforcers. So, Locke believes that we have rights in the state of nature,
but we should have a government to sort things out. He too is a contractarian, but
endorses natural rights.
Traditionally understood natural rights theory poses some epistemic questions.
If our rights are God-given then we might ask what rights did God give us. If we have
rights merely by virtue of being human, then we wonder what they are. So, either way
we define the origin of natural rights, we are left with the epistemic question of what
rights are. The capabilities approach resembles this view of rights but gets around the
epistemic concerns. 
In my view, the capabilities are the basis for rights. The rights we have are
those that we possess the capability to actualize. As mentioned in the last chapter,
although we have the capability to destroy, harm, or commit acts of atrocities, we do
not have the rights to do them because that violates others’ development of
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capabilities. So, rights come from certain human basic functioning capabilities. Once
we reach the threshold of functioning then we have the real live option of living our
lives as we choose.
Rights and Capabilities
Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach is a better way than rights to
address injustices. She gives three reasons for this. First, unlike capabilities, there are
differing views on rights. That is we agree on what capabilities people have. In the
previous pages we have reviewed many of the different ways that people can
articulate rights and attendant obligation. On the other hand, regardless of what rights
we believe people have, we might have a different idea of where rights come from. If
we assume that rights are civil rights, then if a legitimate government does not allow
freedom of religion or does not give a group of people the right to earn wages, then
there would be no ground by which this society can be challenged. The capabilities
approach bypasses all this talk on what rights are and concentrates on what kinds of
being we are and what it takes to have a flourishing human, not man’s or woman’s,
life. Right to freedom of religion (or freedom to not have a religion) is a necessary
ingredient of anyone’s flourishing life.
The second reason Nussbaum gives for the superiority of appealing to
capabilities over rights to redress injustice is that to bring everyone to the functioning
threshold of capabilities, we would have to treat people unequally. Under the
capabilities approach we are justified (and often required) to treat people unequally if
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that is required to bring everyone to a level where their capabilities can function.
Rights, on the other hand, are typically understood to be justified claims of citizens.
These claims are those everyone has, equally. We either respect peoples’ rights,
wholly, or we do not. There is no such obligation to get people to the level where they
can actually exercise those rights. Shue disagrees.
Recall the entitlement theory of rights. As long as we stay out of the way, that
is virtually all that is required of us (government) in relation to other people. The
claims or wellbeing theories that give some positive obligations to others approach a
bit closer to my view.  However, neither of these theories fully captures the
importance that rights have in each person’s life. Merely possessing rights is not
enough to improve one’s quality of life. Rights theories do not obligate us to make
sure these rights are live options for people. The capabilities approach demands that
not only the government reflect these capabilities in its constitutional guarantees but
also ensure that everyone can enjoy them. In the United States everyone has the right
to get a higher education. There are actually many governmental grants and
opportunities for the low-income students. However, going to college is not a live
option for many poor students graduating from high school because they do not know
about these. They have not attended high schools that have prepared them for college,
or simply that they have not been given the encouragement or the information that
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they need to consider college as a live option.247
Third, as a pragmatic issue, rights are often looked at as a Western idea but
capabilities are not. As mentioned in the last chapter, those who identify human rights
violations in third world countries are labeled as imperialists. For instance, when the
people from the West criticized the practice of female genital mutilation, it was
considered a form of imperialism. Often, when the local activists tried to bring
awareness to the issue and ban the practice, they were considered “Western sell-outs.”
By introducing the capabilities talk, we are able to overcome the claims of
imperialism by those who commit the injustices. According to Nussbaum, we can
perhaps achieve more if we leave the talk of rights behind and speak of these women
who are being genitally mutilated as losing a human capability that all men and
women share.248
Nussbaum adopts the talk of rights only to justify the autonomy to choose
which capabilities one will develop. But this ad hoc appeal is unnecessary. We have
the capability to choose between our capabilities. This in itself can generate a right to
do so.249 As for her pragmatic concern, we might wonder why this is particularly
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Many do not know their options when they graduate from high school. The military has great
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countries do not honor the list and to hold them responsible, they charge us with Western imperialism.
249 Again, the rights that violate the liberty principle are not granted. For instance, we might have the
capability of refusing to recognize others we have the right to do so, unless it harms them (violates
their capabilities).
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relevant in theoretical work. Moreover, the capability approach rests on empirical
claims about human beings that are manifestly shared in all cultures. If she is
concerned with the pragmatic issue of using capabilities talk versus rights talk, then
she ought not bring up this talk of rights here either. It is pernicious here if it is
pernicious anywhere. In my view, I rid us of this ad hoc dichotomy of right and
capabilities by arguing that individuals’ capabilities are the basis for their rights.
There is a generative relationship such that the morally relevant capabilities generate
corresponding rights and duties. Because capabilities are a universal empirical fact we
no longer confront Western obsession or culturally relative construct, but rather a
universal, human moral reality.
In summary, the goal of politics ought to include the protection and promotion
of the capabilities of each person. Such protection and promotion should be
understood as a part of what justice requires. Nussbaum uses the capabilities
approach as an alternative to the talk of rights. She argues that talk of capabilities is a
better way than rights to determine if a government is oppressive. I believe that
capabilities generate rights. That is if person X has the potential way of functioning,
Y, then X must have the right to develop Y as long as the development of Y does not
violate another’s development of his or her capabilities. So, for instance, with this
view of rights, people will have the right to political activism, because we have the
ability to participate in politics. However, not everyone will choose to be politically
active. On the other hand, men would not have the right to receive an abortion
because they do not have that potential way of functioning required for generating
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this right.
The capabilities approach as a basis for rights must respond to the concerns
that Nussbaum has about using the rights talk. Her first objection is that there are
differing views on rights. The capabilities approach would get around the question of
where do rights come from. It gives us an understanding of rights as natural rights
without the problems of natural rights as “god-given” or as epistemologically
problematic. Some argue that natural rights are rights given by god, but in the
capabilities view, rights are generated by each individual’s capabilities – no deity
needed. Human worth and dignity dictates that individuals live with dignity and have
available to them a life that is worthy of humans, one that leads to human flourishing,
if they are willing to take the opportunities it provides. People who are unable to
acquire food are unable to live a flourishing life. Starving people cannot function in
many ways. The same point applies to those who are ill. On the capabilities to rights
view, because people have the capability of life and health, these people have a right
to food and health care. Presumably, the ultimate securing of these rights will fall
upon the government. Unfortunate situations do not eliminate one’s right to life (e.g.,
food). While we cannot (and ought not) force adults to eat but they ought to have
access to food if they do choose to eat.250
One might argue against the natural rights theory offered here and opt for civil
rights. No surprise that the same epistemic issues appear here as well. That is, what
                                                
250 This brings two situations to mind. First, people with eating disorders might have to be forced to
eat. This should be treated as an illness and not a violation of their right to choose not to eat. Second
situation is one that a person is on a hunger strike for a political cause. We ought not force those
individuals to eat if they have access to food and they are not suffering from an eating disorder or a
similar situation.
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rights ought the legitimate government grants its citizens and why or what kinds of
rights ought we agree on while we make a contract? Capabilities-based rights solve
these problems as well. In response to civil rights we can argue that the government
ought to grant rights that lead to human flourishing. If we base rights on capabilities,
then we know what rights the government ought to support; in my reconstruction of
the capabilities approach, in addition to Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, there is
always room for additional capabilities that she might have overlooked. It is
imprudent to limit our capabilities to the limited understanding of what we know
about human nature.
The second reason Nussbaum gives for the superiority of capabilities over
rights to address injustice is that in order to bring everyone to the functioning
threshold of capabilities, we would have to treat people unequally. According to
Nussbaum, rights are had fully and equally by everyone but capabilities require
different levels of assistance to reach the threshold of functioning. Our commitment
to justice, human flourishing and human dignity obligates us to treat people
differently to provide them with the opportunities to exercise their rights. Therefore,
since capabilities talk allows for these kinds of inequalities, capabilities talk is
superior to rights talk. So, Nussbaum would not use the rights talk – except to address
autonomy.
 I agree with Nussbaum that some people will require more than others to
achieve the threshold of functioning. However, positive rights also generally require
different levels of responses in different situations. My view entails that some people
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would have rights to more resources than others to achieve that threshold. According
to Sen, rights are political goals.251 Governments ought to aim to achieve these goals
(rights) for each individual. Looking at rights in such a way, the capabilities approach
will give us an accurate study of oppression in a particular society. We can look at
how much each government is ensuring each person’s development of capabilities
and what rights, given those capabilities, are granted to the citizens. If individuals
(who belong to a particular group) are unable to get to the level of functioning and the
government is not actively pursuing that, then there is ground for concern that the
government is oppressive.
Lastly, Nussbaum is concerned that rights are often taken to be a “Western”
idea but capabilities do not have such stigma. This is a stigma because governments
believe they have the sovereignty to do as they wish without the outsider’s intrusion.
The talk of rights was introduced by the West and is associated with the West and the
ideals that some non-Western countries do not hold. If we start with the capabilities
talk, instead of rights, we can accomplish more with those who do not share the
human rights talk. Since there is no dichotomy here, we do not need to choose one
referent over the other. Once the capabilities talk has been accepted and the
capabilities have been granted the move back to the talk of rights is a simple move.
This understanding of rights can no longer be looked at as Western idea but rather a
                                                
251 Amaryta Sen, “Rights and Agency,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11 (1981), p. 15. Ronald
Dworkin worries that “A goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that is, a state of affairs whose
specification does not in this way call for any particular opportunity or resource or liberty for particular
individuals” (See Taking Rights Seriously, p. 91). Given I have grounded rights on people’s
capabilities, our goals are individuated. Here we are concerned with each individual achieving the
threshold of functioning as our goal.
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human issue. The capabilities provide a grounding theory for the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights or ones like it. Once we recognize human capabilities,
then a list of rights is merely a short step away. For instance, if humans by virtue of
being human, can psychologically flourish by having their capability of Control over
One’s Environment, developed by finding work outside the house, then they ought to
have the right to do so.252
In Summary
I believe capabilities provide a better way than traditional understanding of
rights to assess whether a society or its institutions are oppressive based on a society’s
own standards. Rights should be goals of a society and not the beginning. Capabilities
are a better way to start. Governments should be evaluated on what rights they are
able to guarantee and which they indeed do. We look at the capabilities that the
government is able to guarantee. If the government does not have the means to
provide an education past high school, then people are not oppressed by their lack of
education,253 but they are perhaps poor. They may still be entitled to assistance from
                                                
252 “Control over One’s Environment. A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political
choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and
association. B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally
but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the
right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search
and seizure.” See Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 80.
253 This is because oppression happens when only a group is being harmed one way or another due to
their membership in that group. So, if everyone is in the same situation, then there might be other
harmful causes but it is not oppression. `
132
outside but not because people are oppressed.254 Oppression is a particular kind of
harm and not just any harm done, is oppression. However, they would be considered
oppressed if the government has the means but does not, for instance, provide
education for the citizens.
I have argued that capabilities generate rights. This is a version of natural
rights but it responds to the traditional views on natural rights. Further, there are
problems with all three theories of rights (entitlements, claims, and wellbeing)
discussed earlier. The capabilities approach answers all of the objections that I have
address against each view in this chapter. There are certain commitments to justice,
for instance equal opportunity for exercising one’s rights that I have expressed here
and the only construction that can keep those commitments is the capabilities theory
of rights.
                                                
254 I should note that if we move to a one world, one government model, then these people will be
indeed oppressed because another group of people, say in North America, is able to get an education
past high school. So, to determine whether someone is oppressed is determined by the government’s
ability to take care of him or her.
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Five
What is Race?
As part of my job application for my first lecturer position in Philosophy at
the University of Texas – Pan American, I received the standard equal opportunity
form. Included in this form were the usual options, but there were the two I had not
seen: Mexican White and Mexican Black. These terms refer to a combination of one’s
nationality and race255, which is not often made in the United States. We often don’t
think of the group  “Mexican” as having subgroups. I wondered if there are other
racial groups in Mexico, such as Mexican Brown. There have been many times that I
have been mistaken for being Mexican due to my black hair, brown eyes, and olive
skin. On the other hand, my daughter is often taken to be white, due to her light hair,
blue eyes and fair skin. So, my life experiences have pushed me to wonder what race
is and how people are racialized. Surely, my daughter is biracial: her father is White
and her mother (me) is Brown. How do we decide what race she belongs to?
Although there are some biological differences between the races, the biologists do
not use the category race. In addition to this, many scholars of race have noticed that
one’s biology does not dictate one’s characteristics, such as intelligence, abilities,
personal traits, etc. W. E. B. Du Bois “was convinced that a collective black
identity—based primarily on a shared history and culture [are the primary connecting
fact between Blacks], and only secondarily on a common biology…”256 In our
                                                
255 I would say that “Mexican” refers to one’s nationality and “Black” and “White” refer to one’s race.
256 Tommie Shelby, “Foundations of Black Solidarity,” in Ethics, January 2001, p. 235.
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society, I believe race is a very politically charged term, perhaps even more so than
gender, because in the case of gender we can, generally, easily distinguish between
being biologically male or female. However, there is no easy way to distinguish
between being biologically White, Brown or Black.
Many have attempted to justify their human rights violations (such as slavery)
by arguing for the inferiority of some races. We now know that there is no correlation
between one’s race and intelligence (superiority or inferiority). Still, we are very
interested in what race is because, as Sally Haslanger puts it, “race is socially real,
even if a biological fiction” and it plays a huge role in our society.257 If we are to talk
about racial oppression, we also have to understand what race is.
According to Haslanger, there are three projects we can involve ourselves
with when we take on the question of “what is race?”: conceptual, descriptive, and
analytical.
 A conceptual inquiry into race or gender would seek an articulation of
our concept of race or gender….[258] In contrast to the conceptual
project, a descriptive project is not concerned with exploring the
nuances of our concepts…it focuses instead on their extension. The
third sort of project takes an analytical approach….On this approach
                                                
257 Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are they? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?,” in
Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology, edited by Ann E. Cudd and Robin O. Andreasen
(Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 162.
258 According to Michael O. Hardimon we should not be so concerned with what the concept “race” is
but rather with the conception of it. Conception of x represents the concept of it. A concept can be
represented “in a number of different and competing ways. It is part of the idea of a conception that a
conception represents but one of a number of possible different and competing ways in which a given
concept can be articulated.” That is a concept can be interpreted or understood in several ways.
According to Hardimon, these interpretations or understandings are “conceptions”. Naturally the
concept of race can be understood different ways (See Michael O. Hardimon, “The Ordinary Concept
of Race,” in Journal of Philosophy, vol. 100, no. 9, September 2003, p. 341). However, Haslanger does
not get involved with figuring out the concept of race because the theory of race she offers has a
pragmatic as well as conceptual theory. So, putting it in Hardimon’s terms, she looks for the
conception of race.
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the task is not to explicate our ordinary concepts; nor is it to
investigate the kind that we may or may not be tracking with our
everyday conceptual apparatus; instead we begin by considering more
fully the pragmatics of our talk employing the terms in question.259
Both Haslanger and I take the analytical approach, which allows us the use of both
ordinary and empirical methods of investigating what race is, but does not limit us to
either of these methods. With the analytical approach, we can decide what race is; the
“world by itself can’t tell us… it is up to us to decide what in the world, if anything”
race is.260
My interest in race theory is to achieve the following goals: first and foremost,
to figure out what race is and to use the answer to fight against racial injustices. Our
theory of race has to help us achieve that goal. And second, I personally want to know
what that means when I say that I am Persian, Brown, White, or Iranian.261 In order to
achieve these goals, we need some guidelines. According to Haslanger, our project of
figuring out what race is ought to be guided by four concerns. First, it needs to
identify the inequalities between the races and on what basis these inequalities
continue. Second, our theory has to also recognize the similarities and differences
between the racial groups within a society. What does it mean when someone’s race
is White, Asian, Black, or Persian? Third, it has to give an account of what role, if
any, race plays in one’s art, religion, or philosophy. I suppose this concern will help
answer my own question of racial-identity. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is
that our theory of race helps us recognize everyone’s agency, which will help with
                                                
259 Haslanger, Gender and Race: (What) Are they? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?, p. 155.
260 Ibid., p. 156.
261 The answer to these questions might be connected.
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critical social theory and ultimately fighting injustice.
Some modern philosophers, such as Hegel, Kant, and Hume argued that race
is an essential property of a group. In this view, there is an essential correlation
between one’s race and intelligence, culture, aptitude, and even human value.262 E.
Chukwudi Eze argues that these theories were used in oppression of Blacks by
supporting colonialism and slavery.263 The idea is that those who were taken as slaves
could not do better on their own and so it was just (and even to their benefit) to
enslave or colonize them, being inferior was an essential part of their race, their
genetic make up, and it could not be changed. This view is called essentialism. We
hear the same kinds of sentiments today, but the characterizations are not so much
biological anymore, but rather more about the kinds of attitudes a group of people
have.264 For instance, we no longer say that Blacks have no rights, because they are
not human or that they lack the properties to be human, but they are often stereotyped
as lazy, unmotivated, etc. Needless to say, I disagree with the essentialist views on
                                                
262 E. Chukwudi Eze, “Modern Western Philosophy and African Colonialism,” in African Philosophy:
An Anthology, edited by E. Chukwudi Eze (Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998), p. 213-221.
263 Although Eze writes from the perspective of African (and African-Americans), there are numerous
groups who have been the victim of oppression because of their race.
264 Derrick Darby gives us the stereotypes that we use to classify people today. We say Blacks are lazy,
lack ambition, and have a problem with authority (See Derrick Darby, “Blacks and Rights: A
Bittersweet Legacy,” in Law, Culture, and the Humanities, no. 2, 2006, p. 436-437).  These stereotypes
/ generalizations will lead to people’s negative disposition about them. We categorize Asians as
successful, intelligent and hardworking. These essential characteristics, be they positive or negative,
could be dangerous. A recent study by Eliza Noh has shown that suicide rates among minority groups
is highest amongst Asian women, because of the high expectations put on them (Malena Amuse,
“Asian Women Face ‘Model Minority’ Pressure,” in Women’s Enews,
http://www.womensnews.org/article.cfm?aid=2891, September, 18th 2006).  If they are less than
perfect they not accepted. Tommie Shelby adds that, “[t]he peculiar content of antiblack racist
ideology (with its images of blacks as lazy, stupid, hypersexual, and disposed to acts of aggression),
the enslavement and brutal treatment of Africans in the New World, and the subsequent exclusion of
blacks from the mainstream of American civic and social life have combined to give antiblack race
prejudice a distinctive character among American forms of racism” (Shelby, p. 262).
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race. I believe, as Haslanger does, that race is a social but not a metaphysical reality.
In this chapter, I will explore what race is and what racial identity is, what the
differences are between race and ethnicity, and how these help us in understanding
racial identity. In conclusion, I agree with Haslanger in her theory of race.
Race
According to Charles Mills, there are two categories of theories of race. One
is the objective category, which “usually connotes the independence of what we
choose, what we believe.”265 The other is non-objective, which is the opposite of the
objective category. Under the objective category, there are two theories: racial
realism and racial constructivism. Racial realism is the view that races are natural
kinds. Racial realists believe that “the differences between races are not confined to
the superficial morphological characteristics of skin color, hair type, and facial
features, but extend to significant moral, intellectual, characterological, and spiritual
characteristics also, that there are ‘racial essences.’”266 Racial realists will inevitably
fall into the essentialist view of race. According to Anna Stubblefield, essentialism
about race claims that physical traits of a person are a reliable source to determine
one’s abilities, characteristics, culture, etc. In this view of race, just as we are born
with certain hair or skin color, we are born with certain kinds of intelligence, abilities,
                                                
265 Charles Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998), p. 45.
266 Ibid., p. 46.
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culture, or character traits that are essential to the race we are born into.267 For
instance, Asians are smart and hardworking, Mexicans are ignorant and dirty, Native-
Indians are drunks, and Middle-Easterners are violent terrorists. The essentialists
would have to argue that these stereotypical characteristics are essential to their races.
We cannot be any other way than we are, given our race. In this view, even if one’s
path of life were different, one would still be the same person with the same qualities
as she or he has today. For instance, the Palestinian culture would not be any different
living in an occupied territory than it would have been had their land not been given
to the Jews after WWII. Or, as Mills points out, according to the essentialist, the
Black culture in the United States would not have been any different than it is, if the
Africans immigrated here voluntarily and there had been no slavery, no segregation,
and no civil rights movement.268
From a personal point of view, I know that the contemporary Iranian culture is
as it is today due to eight years of war, nearly thirty years of oppressive regime, and
hundreds of years of corrupt governments. Almost everyone who has lived through
the Islamic revolution and war in Iran has anxiety, distrust and confusion about
governments in general and a sense of hopelessness about the ability to make any
changes in the conduct of their government. This is also to some extent true of the
                                                
267 Anna Stubblefield, “Racial Identity and Non-Essentialism About Race,” in Social Theory and
Practice, no. 3, 1995.
268 Mills, Blackness Visible, p. 46.
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Mexican culture. They are generally conspiracy theorists269 about the government,
because they have experienced a great amount of corruption in the government and its
conduct. So, I believe these cultures are as they are due to their histories and
experiences.
I believe racial realism is false, but, in agreement with Mills and Haslanger, I
do not believe that race is not real, as Naomi Zack argues.270 She might be right to
argue that there is no biological category “race”, but race is very real in other aspects
and it is used politically to determine who gets to be on the top of the social
hierarchy. According to Mills,
Race is not “metaphysical” in the deep sense of being eternal,
unchanging, necessary, part of the basic furniture of the universe. But
race is a contingently deep reality that structures our particular social
universe, having a social objectivity and causal significance that arise
out of our particular history. For racial realism, the social metaphysics
is simply an outgrowth of a natural metaphysics; for racial
constructivism, there is no natural metaphysics, and the social
metaphysics arises directly out of the social history.271
Racial constructivism is the view that race is a social reality. It determines a person’s
social status and hierarchy, but is not an essential property of an individual’s (races)
as some modern philosophers have argued. This is similar to the idea of gender being
                                                
269 Lee Basham defines conspiracy theory as, “an explanation of important events that appeals to the
intentional deception and manipulation of those involved in, affected by, or witnessing these events.”
See “Malevolent Global Conspiracy,” in Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 34, no. 1 (Blackwell
Publishing, Spring 2003), p. 91.
270 Naomi Zack, Philosophy of Science and Race (New York: Routledge, 2002).
271 Mills, But What Are You Really?, p. 48. Social metaphysics is “analogous to the way ‘metaphysics’
simpliciter refers to the deep structure of reality as a whole. So, there are basic existents that constitute
the social world, and that should be central to theorizing about it” (Mills, p. 44). I should note that
Anthony Appiah opposes this view of race. He strongly argues that race is not real and races have
nothing in common, unlike families who indeed do. He also adds that if we identify with one race
(prefer them over another), we are being partial and therefore, unethical (see Anthony Appiah,
“Racism,” in Anatomy of Racism, edited by David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1990).
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socially constructed. This view of race is useful because it does not ignore the social
reality of race, but it gets away from the essentialist view. Also, this view does not
deny the fact that we are indeed racially diverse. On the other hand, it does not say
that our biological make up dictates the kind of culture, intelligence, or any abilities
that we have, nor does it deny the existence of race all together.
Racial constructivists are non-essentialists. Non-essentialism is the view that
the physical traits of a person are not a reliable source of one’s character, abilities, or
intelligence. The non-essentialists recognize the power of history, socialization,
environment, etc., on one’s attitude or culture. In chapter two of this dissertation I
discussed oppression and internalization of the expectation of inferiority. If we live in
an environment that constantly degrades us, or those who belong to our race, it will
have an adverse effect on how we understand ourselves in relation to others in our
society. We internalize the expectation of inferiority and start acting in such a way.272
The non-essentialist would say that if a group is generally less advanced in the
society, it does not follow that they are less intelligent, lazy, unmotivated, etc. They
are less advanced either because they are discriminated against (in subtle or not so
subtle ways) or because they have been made that way by their pasts. Imagine
growing up in a society where women are not valued; we would see ourselves
differently than we would if raised in a society where women were considered equal
citizens of that society with equal worth and dignity.273
                                                
272 I will discuss this more in the next (concluding) chapter.
273 John Stuart Mill gives this argument about women and slaves both in his work The Subjection of
Women (see, On Liberty and Subjection of Women, edited by Alan Ryan (New York: Penguin Books,
2006).
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If essentialism were true, there would never be a cultural difference among
people of the same group, be they a racial, gender, or religious group. For instance,
the Catholicism that is practiced in Mexico by Mexicans is very different than the one
they practice in Kansas. I suppose we could not account for such differences, if we
were to hold an essentialist view. Their cultures, regardless of where they are, would
remain the same. In South Texas, where the majority (85-90%) of people are of
Mexican descent, the Mexican-American culture is much different than Mexican-
American subcultures in the rest of the United States where they are the minority.274
If essentialism is true, then we cannot account for the difference in this culture be it in
the United States or elsewhere. I should note, one might argue that Mexican is not a
race but rather a nationality or ethnicity. They are on the right track. “Mexican” refers
to people who are from Mexico. However, in our society the term refers to a
particular race. The job application that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
actually included the race of the Mexican (Mexican White / Mexican Black).
However, we use it as race. So, I am using the term “Mexican” as we would
pragmatically use it. This view is congruent with Haslanger’s view of race that I
favor.
Evidence dictates that race is not an essentialist concept. I believe the concept
of “race” is a changing concept. Different races tend to be different in different
contexts. Race, unlike the common perception, is not uniform across time and place.
                                                
274 We should be cautious when we talk about anyone’s culture. As mentioned in the previous chapters,
cultures are constantly changing. So, we should keep in mind that we are using a term (“culture”) that
is always changing. On the other hand, cultures are very diverse. Gandhi once said, “India is 20,000
villages.” We can understand this to mean that they are diverse and each has different needs,
expectation, and life arrangements. Now the Mexican culture in South Texas is no exception.
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Someone who is racialized to be White in Iran might not be so in the United States.
For instance, anyone who has light skin, light color eyes and light brown hair, is
considered White in Iran but in the United States that individual is not White. The
“Iranian White” will be more privileged in Iran but may find herself in a disadvantage
position in relation to “American Whites” in the United States. The definition of race
will have to have the flexibility to account for these differences.
 Jorge Gracia argues that taken together, our genetic connection to a group of
people (ancestry) and the physical appearance generally identified with a race makes
us belong to that particular race.275 This is a really interesting view of race because
those who do not share the “general appearance” with the rest of the group but do
identify with that race, will not belong to that race. For instance, there is a huge
minority of White Mexicans who are indistinguishable from White Europeans. In
Gracia’s view, they would not be Mexicans because their appearance is not generally
identified with that race. According to Mills, “the appearance of R-ness [race-ness] is
neither sufficient nor necessary for actual R-ness – though it will generally be a good
evidential indicator – for some people may be able to ‘pass.’”276 Recall the Blacks
who were “passing” as Whites in the 1930’s and 1940’s. The idea that framed this as
“passing” or deceiving others about race was, and to some extent still is, that if you
                                                
275 Jorge Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the 21st Century
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005). Mills also points out that the different
criteria that we might use to decide what one’s race is or what race we identify with are not necessarily
mutually exclusive because there are often more than one criterion used to determine what race is, as
Haslanger does (see Mills, But What Are You Really?, p. 50).
276 Mills, But What Are You Really?, p. 51. Later in the chapter I will argue against Mills that it is not
so clear that those who were (are) passing are necessarily people of the race they are trying to hide.
Haslanger also will respond to Mills’s concern.
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have 1/8 “Black blood” then you are Black. So, in a White person’s line of ancestry if
there are a few Black individuals, she or he is considered Black. However, it does not
go the other way. If in the line of ancestry of a Black person, there are few White
persons, it does not classify them as Whites.  They looked White enough, so why
were they Black? I suggest that it is due to racism.277
Although there are biological reasons for one’s physical appearance, there are
no other biologically interesting differences between humans significant enough to
affect our basic capabilities. Ancestry seems to be sufficient for one’s determination
of race. That is if one’s ancestors are from Asia, then that person’s race is Asian.278
However, in a pragmatic use of the term, “race”, people ordinarily use it to refer to
one’s appearance as well as ancestry, which is close to Gracia’s view. An interview
with a young albino Black man revealed the identity struggles that he goes through in
everyday life. He has all the stereotypical physical features of Africans but he also
has blond hair and very white skin. He falls into cracks in both worlds. He is not
White and he is not Black. He is a hybrid that neither community accepts as theirs,
although he self-identifies as Black. Our theory of race has to account for the
                                                
277 Many Iranians refer to my daughter as a “White girl.” I am Iranian (not very light-skinned), I speak
the Persian language, and so does she, she enjoys Iranian gatherings, etc., but my extended family and
some friends do not recognize half of her race, mine. Biracial people are often categorized one way or
another. When I was filling out my job application, there were no mentions of biracial categories that
one could choose. My aunt once told me that she is a good kid because she is American (White), not
like our (non-White) rowdy children. That is “internalization of expectation of inferiority.” Why some
people believe they are any better or worse than other people because of their skin color is, often, a
reference to their culture and wealth and not so much about their race, besides, my child is half non-
White.
278 The same thing I said about the Mexicans can be said about the Asians. The term “Asian” refers to
an individual who was born in the continent Asia. In essence, people from Iraq are Asians because they
are born in that continent. However, the term is no longer used that way. When we use the term
“Asian” refers to the same thing as the not-politically-correct term “oriental” and so I use the term
“Asian” in that sense.
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struggles of this individual and assign him a race.
More often than not, minorities are victims of racial violence due to the way
they look and not what race they actually are. For instance, the Indian Sikhs who was
beaten in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks in September of 2001, or the
newspaper attendant from Bangladesh that was attacked by a fireman in New York,
were both victims of violence due to their Middle-Eastern appearance and
resemblances to “al Qaeda” members.279 Our theory of race also has to help us
distinguish between the races as well. Haslanger’s definition of race is one that meets
both of the above criteria and entails Gracia’s theory of race, but challenges
Mills’s.280  According to Haslanger,
A group is racialized iffdf its members are socially positioned as
subordinate or privileged along some dimension (economic, political,
legal, social, etc.), and the group is “marked” as a target for this
treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be
evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region.281
In this view, if a member of a particular group is “passing” and is not victim of
oppression, Haslanger would argue that that person is not of that race. I agree with
Haslanger that if a person whom we traditionally consider Black because they have
some Black ancestors, does not meet our criteria for being Black, then she is not
Black although her ancestors were dark-skinned people. She is not Black because she
would not suffer the same disadvantages as a person who meets the above criteria.282
                                                
279 Roseanne Pereira, “Valarie Kaur’s Search for America after 9/11,” in
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/04/03/sikhfilm/, April 3, 2007.
280 Recall that according to Gracia X belongs to a particular race if X shares ancestral background with
a group and has the physical appearances generally identified with that particular race.
281 Haslanger, Gender and Race: (What) Are they? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?, p. 162.
282 Ibid., p. 169, fn16.
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On the other hand, the albino Black person who is very fair is actually Black because
he does suffer from the disadvantages that dark skin Blacks do. This definition of race
is good because it does not categorize race as merely a political category.
According to Gracia, to look at race as merely “the products of political
agendas used to advance the interests of certain groups….is dangerous in that it
necessarily makes our approach to these phenomena [race, ethnicity, and nationality]
political and ultimately a matter of power.”283 If race is merely political then only the
few that have power will define race and they are ones that will continue to define
race in order to benefit themselves. This will leave us “without recourse.”284
Haslanger’s definition takes into account, not only the political aspect of a race,
namely their social status, being privileged or disadvantaged in the society, but also
the physical appearance that is generally identified with that group. These are
sufficient criteria for determining what race is.285
One might have a problem with this definition because it challenges our
traditional understanding of race. Traditionally, like Mills’s view, we are inclined to
say that Blacks who were “passing” as Whites were still Black, so we cannot say they
are White, even though they look White. According to Tommie Shelby, “she might
simply conceal her black ancestry — as those who ‘pass’ do — but in either case, she
would still be black…even if never found out.”286 According to Haslanger, Shelby is
mistaken. Our traditional understanding is flawed. If the person who is passing as
                                                
283 Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the 21st Century, p. 144-145.
284 Ibid., p. 145.
285 She believes her criteria are sufficient and necessary.
286 Shelby, Foundations of Black Solidarity, p. 240.
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White can live and conduct his or her life as a White person with all the privileges
that being White in the United States entails, then their Blackness is no longer
socially and politically relevant, and hence ceases to exist.
However, it might be the case that a person who is not categorized as Black
identifies as one. So why isn’t she Black? She might self-identify as Black, although
that would not be her race but rather her ethnicity. So, we can identify with a
particular race without belonging to them. One might argue that whatever race that
we identity with is our actual race but typically we are conflating race and ethnicity.
We are raced by the society, but we can choose our ethnicity. Although I might not be
racially Black or White, I could be ethnically so.
Ethnicity is related to race to some extent but there is not a necessary
connection between race and ethnicity. Members of a race might not even share
history or cultures. For instance, the term “Black” could refer to those living in the
United States whose ancestors were brought here as slaves or it could refer to
Africans who have willingly moved, or those who are currently living in Africa, or
perhaps to Jamaicans. Surely, these people are all dark-skinned and are categorized as
“Black” and suffer the same social disadvantages. However, they might have
different ethnicities. Ethnic groups, as Susana Nuccetelli describes them, “share a
complex property supervenient on the history of relations within their group, with
others and environment.”287 Ethnic group terms often refer to such groups and the
term could get a referent in many different ways. Consider the ethnic group term,
                                                
287 Susana Nuccetelli, “Reference and Ethnic-Group Terms,” in Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 47, no. 6, December 2004, p. 542.
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“Eskimo.” The term “Eskimo” was used by the Algonkian tribe that neighbored the
Eskimos. The term “Eskimo” means those who are “eaters of raw meat.”288 Ethnicity
here is established by a particular cultural practice that their neighbors did not
approve of. However, the referent is set in this case by a group’s pragmatic use,
whether or not Eskimos still eat raw meat or ever did, this term picks a group of
people. The term “Indian” (Native-American) is another example. It was set by
Christopher Columbus who, thinking he had reached India, called the Native-
Americans, Indians. Unlike what we might think, the concept of “ethnicity” is much
broader than race. People of a particular ethnicity are more historically and culturally
than genetically bound.289
To summarize my view of race, I accept Haslanger’s view, which is not an
ontological theory of race but rather a working theory. A race is a group of people
who are either advantaged or disadvantaged because they more or less share a similar
physical appearance, typically associated with a particular geographical area. The
Indian Sikh individual who was a victim of bodily harm because he was presumed to
be Middle-Eastern shares the same bodily appearance with many Middle-Easterns
and so he is racialized to be such and for all intended purposes on that particular
occasion he is Middle-Eastern. He suffers the same disadvantages (or advantages) in
the society and is, therefore, put in the same category at Middle-Easterns. Whether he
identifies as such or not, is not of interest for our concept of race.
When we talk about racial identity, we could be talking about one of the two
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following scenarios. On one hand, when I say I racially identify with a group of
people I mean I am from the same ethnic background; that I share some history or
culture with them or that our ancestors shared some history or culture. In that case,
we should call it “ethnic identity.” The people in an ethnic group could be more
diverse and one might or might not share some ancestral background with them. One
might not share any physical appearance with them either. On the other hand, I could
mean that I racially identify with a group based on the way that I have been racialized
in a society and that is the definition that Haslanger gives us, with the group that I
have been categorized with and been disadvantaged because of that categorization.290
This discussion of racial / ethnic identity takes us to the next section.
Racial / Ethnic Identity
Groups that are victims of oppression often come together to fight against
their oppression and to improve their situation. They do that by identifying with a
particular group. In the case of racial oppression, the members identify a group either
based on their racial categories or ethnicity. According to Mills, we can racially
identify by bodily appearance, ancestry, self-awareness of ancestry, public awareness
of ancestry, culture, experience, and subjective identification.291 Each of these comes
                                                
290 One might be racialized a particular way at one point and not other. For instance, the Italians used
to be racialized as that but they no longer are racialized in any way but White. So, the concept of race,
as Haslanger points out, is a changing concept.
291 Mills, But What Are You Really?, p. 50-54. Earlier I made a distinction between race and ethnicity.
Mill does not make this distinction when he is talking about racial identification. I suggest that when
he is talking about racial identity, he is really referring to ethnic identity, as I have made the
distinction.
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with its set of problems. I will briefly touch on the three that are often used to
categorize or self-identify with, culture, ancestry and bodily appearance.
Culture
Generally speaking people are very visual in their categorization of people.
With people’s appearances, come many stereotypes. Those stereotypes correspond to
our beliefs about other’s cultures. For instance, when we see someone who is
Mexican, we have certain cultural expectations, than we might not have if we see
someone who is White. On the Mexico-U.S. border it is very common to see Whites
who do not identify with White culture, regardless of what they might look like. They
consider themselves Mexican in ethnicity and self-identify accordingly.292 On the
other hand, many Mexicans in the Rio Grande Valley in South Texas who have lived
here for more than a generation, are wealthy and have integrated into the “White”
culture are frequently referred as “Whites” and they often self-identify as “White”.
They classify wealth and culture as criteria of racial identity.293
Those who consider culture as criterion of racial identity, will never be able to
escape their appearance and be considered as a part of that race to which, generally,
their physical appearance does not conform. For instance, given my appearance (olive
skin, black hair and very dark brown eyes), whether I was born in the U.S., speak
                                                
292 A White student of mine at University of Texas – Pan American, who was born on the border and
lived here all of his life, has no White friends and speaks fluent Spanish self-identifies with Mexicans.
He often said, “My people are Mexican people. I feel alienated when I am around Whites only”
(School year 2005-2006).
293 They are not necessarily the “White Mexicans” that the job application was referring to. This group
could be as dark-skinned as one might expect.
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only English, celebrate only American holidays, etc., I will still be considered “the
Other” with a whole set of cultural expectations, although it might be true that I do
not identify with my Iranian culture.294 I am always asked where I come from and the
question does not refer to the State, but rather my ethnic background. On the other
hand, someone who has a lighter complexion than I will not be asked about his or her
ethnic background (race), especially if they have been culturally assimilated.
Another scenario is when someone is rejected from the group she identifies
with because she is considered not well-cultured in her group. A Black University of
Kansas student once told me that she and her sister’s “Whiteness” is disturbing to her
grandfather.295 They talk, dress, and act like White people, and so he classified them
as not Black. Certainly, a majority of our society did not see her as “White”. At least,
she will face many of the obstacles that Black women face in the society but her
grandfather doesn’t categorize her as belonging to his race, Black, because she has
lost the “Black culture.” So, I would say, culture is what ethnically binds us to a
group and race is how we are socially categorized.296
What is the role of culture in the society and formulation of our concept
“race”? Tommie Shelby argues that preservation of culture is not necessary for the
                                                
294 The idea of “The Other” was introduced by Hegel, which refers to one who is difference than
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295 She was my student at the University of Kansas, in Lawrence, Kansas in Fall 2001.
296 Mills would say the University of Kansas student, or ones like her, are examples of an “Oreo-man,”
which apparently refers to someone who has appearance of Black, and is socially categorized as Black
but has the “White” culture, thinks and lives the “White” culture (Mills, But What Are You Really?, p.
60).  It is true that we classify people to be culturally one thing or another but that stereotyping is not
used to racialize people.  A White European who has adopted stereotypical culture of Blacks, is still
not considered Black, although she or he ethnically identifies as such.
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emancipation of race.297 That is, to be taken seriously in a society and be granted full
dignity and human value, one need not keep one’s culture. Surely he is right to say
that preservation of culture is not essential to have a race be free but if one’s race is of
utmost importance to a group for group identity, then having to give up their culture
(or keep it hidden) in order to be accepted as equal members of the society, is
oppressive. For instance, if Mexican-Americans have to give up quinceañeras,
coming out celebration of 15th birthday, eating tamales for Christmas, and stop
planning their life around their family’s lives, to be accepted as equal members of the
United States is a sign of cultural imperialism.298 So, although culture is not essential
to free a race, it might be essential for preservation of ethnicity.299
Ancestry and Physical Appearance
Physical appearance is often associated with one’s ancestry and the
appearance is often associated with people’s race.300 According to Appiah, if
                                                
297 Shelby, Foundations of Black Solidarity, p. 236.
298 We defined cultural imperialism in chapter one as Iris Young does; “Cultural imperialism ‘consists
in the universalization of one group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm’ and is
given preferential treatment. Cultural imperialism is most obvious in a society like ours that places
minority culture in an inferior status to the majority (White) culture” (Young, Five Faces of
Oppression, p. 285).
299 Although I believe culture plays a big role in some people’s lives, I do not believe that it should be
saved if the cost is oppression of a group of people. For instance, if we have to keep female genital
mutilation (FGM) to preserve cultural identity, then cultural identity will have to be sacrificed for the
benefit of the females. On the other hand, if the only way that a people can achieve equality in a
diverse society is to give up its culture, then we are right to be alarmed with the possibility of existence
of oppression. Nussbaum points out the importance of saving human functioning and dignity when she
says, “And what we are going to say is: there are universal obligations to protect human functioning
and its dignity, and that the dignity of women is equal to that of men. If that involves assault on many
local traditions [culture], both Western and non-Western, so much the better, because any tradition that
denies these things is unjust.” See Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p. 30.
300 As we pointed out that could be problematic because of the cases of people who are “passing”.
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someone has Black ancestry, although their physical appearance might not show it,
one might argue, they are “inauthentic” if they hide that fact because in our society
we still categorize people that way. He states that, “while they [the people who are
passing] may have prudential reasons for concealing the fact of their (partial) African
descent, this will be held by many to amount to inauthenticity, especially if they adopt
cultural styles associated with “white” people.”301 If we take Haslanger’s view of race
seriously, then there is nothing inauthentic about these people. They are merely given
a race by the way that they are perceived. On the other hand, Appiah argues that race
is not a biological classification and so it is not real in the metaphysical sense. So, if
race is not metaphysically real, then why say someone is being inauthentic if they are
“passing”?
Appiah gives us an answer similar to Haslanger’s view on race:
for those for whom being African-American is an important aspect of
their ethical identity, what matters to them is almost always not the
unqualified fact of that descent, but rather something that they suppose
to go with it: the experience of a life as a member of a group of people
who experience themselves as—and are held by others to be—a
community in virtue of their mutual recognition—and their recognition
by others—as people of a common descent.302
So, the life experience and the recognition by others is a part of racial categorization
and should be a part of racial identity. Their identity is dependent on their ancestors,
their origination place and such recognition by the other community. So it seems that
a person who is not recognized to be from that community is not meeting Appiah’s
                                                
301 Anthony Appiah, “‘But Would That Still Be Me?’” Notes on Gender, ‘Race,’ Ethnicity, as Sources
of ‘Identity’,” in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 87, no. 10, Eighty-Seventh Annual Meeting
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, (Oct., 1990), p. 498.
302 Appiah, “But Would That Still Be Me?”, p. 497. Emphasis added.
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criteria for being from a particular race. This view has some elements of how
Haslanger designates a race.303 However, like Haslanger, he would say that people,
who are “passing” with an adopted White culture, are not Black. However, one might
argue, they are inauthentic Black people who are lying to the community. Because the
society will not treat them as such and so long as they can live without the oppression
that Blacks typically live with, then that person is not Black. This is a consistent view
on race, if race is indeed a social reality and not so much a metaphysical one. If the
society does not recognize one to be from a particular race, and race is not a category
that the biologists use, then that individual is not from the race that she or he is not
categorized to be by the society.304
Racial self-identity and Essentialism
Stubblefield argues that we should accept non-essentialism because, “the
overall genetic differences among groups of humans classified by race is so small as
to render race irrelevant as a determinate of any other human attribute.”305 Stephen
Jay Gould explicitly endorses this idea;
                                                
303 Appiah seems to have not only a metaphysical theory of what race is but he wants to include the
self-identification and other’s recognition to the concept of a race. He seems to mix in two different
issues: race and authenticity. According to Appiah a part of being an authentic person is to have your
race to be known to the public but at the same time, a part of what it means to belong to a race is the
community’s identification. So, Appiah seems to be in the middle of a contradiction. I cannot be
inauthentic about my race if my community does not recognize me as that. So, if we go back to the
view that as long as you have any “Black blood” then you are Black, Appiah’s view has some
contradictions to be sorted out.
304 Both Haslanger and Appiah agree that race is a changing concept, although Appiah is not explicit
about it. They both agree that some races are racialized in the society at some time but not others.
Appiah gives the example of Irish-Americans who were at some point racialized but are not now and
are not in authentic if they do not reveal or acknowledge their ancestry (Appiah, p. 498).
305 Stubblefield, Racial Identity and Non-Essentialism About Race, p. 341.
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Although frequencies for difference states of gene differ among races,
we have found no ‘race genes’ – that is, states fixed in certain races
and absent from all others. Lewontin (1972) studied variation in
seventeen genes coded for differences in blood and found that only 6.3
percent of the variations can be attributed to racial membership. Fully
85.4 percent of the variation occurred within local populations (the
remaining 8.3 percent records differences among local populations
within a race).306
Given such a difference, it makes little sense to group people based on race and to
identify with that race. On the other hand, we want to identify with our people be it as
our community or as a political statement to fight against oppression. The question is,
what about them makes them our people? Are there some essential characteristics that
make them our people? Given there are no genetic components, then how do we
decide which there are and how do we keep from falling into essentialism? There are
no essential culture, characteristics, political affiliation, geographical similarities, etc.,
that binds people together.
In order to unify against the oppression of our race, Stubblefield sets out to
make consistent the non-essentialist view that she holds with the usefulness of racial
identification. She argues that “identifying oneself in terms of race…[which she calls
labeling] is harmful to the person being labeled regardless of the content of the
label.”307 It is harmful because, among other things, it is divisive; it gives people
unjustified expectations of the people labeled; assumes the individual has certain
traits without any time spent getting to know that person.308 So, we do not label
ourselves but we unite under the label that the society gives us. Basically we identify
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ourselves “in terms of social meanings and situations [oppression] that are an integral
part of the society or world” in which we live.309 This understanding of racial identity
is congruent with Haslanger’s definition of race that I endorse almost entirely.
Stubblefield, as a non-essentialist about race, justifies racial identification based on
the way the society defines and labels a race.310 At the same time, if the oppression of
that group ceases to exit, so will their justification for racial identification.
Michael C. LaBossiere argues that it is not racial identification that we should
be united under, as Stubblefield suggests. We should identify with one another under
the label that we are categorized under and not necessarily with a particular racial
group with which we share some similarity, whether or not we identify with members
of that group. This way of looking at self-identity becomes more of a political
classification and not an essentialist categorization of a race. Suppose that I, as an
Iranian woman, have been labeled Mexican and suffer the same kinds of oppression.
LaBossiere argues that we ought to unite under that label and not so much about who
we self-identify with if we are fighting against oppression. LaBossiere suggests that
all those that are labeled as such ought to come together to fight against their
oppression.311 The term Hispanic refers more or less to people south of the United
States, and was designated by the census bureau in 1980, although some of the
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310 I suppose in her view also, if a person is not labeled as such (because they are passing), there would
be no need for racial identity.
311 This has some similarities with Haslanger’s view. When there are mattes of justice, what is
important is how the society racializes (labels) one and not what we identify with.
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people, who are labeled as such, do not like the term used to describe them.312
LaBossiere is not alone in his view. Shelby agrees that oppressed people
should identify together based on their common oppression or, to put it in
LaBossiere’s terms, the label that they are given and oppressed in virtue of it.
Whether or not we agree with that label is another issue and need not be addressed in
fighting oppression. For instance, we ought not be bogged down in debates about
what is a real Black, or Mexican. According to Shelby,
I would urge blacks to identify with each other on the basis of their
common oppression and commitment to resisting it; and, from the
standpoint of black solidarity, each should be allowed, without
molestation, to interpret “blackness” however she or he sees fit
(provided the interpretation does not advocate anything immoral and is
consistent with the principles and goals of antiracism).313
Shelby rightly argues that once we find ourselves aiming to find the criteria for racial
identity and what makes us belong to that race, we are suddenly trapped in the debate
about who belongs to our race and who does not. This is evident in the Mexican
culture, especially those living in the Borderlands. There is an uncertainty in the
Mexican culture, as it might be in first or second generation in any immigrant culture,
about how to define itself. There seems to be a diverse array of options available to
                                                
312 Many Mexicans do not like the label, “Hispanic.” They often correct me by saying “I am Mexican,
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context and not another. People who are “passing” are not labeled “Black” although they may
(ethnically) identify with being Black.
313 Shelby, Foundations of Black Solidarity, p. 254.
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them to define themselves by.314
According to Shelby, the racialist315 conception of race is bad for identity
because (1) it only allows “pure blacks” in or (2) promotes interracial marriages
merely to increase the number of people who ought to identify as blacks. Both of
which are bad.316 He goes further and says that, racial identity is bad all together for
several reasons; “First, black people would inevitably become bogged down, as they
often have, by disagreements over what constitutes and who possesses an ‘authentic’
black identity.”317 Although Shelby is talking about Blacks only, this question can be
asked of all people of all races. One would wonder under what religion, culture,
living environment, styles, etc., we should base our racial identities. Trying to figure
out what we should unite under, gets us bogged down and we lose sight of our
goal.318 Often times I hear sentiments about who is a real Iranian, Mexican, African,
etc., when these groups are trying to identify the members of their groups. As
mentioned earlier, many people identify with a group based on ethnicity and not
really race. Shelby does not make such a distinction between racial or ethnic identity.
Second, Shelby warns us against racial identify under a single culture; “class
differences among blacks will complicate any attempt to sustain a common black
                                                
314 I should note that the identity issue has been one of the issues in the Hispanic culture since the
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315 Racialism is the view, “that there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species,
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318 The same kind of worries was addressed when talking about what divided the feminist movement
and it has often been said that it was white women’s disagreements on issues such as abortion that
made us lose sight of our goal and get bogged down on the details.
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ethnic or cultural identity.”319 Class is one of the most powerful dividing elements in
a capitalist society and it is also often defining of one’s culture and identification but
that is not strictly related to race. I mentioned earlier in this chapter that many
Mexicans consider themselves White, not because they are racialized by society as
“White,” nor is it because they are indeed light-skinned but because they identify race
with class. Further, as Shelby points out, there could be many different races within a
class, which does not necessarily give them a unified racial identity but class does
divide up groups. So, “cultural identity…is not necessary for the success of
emancipatory project” but it could be a dividing force between people of a race.320
What we hope for is to end oppression of a group and preserve a culture, although
some might argue that to end one’s oppression might require their cultural
acceptance. However, a group that is divided and broken cannot fight to end
oppression.
Lastly, what it would require to have group identity causes friction between
different genders; “the requirement of a common black identity would surely
aggravate the antagonism between black men and women over the meaning of
blackness as it relates to gender.”321 Just as in the majority of cultures, Black identity
has been defined by men, but that is not how a group is racialized in the society at
large. The society at large races a group. Shelby is concerned that more often than not
(Black) men do not concern themselves by the needs and concerns of (Black) women.
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Consequently, Black women as many women of color, are “at the intersection of
racial and gender oppression.”322 Particularly, Black women, Shelby notes, are in a
tough place in the society. If they speak of issues such as domestic violence or rape,
they are scrutinized by their group as confirming the stereotypes of Black men in the
society and keeping the men in their oppressed position. So, the women are often
silenced and their issues ignored.
It is perhaps obvious that all people who suffer racial oppression regardless of
their culture, class, or gender are interested to end it. The uniting force is not
necessarily racial identity because as Shelby too recognizes, the concept “Black” is a
changing concept, “varying with who is interpreting it, their motives for using the
notion, and the social circumstances under which they employ it”, as does
Haslanger.323 We need to be united under the common oppression, which too is
congruent with Haslanger’s theory of race.
In Conclusion
Race is complicated, ever-changing and evolving. We used to think that if one
simply shares genes with a particular group of people, then one belongs to that race.
However, we have learned that although the oppressed might have a goal to achieve
and strive for ending their oppression, people within a race are as diverse as people
get. They might, or might, not share some common goal, they might, or might not,
share the language, culture, or even ancestry with the racial group that they have been
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categorized, nor might they share common blood with them.324 According to W. E. B.
Du Bois “[A race] is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and
language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both
voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more
or less vividly conceived ideals of life.”325 There are too many elements at work here.
We might use each of the above criteria mentioned to racialize people and put them
into groups. Race is something that is assigned by the society to a group of people
because they look, dress, act a certain way or because they are from a particular part
of the world that generally associates with their physical appearance. So, I believe
race is a social phenomenon that changes as the culture changes.
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161
Six
Ending Racial Oppression
In the last four chapters, I have discussed oppression, the capabilities approach,
rights, and race. In this chapter, I will discuss racial oppression and make suggestions
on ending racial oppression, within the theoretical framework established in the
previous chapters. Specifically, I will discuss typical harms of oppression and give
some recommendations as to what can be done in order to end racial oppression,
some of which go beyond the construct of rights. In my discussion, I will address the
oppression, or its lack, of those who are racially “passing”. I will argue that those who
are passing, although they benefit by passing, they too are victims of racial
oppression. However, it is mainly internally inflicted.
The definition of race that I endorse is Sally Haslanger’s, which is,
A group is racialized iffdf its members are socially positioned as
subordinate or privileged along some dimension (economic, political,
legal, social, etc.), and the group is ‘marked’ as a target for this
treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be
evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region.326
In this view of race, people who are passing (as White), for all intents and purposes,
are White. Traditionally, if someone is genetically connected to a race, regardless of
his or her appearance, he or she belongs to that race. On this definition of race, if
someone is socially classified to be Black because she looks Black, even if she is not
traditionally Black (say if she is a dark-skinned individual from India), she is Black.
That is, if she suffers the same disadvantage as all the Blacks. On the other hand, if
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someone has a Black ancestor, but he or she looks White and is “passing as White”,
then he or she is not Black, but rather, is White. She or he benefits from her
appearance and racialization. Although she might also suffer some harms of
oppression, socially, she benefits from the advantages of being racialized as White.
As I discuss the typical harms of oppression, I discuss the case of those who are
passing.
Typical Harms of Racial Oppression
 Because harm is the normative criterion of oppression, racial oppression has to
include some kind of harm, which is, in my view, violations of one’s capabilities.
Typical harms of racial oppression are violence, economic deprivation, and the
harmful consequences of stereotyping. These harms are not rendered internally
(voluntarily), but rather, they are externally applied. These harms are inflicted on the
individuals in virtue of being members of a particular racial group. Group
membership can be voluntary or involuntary. We are non-voluntary members of a
group when we do not voluntarily choose whether or not we are members.
Necessarily, membership in a voluntary group is a matter of our voluntary choice.
According to Cudd, “members of voluntary social groups share joint commitments or
joint projects. The members of a nonvolutary social group share social penalties and
rewards consequent on their being so grouped.”327 Members of a racial group, as
discussed in the last chapter, do not necessarily share a project, history, religion, etc.
                                                
327 Cudd, Analyzing oppression, p. 41.
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They instead are bound by their common oppression or common benefits gained from
the membership in that group – which, according to Cudd, makes race membership a
non-voluntary one.
Furthermore, we are sometimes racially categorized into a group that we
might not racially identify with. I live in a community that often classifies me as
Mexican-American. In my view, Mexican-American is not only a nationality or
ethnicity, it is also a race – it entails disadvantage. In our society the term “Mexican-
American” refers to a particular race because we use it this way and in my view of
race, there is a pragmatic element. That is, we treat Mexican-Americans more like
African-Americans , a race, than like Irish Americans, an ethnicity. Race is a category
of disadvantage or privilege, while ethnicity does not connote hierarchy. Although
Haslanger does not discuss Mexican Americans, I believe that it is congruent with her
view. Mexican Whites are not classified as racially White in our society. However,
because race is a changing concept, it is very likely that in not so distant future,
Mexican Whites would no longer be racialized as “Mexican White” but rather White,
as Italians or Irish have been for some time. On the other hand, one can belong to one
race in one society and not in another. For instance, a very dark skinned woman from
Senegal once told me that I was really White and in her country I would be classified
as racially White. With my Middle-Eastern background, dark brown eyes and black
hair, I am not likely to be racialized in the United States as “White.”
Since we live in a highly racialized society, being categorized as a member of
a racial group has both benefits and penalties. The oppressed face many harmful
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situations, including financial, emotional, or physical. I will consider the three typical
harms of racial oppression; violence, economic deprivation, and stereotyping. Each of
these harms could be externally (involuntarily) or internally (voluntarily) inflicted.
The voluntary inflictions of harm on oneself is the most subtle case of oppression and
the most difficult to detect and fight against.
Violence
As mentioned in chapter two, Iris Young gives us five faces of oppression, one
of which is violence. Victims of violence, “suffer the oppression of systematic and
legitimate violence. The members of some groups live with the knowledge that they
must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no
other motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person.”328  The examples are
numerous. I have recently come across a book written by a Holocaust survivor, David
Faber.329 The stories are heart-wrenching. The Nazi officers randomly, without
provocations, abused, beat, tortured and killed Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and the
handicapped. Violence is often used as a very powerful tool over the oppressed.
Faber, who was in his teenage years during Holocaust, lived through watching his
sisters, brother, mother and father killed, for no other reason than the fact they were
Jews. His mother and sisters were shot when the Nazi officers ran through the
building, going floor to floor, shooting everyone in the building. He survived the
                                                
328 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 287.
329 David Faber, Because of Romek: A Holocaust Survivor’s Memoir (California: Vincent Press
Publishing Company, 2004).
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shooting that day because he was hiding.
In the contemporary United States, Blacks, women, or homosexuals are all
victims of unprovoked violence. Many fear unprovoked attacks on their individual
persons. Blacks are harassed by the law enforcement, killed in the hands of racists as
in the case of James Byrd or are victims of emotional violence through media and the
stereotypes against them. Women, regardless of their race or social status, fear being
attacked, battered, humiliated or raped, even by one’s acquaintances. Mary Koss’s
research showed that 85% of rapes are committed by acquaintances of the victims.
Women are battered in the hands of their lovers, or are humiliated in person or
through media’s presentation of them.330 Homosexuals are also not safe from
violence, harassment, beatings, or humiliation. Mathew Shepard is a highly
publicized case of a young homosexual University of Wyoming student who was
beaten and tied to a fence post while he took his last breaths.
Such scenarios are obvious cases of violence. Their victimhood is unmistakably
inflicted on them by external forces, of which the resistance is either futile or is near
impossible. Jews were physically forced (through horrendous violence) to conform or
else face death. In contemporary society, homosexuals seem to be on the same boat as
the Jews were during the Holocaust. The case of women and Blacks is a bit more
subtle. Blacks and women become voluntary victims of violence, each perhaps in
different ways and for different reasons. Many women stay in both emotionally and
                                                
330 Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin have argued against violent pornography because they
argue that it mixes love and violence, which in turn normalizes violence and romance for the viewers
and promotes violence on women. For the effects of porn and violence on women, see Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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physically abusive relationships and claim it is their own choice to remain in those
relationships.331 This is violence and it is voluntary. Women often blame themselves
for the violence they receive. Some believe that if they were not a certain way, they
would not be abused. In my view, this is a case of psychological oppression.332
Consider the case of Hispanic women. In the Hispanic machismo culture, some
women claim that they want men to occasionally “slap them around” because that is
how they show their love. The man, who really cares, would occasionally hit his wife.
Women seek men who would hit them at times, because they believe this is the most
vivid way that men show their affection.
Accepting violence as a part of one’s life has grave implications on how we
choose to conduct our lives. Blacks often accept the fact that their lives involve
violence, although they might blame themselves for the violence inflicted on them.
Economic Oppression
One of the main components of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made employment
discrimination, based on race and sex, unlawful. Discrimination in the case of
employment keeps people from holding any job but mostly, prestigious jobs. If we, as
women or any other minority, are unable to find meaningful employment, we have
                                                
331 A grandmother I know has not been able to be a part of her children or grandchildren’s lives
because her husband forbids her to do so. She now claims that it is her decision to not be a part of
things and he no longer threatens her. I suppose that the cycle is complete. She has internalized his
expectations. Whether she knows it or not, she fears him and his verbal abuse. Her children have
watched him rape her, beat her, humiliate her, and now, she no longer needs any external abuse to keep
her in her oppressive situation.
332 Since in my view oppression does not entail coercion, it is consistent with my view to say
something is voluntary and it is also oppressive.
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little power in society, be it in the public or private realm. If a woman is unable to
make a living on her own, it is hard to leave an abusive relationship. If she gains the
courage to leave, there is little she could do to make a viable life for herself and
possibly her children. With little or no income, we are also unable to politically do
much to change the laws.
Although there are laws against employment discrimination, it does not protect
everyone at all times. Carol Pateman warned us about the lack of social justice, even
when there are laws protecting all legal employees. Migrant workers are a legal work
force in the United States who is victim of economic oppression. They are paid very
little and live under very harsh conditions.333 Often they have to pay a great sum of
money to acquire work-permits and travel to the United States to work. They do it
because they believe their income would help them pay for it. However, when they
arrive, their contracts are often broken and they are not paid the amount they were
promised. They do not have significant access to justice when they are overworked,
fired without justification, or have their job contracts violated. To approach law
enforcement and the courts would jeopardize their future opportunities as migrant
workers. Generally, Mexican workers, even with those with work permits, are unable
to speak English and they are both geographically and socially isolated, so there is not
much they can do if they are unjustly treated.334 If they attempt to get legal help, they
                                                
333 Here I speak of Mexicans that are in the United States on H-2B visas. H-2B visas are given for non-
agricultural work (forestry, hotel workers, highway workers, etc.). There were 89,000 H-2B visas
given in 2005, which 75% were from Mexico (See, Close to Slavery, p. 5).
334 Close to Slavery, p. 31.
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risk losing their jobs.335  This is a clear case of a minority racial group being
economically taken advantage of for the benefit of others. However, they are not the
only group who are victims of economic oppression.
Blacks and Native Americans, also suffer economic oppression. However, their
case is much more subtle. Their situation is the result of years of “training” in our
society. Economic oppression can also be voluntary, but indirectly so. Blacks and
Native Americans mostly live in poorer neighborhoods, where their education is not
well-funded. They do not acquire skills (including self-esteem) to attend college to
become professionals or improve their quality of life one way or another.336 They
experience society’s image of them and make it their own. They internalize the social
expectations of them and become their own oppressors. In essence, they self-
stereotype.
In the second chapter, I referred to Professor X, a professor at the University of
Texas – Pan American, whose father encouraged her to become a secretary after high
school, believing it to be a good job for a Mexican woman. As it turned out, she did
not. However, this is not often the case. We do what is expected of us and that is how
oppression continues from one generation to another. Stereotyping and also self-
stereotyping plays a huge factor in the continuing oppression of a group.
                                                
335 In the last chapter, I mentioned that Mexican is not a race but a nationality. However, as used in the
United States, we refer to the “brown people immediately south of the border” as “Mexicans.” So, for
our purposes here, I treat the term “Mexican” as a racial term. Although I do not use Asians as an
example here, the term “Asian” is also not a racial term but it designates a group, which ironically,
does not include me, although Iran is certainly in Asia. So, there are some racial terms that refer to
people in a geographic area but they are intended to designate a race.
336 Thomas J. Kane, Race, College Attendance, and College Completion, A published report by
Brookings Institution, September 1994.
169
Stereotyping
Research shows that stereotyping a group has significant impact on the way
the individuals within the group understand themselves. Both negative and positive
stereotyping can have negative effects. In several researches performed by John T.
Jost and Mehzarin R. Banaji, “stereotyping emerged as a fairly unambiguously
negative force within social relations characterized by power differentials – it
contributes to control, constraint, distortion, domination and false consciousness.”337
This control is not physical. It is implanted on the minds of the people who are
stereotyped. Jost and Banaji add, “Those with power can control ideas, beliefs, and
stereotypes in the same way they control other social and material resources and can
thereby instill a ‘false consciousness’ in the powerless such that the powerless
become complicit in their own disadvantage.”338 The powerless accept their own
oppression and become their own oppressors.339 Psychologists have conducted
numerous researches behind self-oppression. Those who are negatively stereotyped in
society internalize the stereotypes and their negative mindset becomes a limiting
factor in the ways they conduct their lives.
According to research done by Katherine J. Reynolds, et al., stereotyping is a
                                                
337 John T. Jost, and Mehzarin R. Banaji, “The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the
production of false-consciousness,” in British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 33 (1), March 1994.
Referenced in Kathrine J. Reynolds, Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam, Mark A. Nolan, and
Larissa Dolnik, “Responses to Powerlessness: Stereotyping as an Instrument of Social Conflict,” in
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, vol. 4, 2000. p. 276.
338 Jost and Banaji reference in Reynolds, p. 276.
339 As Cudd points out, “It is not that they [the psychologically oppressed] will prefer oppression to
justice, or subordination to equality, rather they will prefer the kinds of social roles that tend to
subordinate them, make them less able to choose, or give them fewer choices to make.” See Analyzing
Oppression, p. 181.
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social phenomenon that leads to self-stereotyping. For instance, I have heard women
on the radio strongly argue against a woman president, especially during the time of
war. Their argument is that we need a strong president during war, that a woman
cannot be as strong as a man in handling such situations. That is a case of women
self-stereotyping about their abilities or abilities of women in general.
Just about every group suffers or benefits from social stereotypes. These
harms and benefits are multi-dimensional. Consider the stereotypes surrounding
Blacks and Mexicans in the United States. Blacks are stereotyped as being on drugs,
violent criminals, poor, uneducated, lazy, on welfare, etc. When their children cause
trouble, we often categorize it as an extension of media’s stereotypes of them.340
These stereotypes, as psychologists have shown, negatively effect people’s
perceptions of themselves and how they see their roles in society. Once we see our
roles, we are drawn to act that way. Many gender scholars have argued that the
characteristics typically assigned to men and women are socially learned. We are
socialized since the day we are born, into our expected roles. Considering there are no
essential, genetic characteristics that equate with race, as Mills argues, the
development of race is also socialized. So, if a race is assumed and socialized to hold
certain characteristics, then, they will accept them as a part of who they are, whether
                                                
340 The most disturbing form of stereotyping currently in the media is against he illegal immigrants in
the United States. There are millions of illegals in the U.S. who are hardworking men, women and
sometimes their children who contribute in a great extent to our economy. However, there are also
some in that population, as it is in any other group or population who are criminals. But in today’s
media any crime committed by the illegals is an opportunity to point out to the American population
that illegals are criminal and we ought to stop illegal immigration. Perhaps illegal immigration is a
problem but it does not follow that illegal immigration is the reason for horrible crimes done in the
United States.
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that benefits them or not, it is another debate.
Stereotyping affects a group in different ways. Judith A. Howard points out
that stereotypes also affect the way we react to misfortunes of some groups that are
negatively stereotyped; “Stereotypes influence our reaction to members of these
groups. Those who subscribe to the stereotypes of young black men as aggressive and
hostile, for example, may attribute the unemployment of a particular young black man
to his presumed hostile disposition, ignoring current economic circumstances.”341
Consequently, we see no reason to address the institutional oppression that Black
people face but rather we blame them as having a violent culture, which is in
opposition to the “civilized and calm” European one. I often experience these kinds of
sentiments about the Mexicans as well.
Mexicans are in many ways similarly stereotyped. They are often stereotyped
as having lots of children, poor, dirty, and involved with gangs and drugs. If they are
wealthy, they are believed to be drug-dealers. They are seen as uneducated but, unlike
Blacks, some are hard-working, but most are lazy.342 In schools, the students are told
Hispanics (which include people from Mexico) are bad at math, will only be able to
do hard labor, they are told not to worry too much about good grades in high schools
because “you won’t be going to college; spend your energy learning a trade so you
can get a job”, and so on. The students internalize these expectations of inferiority in
                                                
341 Judith A. Howard, “The ‘Normal’ Victim: The Effects of Gender Stereotypes on Reactions to
Victims,” in Social Psychology Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 3 (September 1984), p. 271.
342 Stereotypes in Advertising: http://www.trivia-library.com/a/history-of-advertising-mexican-
stereotypes-in-advertising.htm.
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the society and often live up to them (voluntary oppression).343 Naturally, many of
them do not nurture their intellectual abilities. Consequently, education will not play a
role in their future. This is a vicious circle.344 They internalize these stereotypes
(social expectations of them) and act accordingly. Social stereotypes are a huge
determining factor as to what one would expect of one’s life prospects. They do not
choose careers or jobs that would lead them to prestigious positions.345 Hence, they
become voluntary victims of oppression, through self-stereotyping. These harms are
seen as an extension of who they are and not the social structure that has made their
world such that they are forced to adopt the preferences that they have.
These three harms of oppression are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Each
could happen by itself or is the result of another. For instance, violence and economic
oppression could lead to self-stereotyping. On the other hand, self-stereotyping could
lead to economic oppression.
                                                
343 Many anecdotes from students who graduate from high schools in the Rio Grande Valley area in
South Texas do not believe that they can do much with their lives besides finding blue collar jobs.
344 I am often struck by the fact that many of our students in South Texas College, who are over 95%
Hispanics, do not believe that they are capable of earning degrees beyond an associate degree. See the
following website for our demographics;
http://www.southtexascollege.edu/about/factsheet/pdf/fact07.pdf.
345 I do not claim that all Mexicans or Blacks will end up in disadvantaged positions. Often classism is
factored in to the question of what one can do in life and what one’s opportunities are. Many
Mexicans, who grow up in South Texas in the lower Rio Grande valley, have not personally been
victims of racial discrimination until they leave the Rio Grande Valley of South Texas, because
Hispanics make over 85% of the population. However, they are often victims of classism. So along
with the society-wide racism and classism, they are in a terrible place. Their women are again
victimized by the Hispanic machismo culture.
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Passing (or not) and Oppression
 The concept of passing generally refers to a situation where an individual is able
to conduct its affairs as members of another group. For instance, some Blacks in the
early 20th century were able to pass and conduct their lives as Whites in order to
overcome the discriminations they faced. Traditionally we understand someone to be
Black if she has among her biological ancestors at least one person who is descended
from (sub-Saharan) Africa. In this view people who are passing, since they share
some ancestry with Blacks, they too are Black. Suppose Gina who is very fair, has
ancestors who are all, but 1/8 are White European. In our traditional classification of
her, Gina is Black. This is not the case if we accept Haslanger’s definition.
Haslanger’s definition of race includes a pragmatic element. She argues that
we are racially categorized (racialized) based on the physical appearance that we
share with the members of a group who are historically from a particular geographic
area and are harmed or benefited from this classification. In this definition, Gina is
White because she looks white and does not suffer the oppression that Blacks do. On
the other hand, if I am racialized as Hispanic in my community of 85-90% Mexicans
and suffer the consequences, then I am Hispanic.
Those who are “passing” are also racialized but they are racialized as the
dominant group and not the group that they are traditionally classified. Our definition
challenges the traditional understanding of race and racial classification. It would be
meaningless to even talk about passing people because people belong to the race that
society racializes them to be, based on our definition and not the traditional way. So,
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it would not make sense to say that Gina is passing. That would assume that she is
one race but is trying to conduct her life as another. Based on our definition, Gina
only has once race, the one that she is racialized as – the one she conduct her life
within her society and is advantaged or disadvantaged by, namely, White. That does
not mean, however, that Gina cannot maintain a Black ethnicity. So, I use the word
“passing” to refer to the phenomenon where someone we categorized as Black (or
another race) and now makes a conscious, successful effort to be categorized as
White.
Although people who are passing are not Black, Hispanic, Arab, etc., they
might self-identify with that minority group. In the view of race I have presented
here, race is a designation one is given by the society, given one’s appearance and
general geographical designation of a particular people. So, when someone is passing,
although they might “racially” identify with the original designation of their group,
they are mistaken. If I can pass as a Mexican and live my life accordingly, then I no
longer am Persian, unless my society categorizes me as such. If I suffer the harms that
they do (and I often do living among them), and my community has racialized me as
Hispanics, then I am just that, Hispanic. However, I might identify with the Hispanic
race but I do not ethnically belong to that group, if I am culturally Iranian. Many
Iranians living in the Rio Grande Valley in South Texas speak Spanish, are married to
Mexicans, eat mostly Mexican foods, and seem to be a better fit with the Mexican
community than Iranian. Although they pass as Mexicans, they are ethnically
identifying as Iranians or Persians.
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Because most of the racialization of people is done in order to classify,
categorize or stereotype them, whether a person is passing or not, the negative or
positive stereotypes will affect them. If someone identifies with the oppressed race,
whether or not they are passing, this identification can and often does lead to
voluntary oppression. Those who are passing could be victims of psychological
oppression due to stereotyping, the traditional understanding of race, and their own
racial or ethnic identification. They are not victims of external forces of oppression
but they internalize the society’s traditional categorization of their “race”, and the
stereotypes that go along with it. The psychologically oppressed internalize the
traditional understanding of race along with all the historical and current negative
stereotypes that go along with it, and become their own oppressors.
Anthony Appiah reminds us of those who disagree with the practice of
passing altogether. They believe it to be a moral offense.346 Considering that race is a
changing concept, and we are racialized in the society, I do not believe there is a
moral offense in the act of passing.347 There are no essential characteristics of a race
that would determine the race of an individual. One’s race does not determine any
facts about an individual’s abilities and so, identifying with a race that one is
traditionally classified as, is unimportant. So, there is no moral offense in being
racialized one way or another. In my view of race no one is really passing. People
belong to the race that they are racialized to belong. No one is pretending to be who
he or she is not. Gina might not identify with her White race, although she is
                                                
346 Appiah, But Would That Still Be Me?, p. 498.
347 Appiah agrees.
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racialized as such. My youngest brother does not identify with Iranian race, although
he likes the food and speaks the language. He does not identify with the Iranian
holidays and denies many of the cultural norms. Although the society is always going
to racialize him as the other, he does not identify with that racialization.
Gina lives in a place where race matters a great deal. As Charles Mills puts it
we have a vertical race system in the United States. That is, there is a close
correlation between one’s race and the likelihood of one’s social and economic
status.348 In such society it is rational to hide one’s race if the racial designations
works against one’s social status. If Gina is racialized as Black and Blacks are
discriminated against, to the extent that they were before the Civil Rights Movement
Act of 1964, then it is rational and to her benefit to alter her race. However, if Gina
internalizes her social designation and the negative stereotypes, she could be victim
of self-stereotyping.
There is one way we might come to interpret the criticism of passing people.
Suppose a society that believes Blacks lack the intellectual ability required to become
engineers. If Gina, being an engineer, reveals her race, she could help minimize the
stereotypes but on the other hand she could harm her own social status if her race is
known. Or she might be the token Black individual in her social group.
Whichever is the case, she suffers from the negative stereotypes against her
racial group. According to Claude M. Steele, widespread negative stereotypes against
one’s group lead to stereotype threat. He contends, “the existence of such stereotypes
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means that anything one does or any of the one’s features that conform to it make the
stereotype more plausible as a self-characterization in the eyes of others, and perhaps
even in one’s own eyes.”349 That is those who are negatively (or positively)
stereotyped are always under the threat of being watched to see if they indeed
conform to the stereotypes. For instance, people often argue that women enjoy
cooking, cleaning and taking care of people. Many women, although they prefer to
have home-made food, and caring for others, refrain from doing so because they do
not want the negative stereotypes that comes with that. Women often feel as though
they live under a microscope. The whole society is watching. Our most miniscule acts
that correspond to the stereotypes further the negative stereotypes against us. If we
cannot get a job, it is because we do not want to work. It is interpreted as our desire to
stay home and be housewives. If we are forced to stay home to care for our sick
children, again, we are only conforming to the stereotypes, which keeps us in the
socially inferior situation. Women are not the only group who suffers stereotype
threat. All the members of other groups who are negatively stereotyped are. Suppose
a Black teen who is a good runner, he might not aim at becoming a runner because he
would prefer to be treated as an individual free from the stereotypes of the society. He
might limit his options because his society stereotypes Blacks as being good at one
thing, sports.
Those who are passing or tokens are also subject to stereotype threat and also
self-shame even if they are advantaged by their exceptional status. Internalizing the
                                                
349 Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of
African Americans,” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 69, no. 5, 1995, p. 797.
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inferior social status, we feel ashamed to be of that kind of person.350 According to
Sandra Lee Bartky, “many oppressed persons come to regard themselves as uniquely
unable to satisfy normal criteria of psychological health or moral adequacy. To
believe that my inferiority is a function of the kind of person I am may make me
ashamed of being of this kind.”351 Self-shame is certainly a hindrance to one’s life
options. It leads to low self-esteem and as result limiting one’s development of
capabilities, which as a result, perpetuates the stereotypes.352
Both self-shame and stereotype threat have many bad consequences. First, it is
limiting, it thwarts the development of one’s capabilities, and aims to mold people in
shapes that they might not fit. Second, stereotype threat keeps some minorities in the
position of power, such as United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, to
turn their back to the people who look to them to address their issues. Justice Thomas
has denounced the welfare system and argued for its abolition, which is not a very
considerate position given his mother was living in public housing during his senate
confirmation hearing.353 Justice Thomas seems to be doing all he can to avoid
stereotype threat, by going against the stereotypes of Blacks being on welfare. More
specifically, Justice Thomas is trying to avoid, what Steele calls, “immediate
situational threat” that is derived from all of the negative stereotypes against a person.
Immediate situational threat is the threat of the possibility of being judged and
                                                
350 When my daughter, who has blue eyes, was born, an Iranian friend told me that I should be glad
that my daughter is White because White kids are smarter, and more polite than non-white kids. She is
not White, neither am I. Her statement is pregnant with self-shame.
351 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, p. 30. Emphasis is original.
352 As a faculty advisor, I have encountered many Hispanic students who coyly tell me they cannot
pick majors that require them to pass Algebra because Hispanics are not good at math.
353 Senate Confirmation Hearings, September 10, 1991.
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treated stereotypically, or of possibly self-fulfilling such a stereotype.” This
stereotype threat,
can befall anyone with a group identity about which some negative
stereotype exists, and for the person to be threatened in this way he
need not even believe the stereotype. He need only know that it stands
as a hypothesis about him in situations where the stereotype is
relevant.354
Research shows this threat can and (and often does) result in poor performance in
intellectual tests. Stereotype or situational threat works in different ways in different
people. People either internalize inferiority or blame others for their problems and
“underutilized available opportunities”, both of which lead to their second-class
status.355 Self-blame could lead to people seeing themselves as not having the
capability to succeed, and so they would not even try. I suppose we all suffer from
this to some extent. For instance, I have always wanted to run a marathon. I do not
believe that it is within my capabilities to do so. So, I have never tried and probably
never will. However, this does not hinder my life-options, my quality of life, nor
would it leave me in an oppressed social status. But self-blame could lead to low
quality of life. If we blame our lack of success on our own inabilities, it would be
difficult to recognize and fight against institutional racism. Self-blame is the final and
key ingredient in perpetuating oppression.
On the other hand, one can blame others to the extent that one would not take
any chances because she believes that she would be kept from succeeding anyway.
                                                
354 Steele and Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans,
p. 798.
355 Ibid., p. 798.
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Therefore, she would “underutilize” the resources she has to succeed. A student who
had missed about a month of class, during which we had an exam showed up one day
and apologized for having missed class. She had been scheduled to work during her
class time. In my opinion, she had relinquished all her responsibilities for missing
class because they scheduled her to work. According to this student, there were other
options that she could have pursued but did not. Self-blame and blaming others can
both end in situations that diminish one’s abilities, and consequently lower one’s
quality of life.
Tokenism and Oppression
Most people do not like to be victims. When discussing women’s oppression,
female students often argue that they are not oppressed but they know women who
are. However, if they accept their oppression as members of an oppressed group, they
often name a powerful woman, who does not suffer the oppression that the rest of the
group does in order to show that not everyone in an oppressed group suffers from
oppression. Condoleezza Rice, President George Bush’s second term Secretary of
State, is common example often used to show that not all women or Blacks are
oppressed. She holds a very prestigious position in the government. She is the first
Black woman ever to hold this position. Considering the social structure of our
society, Rice’s position is not a sign of emergence of equality, but rather she is a
token. Tokenism happens when a member of a minority group is represented in the
majority group but is given little power. Although Rice’s position is a powerful one,
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in reality she has little power. She seems to accomplish very little and is being used as
a tool for the government that she represents. She was much more respected as a
professor at a prestigious university than as the Secretary of State for the Bush’s
administration. However, her inclusion in the government was a prudent move for the
Bush’s Republican administration. She helps secure the illusion that racial oppression
is extinct in the United States.
As I will discuss later in this chapter, so long as the oppressed group are
represented in government, they will not rebel against their oppression. The
government is aware of this. The oppressed group will not feel as though reaching
higher social levels is impossible but that is merely an appearance of opportunity.356
Condoleezza Rice is merely a token. Most people, especially Blacks, do not typically
have the same opportunities that Rice had to get to her level.357 The real life
opportunity is not available to kids being raised in the ghettos or those whose parents
do not realize the value of education in order to achieve one’s life potential.358 There
are certainly no laws to keep Blacks or Hispanics from becoming successful, but
social justice has not caught up yet.359 There is good reason to believe, given the
current societal structures and dominant victim-blaming ideology, it never can. In the
                                                
356 Recall the capabilities approach demands that opportunities ought to be real one. People ought to be
able to develop their capabilities. Putting it in rights-talk, people ought to be given what is needed to
practice the rights that are generated by their capabilities.
357 The majority in the social elite who run this country are White men.
358 About a year ago (in 2006) I met a woman in her early twenties in Oklahoma City whose parents
were migrant workers when she was only a child. They took her out of school in Mexico, immigrated
to the U. S. and took her around as they went around in the Midwest to find farm jobs. This young
woman did not have an education past 4th grade. She spoke fluent English but could not read a word of
it. Her parents hoped to keep her and her siblings fed and aimed at teaching her something that she
could use to earn a living, namely, working in the fields.
359 Carol Pateman makes such argument in the case of women.
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United States, millions of Black children still attend dangerous, impoverished public
schools, the majority of their families still live in or near poverty. The probability that
a Black male will be murdered or incarcerated is many times that of Whites, and the
mere survival of Black citizens is of little interest to the federal government.360 We
witnessed this most poignantly in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina disaster. All of
this is the injustice of racial oppression in America. All individuals, including Blacks,
ought to have the means required to achieve the threshold of functioning. In my view,
people, not only, have negative rights, but also positive rights to some opportunities.
This implies that if we leave the doors of the universities open to racial minorities, it
might not be adequate to get them to see college as a real option – that is, the society
has to provide the means for them to reach a level where they realize that they are
capable of making a better life for themselves. Education is one way to do so.
Each individual has the right to live in a society that does not degrade or
humiliate her or him. Social justice demands that one is not ashamed of one’s race,
does not suffer the threat of stereotypes and is not intellectually degraded. Stereotype
threat and self-shame thwarts one’s abilities to develop one’s capabilities, which in
my view is the violation of one’s rights.
                                                
360 The government keeps introducing new programs to help the people of color. However, these are
often symptom removers and do not really address the oppressive social structure. According to Sandra
Van Dyke, if we understand race theory and race within the social and historical perspective in the
United States, we are led towards “action that has sapped valuable energies and resources working on
fruitless programs.” We need to see the situation of races from an institutional perspective (See, Van
Dyke, “The Evaluation of Race Theory: A Perspective,” in Journal of Black Studies, vol. 24, no. 1,
September, 1993, p. 82-83). She further explains, “Little, if any, money is spent by public or private
agencies for economic development of create infrastructures within African communities that would be
self-sustaining and would allow for community development. Because of their deleterious effects on
African people, culturally, politically, and economically these theories cannot offer any viable hope for
liberation from the constant and continuing pressures of a racist society” (Van Dyke, p. 83).
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Rights as Weapons Against Racial Oppression
Skin color is used to rationalize all sorts of harms on a group of people. Harm
is violation of one’s capabilities. In my view, capabilities generate rights. Violation of
one’s development of capabilities is violation of one’s rights. Negative self-
stereotyping can and often does lead to not attempting to develop one’s capabilities. If
Hispanics really believe the stereotype that they are not capable of doing math, then
they will limit their life options. For instance, they will not choose majors in college
that requires them to pass Algebra. If they have the capability to do it, then they ought
to have the right to do so as well. One can have one’s rights violated (capabilities
destroyed), not only by physical force but also by years of “training.” Stereotyping
through media, poor education, lack of health care or other services, all in all, leads to
one’s negative self-image, and as I mentioned earlier, that is oppressive.
Stereotyping keeps people from developing their capabilities and in doing so
violates their rights. So, stereotyping violates one’s rights. For instance, if we have
the capability of having control over our political environment, which virtually all
people do, then we ought to have the right to effectively participate in “political
choices that govern one’ life [and have] the right of political participation, protection
of free speech and association.”361 In order to have these rights, we ought to educate
people and give the real options in the political realm. Blacks have not been given
this opportunity and in recent years there have been many examples of violation of
their rights. That is unjust.
                                                
361 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 80.
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We have the right not to be emotionally or physically violated. Humans are
beings with inherent value with full worth and dignity granted to each individual and
each individual deserves to live lives free from violence and abuse. Governments
ought to protect each citizen’s development of capabilities, which lead to human
flourishing.362 That would include the fight against individual’s violation of one’s
own rights. Through self-stereotyping, we can come to believe that we do not have
certain capabilities and consequently we do not aim at developing them. If so, then
(by my definition) we violate our own rights. Women who “volunteer” to undergo
female genital mutilation are violating their own rights that stem from the capability
of bodily integrity. There are numerous reasons why women “choose” to undergo the
procedure. One might self-stereotype, as her society does, and that is, uncircumcised
women are dirty and sexually promiscuous. In fear of both, they choose to have their
bodily integrity, or even health, violated. In doing so, they cause the violation of their
own rights. Governments cannot fight against all kinds of cultural practices, social
norms, or even religious practices. However, through adequate education, providing
information, and development of one’s capabilities to the threshold of functioning,
one would be less likely to make choices that violate, thwart, or destroy one’s own
capabilities and hence rights.
Beyond Rights
Most agree that all people deserve to enjoy their rights and have the right not
                                                
362 As mentioned, we ought not protect those capabilities who violate the liberty principle, although
violating others’ freedom and liberties might be some individual’s idea of a good life.
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to be unnecessarily harmed. However, having rights is not enough to overcome the
harms that oppression has caused on the mind of the oppressed and stop those who
are doing the oppressing. More needs to be done. Research has shown that although it
is true that stereotyping leads to domination of a group, stereotyping could also help
them out of the oppressive situation. Self-stereotyping can be the force that helps the
oppressed out of the domination of the power group but the matter is not so simple.
Reynolds, et al. write, “stereotyping process can work for social change and
resistance to domination just as much as it can contribute to the maintenance of such
domination. This is because stereotypes represent context-specific group identities
and the current goals and values of group members.”363 Groups can develop an inner-
group dynamic that helps them break out of their oppression.364 A great example of
this is the civil rights movement during the time of segregation. Blacks realized that
their oppressive situation is not going to change as long as they sit around and wait
for it. So, they took united action.  They encouraged one another to fight against their
oppression. Powerful role models such as Martin Luther King set great examples for
the people to follow in their fight. Virtually every member of that group, regardless of
gender, class, socio-economic status, or religion, stood in solidarity. They developed
a collective identity regardless of their individuality, which made their demands more
immediately heard.
Groups are more likely to take collective action when they see no hope for
                                                
363 Reynolds et. al., p. 277.
364 Although Reynolds et al., do not make the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
oppression, I believe their argument applies in both cases.
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their members to step up the social ladder or to get out of their oppressive situation.
The research done by Reynolds and her colleagues concluded,
In cases in which the group boundary was open [that is, if people from
the oppressed group could enter the world of the powerful], we
observed acceptance and stereotype reproduction. However, when the
boundaries were firmly closed [as it was during the segregation,
especially in the South], participants exhibited a preference for
collective protest that represented a strong challenge to the existing
status relationship, and this was backed up by creative negative
stereotyping of the out-group…. negative stereotypes of the powerful
group played some determining role in paving the way for social
change.365
This is an extraordinarily important research for diagnosing and understanding
oppression in our society and the psychological state of the oppressed minority
groups. There are two factors involved in maintaining oppression: (1) whether the
oppressed group sees the opportunity for moving from their oppressed situation to the
world of powerful; and (2) the stereotypes that the members of the oppressed group
collectively hold about the people in power. Both the oppressed and those doing the
oppression stereotype one another. I will explore (1) and (2), respectively.
(1) Can the oppressed change their situation and become real members of the
social elite class?366 As mentioned, currently, there are some minorities in political
position of power. According to Reynolds, when the oppressed see the boundaries of
the powerful penetrable, they generally do not collectively rebel against their own
oppression. There is certainly the appearance of inclusion and equality in our society.
The mainstream media, being also ran by the social elite, has made it virtually
                                                
365 Reynolds, et al., p. 284.
366 By “real” I mean not as a token but as a serious contributor.
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impossible for any dissenting view to be aired and so, many citizens are ill-informed
of the injustices that some racial minorities suffer. As a result, although we are far
from equality among the races in the United States, many people (even those who
belong to the racial minorities) are not aware of it. Again, the social stereotypes
against them, causes them to blame themselves for their shortcoming and lower social
status in the society.
Hurricane Katrina made government racism very clear to everyone who is
aware of the situation. For those of us who live in hurricane-prone cities we are aware
that our officials know what to do in order to prepare for the day the big one hits.
Because New Orleans sits below sea level, the danger of a disaster is much more than
other places. The government had allocated a substantial sum of money for fixing the
levees in order to prepare the city for the inevitable before the disaster hit. Only a
fraction of that budget was used. In a city where the majority (67%) is Black and 34%
live under the federal poverty line, there was not much interest in fixing the levees
and making an effective evacuation plan. The majority of White population of the city
evacuated but the poor Blacks who lacked transportation or funds, stayed behind and
gathered in the Superdome that quickly lost power after the hurricane and became a
tragedy of its own.367 Two years later, things have not changed as quickly as one
would have hoped. According to a report by Southern Studies, out of 116 billion
dollars set aside for Katrina, only “less than 30% has gone towards long-term
                                                
367 Lee Sustar, Katrina Exposes Racism, August 31, 2005. See:
www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8625
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rebuilding — and half of that 30% remains unspent.”368 How could this be, given
there are still victims who do not have permanent housing? New Orleans rates as one
of the worst in the area of criminal justice, public defense, and education; the murder
of Blacks is not given the attention it deserves, but that is not all; “In 2004, Louisiana
spent $96,713 to incarcerate each child in detention, and $4,724 to educate a child in
the public schools.369 Jordan Flaherty argues, “For poor Black kids growing up in
New Orleans, the education system functions as a school to prison pipeline.”370 After
all this, the fact remains that the Blacks in the Unites States are not a comprehensive
group. They, as a group, are not entirely convinced that their oppression is systematic
and planned. This plays a role in their reaction to their social status.
(2) People in disadvantaged positions in the society also stereotype those in
power. Unlike during the 1960’s, and perhaps before, many oppressed groups, such as
women, Blacks or Hispanics are not convinced that the government treats them as
second-class citizens. Some of which might be the result of classism. Some of those
belonging to the oppressed group side with the offenders and by doing so divide their
group. For instance, people like Justice Thomas, or Secretary Rice, do not belong to a
world where many disadvantaged Blacks live. Perhaps there was a time or a place
where they experienced poverty, but they no longer belong there. Their loyalties do
not appear to be with the people of their race and improving their situation but rather,
they have a more personal and political agenda. They do their best to assimilate into
                                                
368 Jordan Flaherty, Two Years Post-Katrina: Racism and Criminal Justice in New Orleans, August
30th, 2007. See: www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=13655.
369 Ibid.
370 Ibid.
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the wealthy White social elite and distance themselves from Blacks, their problems,
and their issues. Division within a group often leads to less power in that group which
causes slow or little progress or they will quickly face backlash against the progress
already made.371 Regardless, the way the oppressed stereotype those in positions of
power have a lot to do with whether they would act against their own oppression. For
instance, as long as women believe that those in power are not against their
advancement in society, they will not collectively act to end their oppression. Blacks
in the United States are not entirely convinced that their oppression is intentional,
planned, and systematic. So, the second criterion for collective social change is not
met. Consequently, they do not collectively act in order to end their oppression.
The road to ending racism and racial oppression is a bumpy one. Martin
Luther King said that people in power will not give up their powers if not
challenged.372 As mentioned, more often than not, racial minority leaders do not
challenge the system but rather they assimilate to gain access to power.373 Appointed
U.S. public officials such as Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Alberto Gonzalez, and
Clarence Thomas are prime examples. They hold high offices and create an illusion
of equality: one that is comforting to the privileged groups, but dangerous and
damaging to the oppressed. A society in the grips of these illusions ignores its very
real problems with racism. Consequently, we minimize the horrible conditions under
                                                
371 We saw the division in the feminist movement by women siding with their men in issues that
distracted them from their real goals. Also division between women of different races led to the halt of
the feminist movement.
372 Martin Luther King, Jr. Why We Can’t Wait (New York, Penguin Group, 2000), p. 68.
373 Further, Cudd reminds us collaborating with the oppressors is not resisting oppression. The kind of
collaboration with its long-term goals must be considered. Therefore, short-term collaboration might
be an essential part of long-term resistance. Analyzing Oppression, p. 191-192.
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which they live and overlook the social problems that place people in disadvantaged
positions. Instead of fixing the system, we ridicule, stereotype and blame the
victims.374
There are a few things we can do in order to end racial oppression. The harms
of segregation, violence, stereotyping, and economic oppression have been grave. The
situation can be changed but it will require much attention. Big inner city schools are
mostly segregated and the students receive a poor education. If we are to overcome
the effects of self-stereotyping, it is not enough to stop the social stereotypes. Serious
intervention needs to be done in order to get individual’s capabilities to the threshold
of functioning so all individuals could enjoy their rights. Both gender and racial
socialization start at a very young age. We are taught our roles, which to some extent
define the way we self-identify and realize our abilities or their lack. Therefore, if we
are to counter the negative stereotypes in our society, we ought to start with children
when they are very young. In order to do this, we ought to take the education of racial
minority children seriously and fund their schools better. Education that is based on
local economies (local property taxes) might not be enough. It only perpetuates
inequalities in capabilities development – poor communities do poorly here, rich
                                                
374 Van Dyke points out, “following the Reagan and Bush years, American society is back to blaming
the victim as an explanation of inequality…. The race problem does not lie in the characteristics of
Africans [Blacks], but in the nature of America society” (p. 78). As the quote suggests, blaming a
victim happens when people in the disadvantaged positions are held responsible for their misfortunes
without looking at the way the situation is structured to keep them in their position. For instance, when
a physically abusive man blames the woman for not doing X or Y to make him have to hit her. This is
blaming the victim. For more discussion of blaming the victim, see William Ryan, Blaming the Victim
(New York: Vintage Publishers, 1976).
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communities do much better.375 More resources should be allocated to encourage
minorities’ college attendance.
One of the fastest ways that stereotypes are perpetuated is through mass
media. There ought to be more effective formal and legal venues through which the
media’s negative stereotyping can be effectively challenged. When the social elite
controls the media, as they do in the Unites States, it only makes sense that they
protect their own status quo. For instance, generally speaking, the citizens of the
United States trust that there are no really harmful conspiracies in the government.
That is to say, we trust our government. We like to continue this trust and the
government is interested to keep the trust of the citizens. However, this trust is not
entirely founded. Politicians do often act immorally or even unconstitutionally, but
that often goes unheard, especially if injustices are committed against an oppressed
group. For instance, there is some evidence that Blacks, in some places, were unjustly
kept from voting, in one way or another, both during 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections.376 However, the mainstream media did not cover any of them. Those who
attempted to bring this to light were victim of negative stereotypes and quieted down.
The people who were kept from voting had their capability of political affiliation
violated, but it does not end here. Once they are not represented, then their interests
are also not represented and their situation will, for the most parts, remains
                                                
375 What might be done is to fully nationalize the distribution of funds and the conduct of public
education.
376 For the year 2000 presidential elections see http://unprecedented.org/unprecedentedfirstpage.html
and “Voting Irregularities in Florida during 2000 Presidential Elections, “ a report by United States
Commission on Civil Rights (6/2001). For 2004 problems see Deborah White, “Democracy & Voting
– Ohio 2004 as Lesson in What Can Go Wrong,” in
http://usliberals.about.com/od/electionreform/a/votingrights1.htm?p=1,  (June 7, 2006).
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unchanged. In short, the media plays a huge role in the way we stereotype others or
self-stereotype ourselves. The harms that it causes has to be countered, minimized,
and fought against.
Our fight to end oppression ought to, not only target the future citizens, but
also the children, or adults who are negatively affected by racism and stereotype
threats right now. I suggest, difficult as it might seem, we, as a society, ought to aim
at reversing the stereotypes and reconstruct capabilities that have been damaged. The
restoration of undermined capabilities is our critical task here. Figures such as Martin
Luther King play key roles and are still essential in starting the movement in peaceful
but radical ways. Groups that aim to empower the oppressed, for instance, “Black
Power” groups should enjoy public support, not dismissed and labeled “domestic
terrorists.” Education is not a panacea, but it remains our most solidly established
institutional force for restoration. Black history month is an example of what has been
done in order to reverse the stereotypes against Blacks. While this effort is important,
I believe it does not have as much power as one might hope, nor do the events have
much audience outside of the Black race, mainly because of the very historical or
even current segregation it aims to challenge. An educational approach that derived
from the oppressed communities and their experience is what is required. Not a
“balance” calculated to shelter white sensibilities, but an open pedagogy of the
oppressed ought to be developed. In his book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo
Freire argues,
The oppressor elaborates his theory of action without the people, for
he stands against them. Nor can the people—as long as they are
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crushed and oppressed, internalizing the image of the
oppressor—construct by themselves the theory of their liberating
action. Only in the encounter of the people with the revolutionary
leader—in their communion, in their praxis—can this theory [a theory
of action] be built.377
Hence, revolutionary minority leaders as well as federal support are essential
ingredient to ending oppression.
We must ask what can be done to make people’s motivations independent of
their negative racial identity and help people to develop into strong and ambitious
individuals? We ought to re-build people’s capabilities that have been destroyed and
aim to get everyone to the threshold level of functioning, both mentally and
physically. This is not an impossible task. In his book, Learned Optimism, Martin
Seligman explains the psychology behind optimistic and pessimistic attitudes and
expectations.378 These are the attitudes and expectations that can keep people in their
oppressive situations. A more positive perception of self would open many
possibilities for an individual who might not be there otherwise. I should note that I
am not reducing the oppression of racial minorities to an “attitude problem” but
rather, if we are to stop racial oppression, it is critical that we undermine the patterns
of thought and feeling that produce voluntary oppression. Reducing oppressive
patterns of thoughts would be an obvious first step. Only then will we have a
reasonable chance in making progress towards ending the oppression of racial
minorities.
                                                
377 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th Anniversary Edition, translated by Myra Bergman
Ramos (New York: Continuum, 2007), p. 183.
378 Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Optimism (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1990).
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